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THE ANALOGY

OF

NATURAL AND REVEALED RELIGION

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THE

PHILOSOPHY OF REVELATION

OR

THE ANALOGY

OF

NATURAL AND REVEALED RELIGION

A FRAGMENT

A NEW THEORY OF ETHICS

111762

BY THE LATE THOMAS FREWEN, ESQ.
OF BRICKWALL, SUSSEX

'Thy judgments are a great deep'
'How unsearchable are His judgments'

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1873

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EDITOR'S PREFACE.

THE following pages are (with a few verbal corrections) presented to the public as they were left by their author at his death.

This fact must serve as an apology for the manifest incompleteness of the work as a whole. It lacks, in truth, the final revision and adjustment, which none but the author himself could have properly provided.

Subjected to years of intense suffering by a severe nervous disease, he yet maintained his mental vigour unimpaired, and found one great solace in discussing abstract questions such as are here treated of.

The manuscript is published with the double hope that to some minds the argument may present a clearer view of Man's Fall and Man's Redemption; and that, if perchance it falls into the hands of one similarly afflicted, he may be reminded that the invalid has yet his solace and resort, and may yet take part in the great work which God has appointed man to carry out.

AUTHOR'S PREFACE.

THE following work (as its title indicates) is so far philosophical in character as to be adapted only for the study of Philosophers, or men of deep thought, and not at all suited to the general reader. Subjects adverted to in Scripture, in reference to morals and to the sexes, are here necessarily discussed, thus rendering portions of the book undesirable for the perusal of women, who indeed had better not trouble themselves with philosophical speculations.

The work may be denominated, and correctly described, as Rationalism under a new phase; for it is, in fact, nothing else but an application of Reason to Revelation, or a rationalistic examination and comparison of the deductions of Man's *moral* and *intellectual faculties* with *Scripture*.

By this means an elaborate system is detected and developed in the latter, hitherto unrecognised by divines, but which exhibits in a much stronger light those great Cardinal Doctrines by which the Christian Religion is characterised.

Let no one be scandalised at the term Rationalism, as though Reason when applied to Religion had a tendency to produce Infidelity. So far from this, Revealed Truth comes out from the examination with all its peculiar and prominent doctrines confirmed and

strengthened, though exhibited with a diversity of aspect from that usually entertained; and the author of this work looks confidently forward to the time (not far distant) when Reason will be recognised as a chief support and bulwark of Revelation.

For when the Creator conferred upon men those powerful intellects, which exalt them immeasurably above other animals, He set before them, as subjects for investigation, this entire creation, both material and spiritual. Nor did he make Revealed Truth any exception to this unlimited grant. We are, therefore, entitled to expect, that as time rolls on, and additional scientific discoveries are continually being made in respect to the material creation, so also that Scripture will afford to the diligent Christian Student increased religious light and knowledge; and that the obscurity and mystery attaching to parts of it, and to particular doctrines, will be dispelled by a more perfect understanding of the sacred volume.

The times in which we live are characterised by a restless desire to know more upon all subjects than was known by our forefathers. This increased activity of mind, and enlarged appetite for knowledge, have produced great results. Within the last century several new sciences have sprung up, quite unknown before, and great additional discoveries have been made in the older ones, thereby producing effects which have well-nigh changed the face of large districts of country, as well as afforded much new matter for man's thought and investigation.

It is only natural, therefore, that this avidity for increased knowledge should have extended itself to Scripture, and that the human intellect should have exercised itself on Revelation with a determination to

make new discoveries;—a legitimate and laudable endeavour, and one enjoined on us by God Himself. Nevertheless, Rationalism has acquired a bad reputation, but chiefly from the three following causes:—

1stly. Man has undertaken the search in his own strength; whereas if every good and perfect gift is from above, then, surely, *Religious* and *Revealed Truth*, the most important of all knowledges, is especially to be sought in an abnegation of his own powers, and a reliance on the aid of the Holy Spirit.

2ndly. Man has entered upon the subject with a degree of proud self-sufficiency and reliance on *Reason*, not remembering with David, that it is 'the meek He will guide in judgment.'

3rdly. The search has been undertaken by man with strong preconceived notions: he has made erroneous decisions of his versatile *Moral faculty* (a most dangerous and unsafe guide, as will hereafter appear) his rule, and has determined to make Scripture conform to this, rejecting at the same time all such doctrines as cannot be forced into compliance with it.

Hence it has come to pass that Rationalism and Neology (two good things in themselves, the *former* being a mere application of Reason to Religion, whereby the truth of Christianity is strongly confirmed, and the latter *New Doctrine* highly auxiliary to the *Old*) have grown (and very justly so from the way in which they have been misused) to be looked upon as mere modifications of Infidelity, or as Scepticism under a new phase.

In the following work the author indulges in the hope that he has vindicated *Rationalism* and *Neology* from the *odium* hitherto attaching to them, and at the same time confirmed the doctrines of Revelation, and

established Scripture on a firmer basis, simply by a clearer exhibition of its own inherent, undeniable Truth.

Two defects in the work, as a literary composition, the author freely admits—viz., first, that there is occasionally too much repetition, the same thing being said twice over here and there with but slight variation of terms or expressions. He considered, however, that as his speculations were entirely novel in character, it was far better to err on the side of redundancy, and say too much, than to be too concise in the exhibition of a new scheme of thought; and even the inconsiderable variation in terms often placed the ideas in a stronger light, and rendered the argument more conclusive.

Secondly. The work would appear to be too much encumbered with foot-notes, which in places nearly monopolise successive pages to the exclusion of the text. These notes, which are either detached observations or short distinct essays, contain often more important matter than the text itself, to which they are appendages, and with which text it was found impossible to incorporate them without destroying the clearness of the main argument. They were all of them, more or less, composed subsequently to the section to which they refer, which must have been broken up and re-composed had the attempt been made to introduce any of them, and this would have been a labour far too great for a mere improvement in literary composition.

Whatever may be thought of the theological system contended for in this work, one thing will doubtless be admitted—viz., that the subject of theology requires a greater precision of language, better defined terms, and nicer distinctions than it has hitherto received; in

order to produce which, more correct and definite ideas, the basis of all scientific language, are essential.

This work is probably a first attempt to consider Theology, together with its kindred subject, Moral Philosophy, as constituting one distinct science, from their possessing in common a system to be discovered only by the two conjointly; and, being thus treated philosophically, the author has endeavoured to introduce into each more correct and definite ideas, and consequently better defined terms and a greater precision of language, than have been hitherto employed. He has satisfied himself that the great doctrines of the Christian Religion, which are usually regarded as mere objects of faith, are likewise the undeniable deductions of reason. That they equally admit of analysis and investigation with all other truths. That theology constitutes a science in no degree inferior or less philosophical than other sciences. That God's Book of Revelation may be read and examined by the light of reason with as much benefit as his work of Creation. So that reason comes in as auxiliary in the highest degree to faith in the Christian, and even exacts assent to the truths of Revelation from the mere sceptical philosopher. And as religion is the most important, as well as the sublimest subject, that can occupy the thoughts or engage the attention of any created being, a subject which the angels desire to look into, so he who has anything to offer, likely in the slightest degree either to elucidate or to confirm its unsearchable and mysterious, yet invaluable doctrines, can never be justified in withholding it from mankind.

THE

PHILOSOPHY OF REVELATION.

INTRODUCTION.

TOWARDS the close of the sixteenth century, Lord Bacon, whose powerful intellect by a sort of Intuition and with scarcely any intermediate process of Reasoning, apprehended Truth, in the variety of subjects which he investigated, more correctly on the whole than has since been done, indited the following passage, which is extracted from his Essay on the Interpretation of Nature:—

'Behold, it was not that pure light of natural knowledge, whereby man in Paradise was able to give unto every living creature a name according to his propriety, which gave occasion to the Fall; but it was an aspiring desire to attain to that part of *Moral knowledge* which defineth of Good and Evil, whereby to dispute God's commandments, and not to depend upon the revelation of His will, which was the original temptation.'

The importance, as well as the correctness, of this view of the Fall of Man, appears to have impressed the mind of the great Philosopher so forcibly, that he repeated it in a more concise and distinct form, but nearly in the same words, in a subsequent Essay, thus:

'He (Bacon) considered that the knowledge of Nature, by the light whereof man discerned of every living creature, and imposed names according to their pro-

priety, was not the occasion of the Fall ; but the Moral knowledge of Good and Evil, affected to the end to depend no more on God's commandments, but for man to direct himself.'[1]

In these two remarkable passages, the following positions are distinctly laid down, viz.:

1st. That Adam by creation possessed an Intellect of the very highest order, for so extensive and correct was his knowledge or perception of nature that 'he discerned of every living creature, and imposed names according to their propriety:' in other words he was the greatest Naturalist that has ever appeared.

2ndly. That though possessing this highest Intellect, he was totally devoid of a Moral Sense, called by Bacon the Moral knowledge of Good and Evil, for it is only by means of an inherent Moral Sense that Man could either acquire or retain any Moral knowledge of Good and Evil; for without a Moral Sense Man is unable to estimate or take cognizance of Moral distinctions; so that he was ignorant of Right and Wrong, and therefore was not a Moral agent, or responsible to a Moral Law.

3rdly. That in the absence of a Moral Sense or Faculty to direct him, he depended upon God's commandments and on the *revelation* of God's will as his rule of Right and Wrong upon all Moral questions.

4thly. That the possession by a Man of a Moral

[1] *Filum Labyrinthi.* The latter half of these two passages, though in a somewhat different form, Bacon reiterates also, in his 'Confession of Faith,' where he states 'that God gave man in Paradise a law and commandment which was in his power to keep, but he kept it not ; that man made a total *defection* from God, presuming to imagine that the commandments and prohibitions of God were not the Rules of Good and Evil' (*i.e.*, Right and Wrong), 'but that Good and Evil had their own principles and beginnings ; and man lusted after the knowledge of those imagined beginnings, to the end to depend no more upon God's will revealed, but upon himself, and on his own light as a God.'—Bacon's 'Confession of Faith.'

sense, *i.e.*, such a Moral knowledge as defineth of or distinguisheth between Good and Evil, would render him independent of God on all questions of Right and Wrong, and cause him to exercise a judgment and decision of his own on such subjects.

5thly. That man's fall was occasioned by his acquiring this Moral Sense or Moral knowledge of Good and Evil, which rendered him a Moral agent.

6thly. That man's inducement to aspire after or desire this Moral Sense, was that he might dispute God's commandments, and depend no more upon the revelation of His will as his rule of Right and Wrong, but be enabled to direct himself.

Such is the view taken by that great intellectual luminary, Bacon, respecting the Fall of Man, as described in the early part of Genesis. Nearly three centuries have passed away since these two passages were written, yet they have remained unnoticed or neglected; nor does any author appear to have set himself seriously to inquire into the great Philosopher's meaning, or to have entered upon the question as to *how* or *in what manner* a knowledge of Right and Wrong could have given rise to the Fall and brought ruin upon Mankind. Nay more, even that portion of Scripture to which these passages relate, has continued either altogether unexplained, or if any explanation has been attempted, it is thoroughly unsatisfactory; and the narrative is regarded by many Theologians as too obscure to deserve much attention, and by some, as merely allegorical, and not at all a statement of historical facts.[1] Nevertheless in this description of the Fall, so correctly epitomized by Bacon, is involved nearly the whole sum and substance of those two most important subjects to Mankind, on which his everlasting wel-

[1] Bishop Stock, of Waterford, to wit.

fare as well as his temporal interest hinges—Divine Revelation and Moral Philosophy. In fact these six propositions, if rightly understood in all their bearings, and in their inevitable results, furnish the correct key to the chief difficulties of the Scriptural account of man's fall, and of God's scheme of Salvation for him on the one hand, and for setting forth Moral Philosophy upon a new and intelligible basis on the other.

Moral Philosophy has hitherto been treated of by Moralists in general, as a Science whose aim and object is to analyse or investigate the nature of Moral Principles and of Moral Obligation on the one hand, and then by this means to ascertain or determine the Moral character of man's various thoughts and actions on the other. Viewed in this erroneous light, it is an impracticable Science, aiming at impossibilities, and thus giving rise to many monstrous conclusions. Moral Right is a Simple Idea or Ultimate Fact, admitting of no analysis or examination, and man's natural Moral Sense, being finite, is too imperfect and versatile a Faculty in itself to enable him correctly to estimate Moral distinctions, which are based upon and arise out of an infinite attribute of God. Every Science rests upon certain Ultimate Facts or Elements which are incapable of analysis, and any attempt to investigate the nature of these Prime Truths,[1] or to resolve them into further Elements, invariably confounds the Human Intellect, and produces error. Of this Moral Philosophy furnishes a most remarkable illustration; for even men of superior mental powers, and able writers on other subjects, have nevertheless by endeavouring to push analysis beyond its due limits, completely stultified themselves when treating upon Morals. Three instances, out of

[1] In arguing *a posteriori*—*i.e.*, from Effect up to Cause—the last Cause arrived at is an Ultimate Fact; conversely, in reasoning *a priori*, from Cause down to Effect, the first Principle,—*i.e.*, Cause commenced from, is a Prime Truth: thus, Ultimate Fact is identical with Prime Truth in the two opposite modes of reasoning.

many that might be adduced, will suffice as exemplifying the correctness of this remark.

David Hume, the Philosopher and Historian—a man of whom there is no reason to suppose that he had either destroyed or impaired his Moral Faculty by a licentious life, for he does not appear to have been a licentious man in his conduct, though eminently so in his Philosophical Speculations,—in his Inquiry concerning the Principles of Morals, when discussing the Morality of Human actions, arrives at the outrageous conclusions, 'that Adultery must be practised, if men would obtain all the advantages of Life:—that if generally practised it would in time cease to be scandalous; and if practised secretly and frequently it would by degrees come to be looked upon as no crime at all!' So much for the Morality advocated by this celebrated Infidel.[1]

Samuel Johnson, LL.D., usually denominated the Great Moralist, whose name it would be a gross injus-

[1] In answer to Hume (if it is worth while replying to such a proposition at all), it may be urged, that the practice of Adultery must effectually destroy all paternal affection, by placing in doubt the paternity of the offspring; and, therefore, also that the reciprocal filial affection towards the father would be seriously compromised if not entirely got rid of, from the absence of paternal love; also, that marriage would become a solemn farce or perfectly unmeaning form, if its chief element, which consists in mutual conjugal fidelity, was disregarded or set at nought.

Hume, whose admiration of the Greeks was excessive, has evidently borrowed his idea about Adultery generally practised from Plato's 'Model Republic,' in which it is insisted that all the women of the State should be possessed and used in common, marriage being utterly abrogated. Plato also contends that neither parents nor children were to know each other, so that parental and filial love would, of course, be impossible.

[The statement in the text is taken from 'A letter to Adam Smith, on the life, death, and philosophy of his friend David Hume, Esq., by one of the people called Christians.' This letter was published at Oxford, 1777. It was written by George Horne, afterwards Bishop of Norwich, but was published anonymously. Appended to the letter is a Postscript containing a 'short but comprehensive summary of Mr. Hume's philosophical system, drawn up by a learned gentleman, for his amusement.' It is in this Postscript that the words in inverted commas occur.

I have been unable to discover any trace of either the words or the principles here attributed to Hume. His mature judgment on these questions was certainly very different. See in particular Essay XVIII. 'On Polygamy and Divorces.'—ED.]

tice to associate with that of the Infidel Hume, and who was in many respects both a great and good man, is however scarcely less absurd than Hume in his opinions. With respect to adultery he considers, that confusion of progeny constitutes the essence of the fault; and therefore pronounces the adultery of a husband an offence of so very trivial a kind, that a wife should never be allowed to leave him on account of it; whereas a wife's adultery he regards as a most heinous crime, being likely to confuse the race by introducing spurious offspring into a family! Strange, and melancholy, that such a man could not have seen that the Moral character of an action was something absolute, and not dependent on its consequences, and therefore, that in the case of adultery, both sexes must be equally guilty.

Dr. Paley likewise advocates the Utilitarian Theory of Morals, and contends that because a particular course is *expedient*, *i.e.*, generally advantageous, therefore it is right; thus degrading absolute Moral Right from its independence and priority over all things, and making it subordinate and secondary, and dependent upon expediency; on this principle, Paley would be compelled to coincide in Dr. Johnson's conclusion, that adultery was wrong, not absolutely, but in proportion as it was inexpedient, and disadvantageous in its consequences.[1]

[1] Paley, and the advocates of the Utilitarian Theory of Morals, have merely adopted the views of Plato and of the Stoics, and of Plutarch and other Greek philosophers who resolved all virtue or Moral Right into what was useful and beneficial: *κάλλιστα γὰρ δὴ τοῦτο καὶ λέγεται καὶ λελέξεται ὅτι τὸ μὲν ὠ ἑλιμον καλόν, τὸ δὲ βλαβερὸν αἰσχρόν.* Plato de Rep. 5, p. 457 B.: *καλὸν τῶν βλαβερῶν οὐδὲν* says Plutarch. *Φασὶν οὖν οἱ Στωικοὶ ἀγαθὸν εἶναι ὠφέλειαν, ἢ οὐκ ἑτέραν ὠφελείας, ὠφελεῖν μὲν λέγοντες τὴν ἀρετὴν καὶ τὴν σπουδαίαν πρᾶξιν.* Sext. Empiricus, lib. iii. ch. xx.

How strange, that a Christian divine enjoying the blaze of Gospel light in the eighteenth century, should have been driven to borrow his principles of Right and Wrong from philosophers living under Pagan darkness two thousand years before, whose works were too foul and abominable to be perused by any person of decent mind! See Plato's 'Symposium.'

In each of these three cases, the attempt is made to look upon Moral Right, not, as it is in fact, a Prime Truth or Simple Idea which man's Intellect must concede, but cannot analyse or examine, but as secondary, and therefore resolvable into some prior element by the Discursive Faculty. Hume would resolve Moral Right, in this particular instance, into sensual gratification, or the indiscriminate and unregulated indulgence of the sexual appetite, and thus approve of, and advocate clandestine adultery. Johnson's idea of Morals is, that they are mainly dependent on the advantage or disadvantage accompanying them, and therefore pronounces adultery a trifling offence in one sex, and a crime in the other. Paley, acting on a similar principle, refers the Moral character of any action to its expediency, *i.e.*, its generally beneficial consequences, and would thus be driven to Johnson's conclusion.[1]

Now these and many other such absurdities, which are an outrage upon man's corrected and well regulated Moral perceptions, would have been obviated, had the Authors merely asked themselves the question,—What is the ultimate Standard of all Moral Right and Wrong? To which question there can be but one answer, viz., the ultimate and only Standard of Right and Wrong, is the Holiness or Moral perfection of the Creator of all things, and therefore an attribute of the Supreme Being, which like all His other attributes must be infinite, in order to be consistent with His infinite nature. All Right and Wrong must have reference to this ultimate Standard, and be judged of by, or according to it. Of this Moral Standard or Holiness, man can know nothing whatever, except by a Divine revelation; and

'It is a shame even to speak of those things which are done of them in secret.'

[Plato was no Utilitarian. See the 'Philebus,' where the *summum bonum* is fully discussed. For the character of the 'Symposium,' see introduction to dialogue in Jowett's translation.—Ed.]

[1] Can a more striking illustration of the Apostle's words be any where met with, '*φάσκοντες εἶναι σοφοὶ ἐμωράνθησαν.*'

therefore for man's Intellect to endeavour to analyse or investigate the nature of Moral Principles, is an endeavour by the creature to deliberate upon and examine into the nature of the Creator; an attempt on the part of the Finite, to grasp and to comprehend the Infinite and Incomprehensible, and such an attempt can only recoil upon its author, and issue in nothing else than in confounding and stultifying him, and giving rise to absurdities similar to those above cited.

Hence then the three questions—What is it that is Right? Why is it Right? and, Why am I bound to do what is Right?—questions which it has hitherto been regarded as the peculiar province of Moral Philosophy to find answers to, and as constituting the basis of the Science—ought never to have been propounded; for from the very nature of the case, they never can be satisfactorily or correctly solved by man's mental powers when unassisted by a Divine Revelation.

In reference to the *first*, What is it that is Right?—the entire history of the world evidences beyond a doubt that Mankind possesses no definite or clear notions on the subject, but on the contrary has universally, in a greater or less degree, mistaken Wrong for Right (see this accounted for hereafter, Sec. 16, the Versatility of the Moral Sense), seeing that every Vice which degrades and disgraces human nature, has at some period or in some particular nation been recognised either as a Moral Virtue or a Religious duty, and practised as such.[1]

[1] *E.g.*, Suicide was inculcated by the Stoics; incest or marriage between a brother and sister was sanctioned by the laws of Athens, and generally practised; pæderasty was forbidden to slaves as an act of too great dignity for such mean persons by Solon's law, and it was recommended by Plato as a source of friendship, sympathy, mutual attachment, and fidelity; murder is even now practised as a religious duty by the Thugs in India; fornication and adultery became a religious rite practised in her honour by the worshippers of Venus; and theft or fraud not less so under the patronage of Mercury; also the Athenians, acting under a sense of duty, murdered their infants by exposing them, to prevent them from suffering poverty (Hume, Vol. II., p. 389); and Plato, in his ideal Model Republic, abro-

With respect to the *second*, Why is an action Right? —the only answer Moralists have been able to find during 2,000 years from Plato to Paley is—the now justly exploded one—Because it is expedient.

And in the case of the *third*, viz., the nature of Moral Obligation, the universal consent of mankind has evaded the question, by transforming the Obligation into a Religious one, for some fictitious Deity has been invented to whose will such Obligation has been attributed.[1]

But though the nature of Right and Wrong, and of Moral Obligation, must therefore of necessity ever remain a mystery to man, for they constitute Ultimate Facts which his Reason must concede, but cannot examine or analyse, yet nevertheless by admitting this Prime Truth as a basis—viz.: that Moral Right has reference to, and originates in an attribute of God—and by arguing—*not respecting it,—but in connexion with it*, a large amount of most important knowledge is disclosed.

The entire Creation may be classed under two heads,

gates marriage, and advocates the community of women as an eminently *advantageous* (and, therefore, according to his principles, moral) course of proceeding. All these enormities and fearful abominations have been practised by mankind under the belief that they were Right, being regarded either as moral duties or religious observances.

[The marriage of brothers and sisters was allowed at Athens in the case of their not being ὁμομήτριοι or uterine; but there is strong reason to conclude that, except in the very earliest periods, such marriages were condemned. See Becker's 'Charicles,' p. 478. For Plato's views on παιδεραστία, consult 'Rep.' bk. iii. p. 403; 'Leges,' bk. viii. p. 841; see also Grote's 'Plato,' vol. iv. p. 389. On Plato's 'Community of Women,' see Jowett's 'Plato,' vol. ii. pp. 140 and 145. On Suicide, see Lecky's 'History of European Morals,' vol. i. p. 223.—Ed.]

[1] The truth of our position that all Moral Right originates in and has reference to the moral perfection of God, is here very remarkably confirmed; for this doctrine appears to be so indelibly engrained in man's Moral Constitution, that even when he has lost all knowledge of the true God, and his Moral Sense also has become inverted (Sec. 16), he is, nevertheless, unable to divest himself of this truth, and, therefore, invents a fictitious deity, whose moral attribute (his standard of Right), he makes to correspond in its character with the particular vices which he practises as virtues. (See forward, pp. 126, 127.)

viz., The Material World, and the Spiritual: the former comprises everything that man is acquainted with by means of his Physical senses, and it is to this class that human knowledge principally relates. Every science which has arrived at any degree of perfection, has reference to the Material Creation; for even Pure Mathematics, which is either the Parent or Auxiliary of almost all science, and which treats of Quantity in the abstract, has its origin in the Idea of Quantity in general, which the human mind has formed by means of its bodily senses.

Now, in the case of the Material World—where to the uninformed mind of Man all appears confusion and irregularity—no sooner has ignorance given place to knowledge, than all displays system, regularity and order. In Astronomy, for instance, the motions of the heavenly bodies were for ages an enigma and perplexity, and presented nothing but inexplicable difficulty: yet no sooner had Newton discovered the principle of gravitation and applied it, than the most perfect and systematic order and regularity were detected in all their movements; so much so, that even the apparent irregularities are no contradiction to, but actually an exemplification of his newly-discovered principle; for the deflection of the planets from their respective orbits through their reciprocal attraction for each other, and their consequent variations in the periods of completing their revolutions, are the result of, and in strict obedience to, the law of gravitation, and demonstrate the perfection of the system in which they are mutually connected together. Then again in Geology—the crust of the earth, which to the uninformed mind presents nothing but confusion and disorder, has been ascertained to consist of vast beds, deposited upon each other in a consistent series, and at distinct chronological periods, and manifesting a very perfect, systematic arrangement in the positions which they occupy

with respect to each other. And the same holds good in the case of all other sciences. If then, throughout the Material World, it is evident that in reality all is harmonious connection, system and order, and that man's ignorance alone had given rise to the contrary supposition, there is very strong reason to infer, *prima facie*, that it is precisely the same in the case of the Spiritual World ; and that an equally perfect system prevails both in Metaphysics,—the science of Mind—and in Moral Philosophy, which, however, through man's ignorance of these subjects, has not hitherto been detected.

Philosophy is that process of the mind through which man, by first investigating the general laws of Nature, *analytically*, and afterwards by reasoning from them *synthetically*, can usually trace an established order, where a mere observer of facts would perceive nothing but irregularity and confusion. This method of Philosophising has hitherto been chiefly limited in its application to the Material World ; but by applying it to the subject of morals, *i.e.*, by laying down as a basis, certain Prime Truths or Axioms, which do not admit of analysis or examination, but which extort the assent, either of man's Moral Sense, or of his intellectual powers, and then by reasoning from, and in connection with, these axioms, a very perfect system is at once developed ; each result as it is obtained becomes the immediate and inevitable parent of a further result ; and thus a chain of reasoning, in which each link is the *effect* of the preceding, and the *cause* of the succeeding one, forces itself upon man's convictions. This system thus obtained may be denominated by way of distinction, the Moral System.

But inasmuch as Moral Philosophy and Divine Revelation, each of them treat upon one and the same subject, viz. Moral Right and Wrong in their origin and their consequences—the former limiting itself to

that knowledge of the subject which can be acquired by means of man's unassisted mental powers, while the latter discloses all that the Deity has seen fit to make known respecting it, through direct inspiration—and inasmuch as all Truth must of necessity be consistent with itself—there arises a *prima facie* inference, in the highest degree probable, viz.: That the knowledge acquired through the first, will correspond closely with that obtained by means of the second; that the subject being the same, these two methods of dealing with it,—even though so widely differing from each other—will nevertheless in their results exhibit strongly marked features in common, and a very general resemblance the one to the other. And this inference is fully realised upon investigation; for by comparing the Moral System just described with Scripture, a very perfect and highly philosophical system is at once detected in the latter, though it has hitherto been entirely overlooked by Divines. The two systems coincide in the minutest particulars, exhibiting a very complete analogy; they commence at one and the same principle, run parallel to each other with the strictest correspondence, and terminate at the same conclusion; wherever a difficulty presents itself in the one, it is either removed or elucidated by referring to the corresponding link in the other. So entirely are these two systems identified, that it appears impossible to overthrow the one, except by getting rid of the other along with it, so that both must of necessity either stand or fall together. The system displayed in Scripture, which may be denominated the Revealed System, has, however, a superiority in many respects over the Moral, being more full and comprehensive, and disclosing to mankind very much that he never could have arrived at by means of his unassisted mental powers; for in fact, the Revealed System not only coincides exactly with the Moral, but Revelation in addition furnishes the

historical information necessary to illustrate and exemplify the Theoretical deductions common to both systems.

The following outline is divided into three parts :

Part I. contains the Moral System. In developing and exhibiting it, all reference to Scripture has been rigidly excluded : the argument is strictly limited to such knowledge as can be obtained by means of man's unassisted mental faculties, and might have been conducted equally well by a person who had never heard of a Divine Revelation.

Part II. is supplemental to Part I., and is an examination of the Animal Kingdom, including mankind, to ascertain how far it furnishes any exemplification of the Theory contained in Part I. : this examination is also conducted without reference to Revelation.

Part III. is the Revealed System, which is obtained by means of an exact and careful comparison of the Moral System with Scripture. If any person has been compelled by his mental powers to admit the correctness of the former system, he will scarcely be able, however sceptical, to withhold his assent from the latter, which is contained in and pervades generally the entire Canon of Revelation ; so closely do these two systems harmonise, and so effectually do they sustain each other.

Before entering on the work itself, the three following Postulates must be conceded, viz. :—

1st.—With reference to Holiness. The word holy is occasionally applied in Scripture to inanimate matter, 'holy ground,' 'holy oil,' 'holy garments,' 'holy things,' &c. ; when so used, its meaning must be totally different from the sense it bears in the phrase, 'Holy God,' 'holy angels,' &c., for holiness, strictly speaking, is moral excellence, which is either an attribute of the Deity, or a

quality of mind or spirit; and to apply this adjective 'holy' in its strict sense to anything purely material is incorrect and illogical: for matter is utterly incapable of any Moral qualities whatever, whether good or evil; such qualities are the exclusive property of Mind or Spirit, and could not attach themselves to, or subsist in any purely material subject. Throughout the following Work, it must be understood that 'holiness,' or 'holy,' and its converse Moral Quality, Sin or Sinfulness, is always used in the latter and more correct sense, as having reference to the Moral character, either of the Supreme, or of a rational and Spiritual Being, and never in the former.

2nd.—With reference to a Moral Faculty. It would be altogether beyond the scope, and foreign to the object of this essay, to enter upon a metaphysical disquisition as to the mode by which man's ideas of Moral Right and Wrong are acquired; the question has been discussed during the last two centuries—upon most conflicting principles, and with totally opposite views and aims—by men possessed of high intellectual powers; and the general results arrived at, and which must here be conceded, and not required to be proved, are briefly as follows, viz. :—

That the mental powers possessed by man—excluding his affections, in which the brute creation fully participate with him, comprise—and chiefly consist of—his Intellectual powers, with their accompaniments, including as a principal portion of them, the Discursive faculty by which he reasons,—and a Moral sense or faculty, by which he recognises Moral distinctions, and by means of which all his natural knowledge of Right and Wrong is acquired; that these two component parts, which constitute almost the whole of man's rational nature, are nevertheless so disconnected and distinct from each

other, that either of them may be seriously impaired or nearly destroyed, without detriment to the other; for it is no uncommon thing to see a man whose intellect is of a high order, with a perception of Moral qualities so feeble in degree, that he can scarcely estimate Moral distinctions;[1] and conversely a person whose Intellectual powers are but little removed from imbecility, has often a correct approximate appreciation of Morals: that by no conceivable process of reasoning or operation of his intellect, could man acquire any ideas of Right and Wrong; for his intellect could not inform him of the Moral character of any action, but would merely instruct him as to either its advantageous or injurious effects; that in the same manner as his physical senses inform him of the existence of Figure, Extension, and other primary qualities of Matter, and his Intellectual powers assent to all such Truths as are ultimate facts, and therefore do not admit of examination; so also does his inherent Moral Faculty apprehend Moral distinctions, and provide him with the ideas of Right and Wrong, which ideas are simple and beyond the reach of analysis.[2]

[1] Hume, to wit.

[2] A Moral Sense would appear to be, not an ingredient of man's mental constitution by original creation, which, in that case, would be intermingled or associated on an equality with his other mental faculties, but something distinct and independent superadded to, or a more recent augmentation of that constitution; a kind of newer external casing or additional envelopment, so to speak; for, as a general rule, if the mental constitution becomes impaired, or undergoes a process of deterioration, the Moral Sense disappears first, and the process often stops there, leaving the intellectual powers uninjured (See the medical evidence at Oxford's trial for shooting at the Queen). So that, apparently, the Moral Faculty, as a more delicate and exposed mental quality, is the first to suffer injury or decay: such deterioration, or process of wasting, seldom, if ever, attacks the intellectual powers first, leaving the Moral Sense uninjured. A Moral Sense *may* and often *does* subsist in connection with very feeble or inferior intellectual powers, but these last do not appear in general to deteriorate while the Moral Sense is preserved. Among those sections of mankind, however, who possess a Divine Revelation, this process of deterioration or wasting of the intellects and preservation of the Moral Sense is to be met with,

3rd. With respect to Moral Obligation;—A Moral Obligation requiring every Being to act conformably with the Ideas of Right provided for him by his Moral Faculty, is an essential adjunct of, or ingredient in that Faculty, and quite inseparable from it; is an Ultimate Fact, necessary to be conceded, as it admits neither of examination nor explanation.—Any person disregarding his own notions of what is Right (however incorrect they may be), and doing what he believes to be Wrong, will be conscious of an internal self-condemnation for so acting, usually denominated a Guilty or condemning Conscience; and this Guilty Conscience, on account of any Wrong action or intention,—which is universal in mankind, and the degree of which is regulated by, or proportioned to the degree [1] both of criminality in the action or intention, and of the acuteness or sensibility of the Moral Faculty in the Agent—necessarily implies

because Scripture and Moral Sense are part and counterpart, each being the reflex of the other, and the Bible, as a Moral Code, when carefully studied and conformed to, has a direct tendency to correct and strengthen the Moral Sense, and thus to preserve that faculty unimpaired, without exercising, in any considerable degree, a similar conservative operation on the intellectual powers. Thus the Moral Faculty, which, in the ordinary course of Nature, is the first to become impaired, is continually renewed and restored by the study of Scripture, and by conformity to its moral precepts as an external rule of Right and Wrong, even while the process of deterioration has penetrated deeper, and reached the intellectual powers, which are thus gradually suffering decay or destruction: the natural Moral Faculty in man, and the Moral Code contained in Revelation mutually act and react upon one another, the latter strengthening and forming an antidote to the versatility of the former, and the former appreciating and vigorously apprehending the latter, so that as intellectual faith fades away and becomes lost through the decay of the intellectual powers, Moral Belief is gradually renewed and strengthened, and thus preserved from decay.

[1] Though the Moral Law admits of no degrees in sin, and all sin is equal (see forward, Sec. 24), yet the Moral Faculty in man which comprehends merely a *finite*, *i.e.*, a partial or inadequate, and therefore incorrect, perception of the *infinite* law, does recognise (though incorrectly) a distinction; and considers one sin a crime and another a mere impropriety; and thus also the consciousness of guilt differs in degree in the case of one, as compared with the other.

or pre-supposes an existing Obligation of some kind to do Right (*i.e.*, Moral Obligation), out of the breach of which such internal condemnation arises.—'It is absurd therefore to ask why we are bound to practise Virtue? The very notion of Virtue implies the notion of Obligation. Every Being who is conscious of the distinction between Right and Wrong carries about with him a Law which he is bound to observe.'—Stewart's 'Moral Philosophy.'

Any person who attentively watches the operation of his own mind will perceive that an Obligation to do Right and to refrain from doing Wrong is indispensable to protect and preserve his Moral Sense, or to keep alive in his mind the distinction between Right and Wrong; for if no Moral Obligation in the least degree attended on the Moral Faculty, and it was a matter of perfect indifference, and entirely optional on his part to do either Right or Wrong, his consciousness of the distinction between Right and Wrong would soon fade and die away altogether. Hence a Moral Obligation, though it neither originates nor creates the distinction between Right and Wrong, is essential to maintain or preserve that distinction in the human mind; for in fact, or practically, the best definition of Moral *Right* which can be given is, 'that which every one is bound to do;' and of *Wrong*, 'that which every one is bound to refrain from doing;' for Moral Obligation is in reality the only insuperable or indispensable Obligation that exists; every other kind of obligation it is optional with man either to maintain or break; and if the obligation to do and to refrain from doing was destroyed or ceased to exist, the very essence of Right and Wrong would be eliminated, and the distinction between the two would either fail absolutely, or no longer be perceptible by the Moral Faculty. This is sufficiently exemplified in the *comparatively* clear and

decided views of approximate Moral Right possessed by those who habitually aim at conformity to their Moral judgments (*i.e.*, to the dictates of Conscience) as contrasted with the doubtful, faint, feeble and indistinct views of those who habitually disregard them. A mere theoretical distinction between Right and Wrong in the mind of man is impossible; such knowledge is essentially practical and compulsory in its character; *i.e.*, he is bound to do the one, and to refrain from doing the opposite: in other words, a Moral Knowledge involves a Moral Obligation, *i.e.*, an obligation to act up to such knowledge.

Thus much respecting man's Moral Faculty and the Moral Obligation attending it must here be conceded; but on this subject more will be met with in the course of the Work.

PART I.

THE MORAL SYSTEM.

ON THE THEORY OF MORALS AS ARRIVED AT BY MAN'S MORAL AND INTELLECTUAL POWERS WHEN UNASSISTED BY A DIVINE REVELATION; AN ARGUMENT A PRIORI.

1. INFINITY and Eternity, that is to say, boundless extent and endless duration,[1] are not fictions invented by the human imagination, but are either qualities of some created object, in which case the Creator Himself must have possessed these qualities; or are more probably attributes of the Great Creator of all things peculiar to Himself, and imparted by Him to nothing that He has created. [Newton Principia: Scholium Generale.][2]

[1] Endless duration is not peculiar to Deity, but common to all immortal beings. The best distinction is to call Deity eternal, *i.e.*, without beginning or end, and immortal beings everlasting, *i.e.*, having a beginning but no end; for, according to reason, no created being could be eternal, *i.e.*, without beginning or end, for he must have had a beginning at the period of his creation. The existence of a Creator or Great First Cause, and the infinity and eternity of His nature or essence, need not be assumed, as here, but may be incontestably proved. (See 'Abercrombie on Moral Feelings,' p. 151.) The proof is omitted here, in order that this outline might not be unnecessarily extended.

[2] 'Æternus est et infinitus; id est durat ab æterno in æternum, et adest ab infinito in infinitum. Non est æternitas et infinitas, sed æternus et infinitus; non est duratio et spatium sed durat et adest. Durat semper, et adest ubique; et existendo semper et ubique, durationem et spatium constituit.' The identity and common origin of all truth is here very remarkably evidenced. Newton, the great philosopher, who may almost be regarded as the author or parent of every science which is dependent on or assisted by mathematics, in this Scholium lays a foundation common to Moral Philosophy as well as mathematical: these sciences are but two branches springing from one stem or root, viz., the Infinity of the Deity.

2. A similar argument applies to Immutability: the mind of man recognises the existence of this quality, which therefore is either a product of the Imagination,[1] *i.e.*, a pure fiction,—or it is a reality; in which latter case, if anything in the Universe is immutable, God Himself must be so; for it is impossible to conceive that the Creator of all things is deficient in a quality which nevertheless He had conferred on some object of His creation; but inasmuch as mutability[2] attaches to every thing that man is acquainted with,[3] for each individual and every part of creation appear more or less subject to change, it seems probable in the highest degree that, like Infinity and Eternity, Immutability also is proper to Deity, and so far limited to Him that it does not extend to any of His creatures.[4]

3. The Creator of all things being thus inevitably both infinite and immutable *in His nature, all His qualities* or *attributes* must of necessity be infinite and im-

We see here that God Himself, in one of His attributes, Infinity, constitutes the origin of two sciences: query, is He not similarly in His own nature the origin of every science? And is not all truth equally referable to Deity as its basis; which, however, man's ignorance has not as yet discovered?

[1] Immutability (like Infinity and Eternity) is a simple idea, and not resolvable into any further elements: the human imagination cannot create or call into existence in the mind any simple ideas, but merely uses all ideas, both simple and compound, as its materials.

[2] Mutability is not a *positive quality* which Deity has conferred on all creation, Himself being without it, which is impossible; for the Creator could not confer a positive quality in which He Himself was deficient; but merely *negative, i.e.*, an absence of Immutability: the same rule holds with most of the other qualities in which creation differs from the Creator; they are mere *negatives* or *deficiencies*, the opposite qualities or attributes of God constituting the *positives*, or perfections: thus, Holiness is positive, Sin is merely the absence of holiness, and therefore negative; so also in the case of Almighty, *i.e.*, infinite power and infinite strength; and many others.

[3] As far as Chemistry has hitherto advanced, every species of matter appears to be absolutely indestructible, but mutable in an extreme degree; presenting itself in a very great variety of forms, and entering into an almost infinite number of combinations, by which its nature becomes modified or varied.

[4] Query: does not *Infinity* in essence inevitably imply Immutability? For infinity in essence undoubtedly renders impossible either contraction or expansion, and therefore also apparently either variation or mutability: the two attributes are, doubtless, both concurrent and inseparable.

mutable also; for finite and variable qualities or properties could not compose, or subsist in an Infinite and Immutable Being: hence then His knowledge, wisdom, power, &c., must of necessity be infinite and immutable, like the nature in which they subsist.

4. The *attributes* or *qualities* of Deity must be infinite in two different respects, viz.:—

1st. Infinite in extent.

2nd. Infinite in intensity or degree.

1st. Take for instance Power or Strength, God is an Infinite Spirit, so completely filling the Universe that no spot in it exists where He is not equally present (Sec. 1). His strength, therefore, must so fully pervade His entire Being that He may be enabled to exert or put it forth in every part of space where He is Himself present: hence then His Strength is infinite in extent, like the nature or essence in which it resides; for if not, then His strength must be confined to a mere fraction of His Being, and so be finite in extent, leaving the infinite remainder of that Being without strength at all, which is absurd.

The strength therefore of Deity must be co-extensive with His Being, and as the latter is infinite in extent, the former, which pervades it universally, must equally be infinite in extent.

2ndly. The strength which God is able to exert or put forth in every part of space, must be an infinite or unlimited strength in degree or intensity, and not merely a finite.

For if the strength of Deity pervades equally His entire infinite being, and thus is capable of application at every point in space, such strength, when concentrated and exerted collectively at any given point or upon any definite object, must be an infinite or unlimited strength. For Deity must possess the ability by the exercise of His Will, of exerting from time to time as He sees fit His *entire strength* on some given occasion

and upon some definite object; and such entire strength being co-extensive with His Being, which is infinite, must be therefore no less infinite in its accumulated force or power, *i.e.*, in degree or intensity.

Hence it is that God is Almighty, possessing infinite power or strength, and able to do all things.

A somewhat similar argument applies also to other attributes or qualities of the Deity.

The proposition in this section may be stated generally in the following form, viz.:—Infinity in the case of a *substantive* means boundless in extent; in the case of an *adjective* or the *quality* of *such substantive*, it means unlimited both in extent, and in degree or intensity also, *i.e.*, where such quality is an absolute one and not merely relative[1] (See Sec. 24, Notes 1 and 2).—Note here: all infinite qualities that are *absolute* are attributes of Deity, for no finite being is capable of an infinite quality that is *absolute:* any infinite quality in a finite being must be merely *relative*, *e.g.* infinite sinfulness: for sinfulness is not infinite *per se* or independently, but only so as the opposite of Holiness, which is infinite absolutely.

5. All the attributes of Deity being infinite and immutable, His Moral Perfection or Holiness, which is one of His attributes, must be infinite and immutable likewise; and thus Holiness, both infinite in extent, as well as in degree or intensity, and immutable in its nature, pervades and is diffused throughout the entire Being of God, the Infinite and Immutable Spirit.

6. This Moral perfection or Holiness of Deity constitutes the ultimate,[2] and absolute, *i.e.*, invariable, and the universal or sole standard or measure of all Moral qualities whatsoever:—no other Moral standard is con-

[1] This argument unnecessary: any quality or adjective infinite in amount, must be infinite also in degree or intensity, otherwise such quality would be both infinite and finite at one and the same time.

[2] Ultimate. Not the last or furthest of other standards within it, but such a standard as that no other further or beyond it is possible.

ceivable, for a more perfect one than infinite Moral Perfection or Holiness is impossible; and one less perfect is inadmissible; for in whatever degree it fell short of, or was inconsistent with the most perfect standard, in that degree it is condemned by that standard, and its imperfection becomes sinful; thus Holiness in the abstract, as a Moral quality, being nothing else but conformity to an infinite Moral Standard, admits of no degrees, so that reduced, *i.e.*, partial Holiness is an impossibility, and a misnomer, being identical with and strictly equivalent to actual sinfulness.[1]

7. Any reduction of this infinite Standard Holiness, so as to render it finite, in order to bring it within reach of the Moral capacities of finite creatures and render it attainable by them, is an hypothesis utterly inadmissible: for

1st. Such a reduction would be a change effected in an immutable attribute of God, which is impossible.

2nd. Such an hypothesis is an affront to man's Moral convictions: his Moral nature recoils from the

[1] Throughout this essay many terms are employed which represent objects beyond the grasp or comprehension of the Human Intellect, and which the mind of man can form no distinct idea of: thus, 'Infinity,' 'Holiness,' 'Holiness of an infinite intensity,' 'the soul,' &c., are incomprehensible to the Human Mind, of which, however, it both can and does admit the existence; and they may, therefore, be with the strictest correctness represented by words, and introduced into the argument or reasoned upon, in the same manner as in Algebra, Surds, or Irrational Quantities and other quantities, which, though possible, the Mind can form no idea of, are represented by symbols, and become subjects of or ingredients in calculation (also in Algebra impossible quantities are often introduced into calculations: thus, $2a^{\alpha}$ is any quantity (a) expanded infinitely, and then multiplied by 2; but it is evident that an infinite quantity must be boundless in all directions, and thus fill all space, and could therefore neither be multiplied nor even increased: in this case, an impossible quantity, $2a^{\alpha}$, is hypothetically considered possible): in other words, the materials for correct argument both *may be* and often *are* objects beyond the reach of human comprehension. Our reasoning concerning incomprehensible objects should not be analytical, or respecting them, but synthetical, or in connection with them.

[On the application of mathematical principles to other sciences and to morals, see some valuable remarks in Dugald Stewart's 'Elements,' iii. pp. 272 *seq.* Ed.]

idea of any reduction of, or any tampering with the standard, God's Holiness.

Nor would the construction of any inferior finite Standard of Moral Right for such an object, be at all more admissible; for

1st. This finite standard when compared with the Ultimate (infinite Holiness) must of necessity be a sinful one, and therefore conformity to it by any creatures would render them—not holy—but sinful.

2ndly. On this principle consistently carried out Moral Standards differing in degree must be multiplied to meet the various Moral capacities of different orders of Beings, and therefore even a Moral Standard suitable to Fiends be admitted; in this case what was Right according to one Standard would be Wrong according to another, and thus Moral Right instead of being absolute and immutable or uniform, would be relative and variable.

3rdly. This principle would be directly inverting the proper order by constituting the inferiority and incapacity of creature, the Rule, and reducing the Moral Standard to it; bringing the Standard down to finite capacities, instead of bringing them up to it.[1]

Hence then, God's infinite Holiness, as it is the *ultimate*, so also must be the *absolute* and *sole Stan-*

[1] Indeed, if Moral Right, instead of being infinite and therefore absolute, admitted of degrees, so that as a Moral quality it might become gradually less and less Right, and thus diminished in intensity in a descending scale towards Moral Evil, where is the point to be fixed at which Moral Right ceases, and merges into Wrong, or where Holiness becomes transformed into Sinfulness? No such point of demarcation between reduced or modified Moral Right and incipient Moral Evil would be ascertainable or could be determined; therefore, Right and Wrong would be confounded together, and become undistinguishable. The attempt, therefore, to deal with Moral Right, as admitting of degrees, involves an impossibility, as it inevitably conducts to impracticable or absurd results.

dard of Moral Right, utterly excluding any and every other standard.

8. But if Moral Perfection or Holiness is infinite, and absolute or invariable, admitting of no degrees, and if this Holiness constitutes the sole Moral Standard (6 and 7), then it follows of necessity that Holiness must be peculiar to Deity and proper to Him; for no finite being is capable of an infinite quality *absolutely;* therefore the moral character of any and every finite being, must of necessity fail in conformity to an infinite standard, and thus be sinful; for finite holiness when compared with an Infinite Standard is not Holiness at all, but Sin. Hence no creature can participate in the Holiness of its Creator, though it may be a partaker of other attributes, Wisdom, Knowledge, Power, &c., in some reduced measure or finite proportion; for these and other attributes of God may exist in a partial or reduced form, as qualities conferred by Him on a finite Being, which Holiness cannot.[1]

[1] The finite properties or qualities which God has conferred on His creatures, when infinitely increased or expanded, constitute in most cases, His infinite attributes, *e.g.:*

1.—The extension of any creature infinitely increased, is infinite extension or Infinity and Ubiquity.

2.—The duration of such creature infinitely increased in both directions forward and backward, is infinite duration or eternity. For unless duration was increased or extended, equally backwards towards the past, as well as forwards to the future, it could not be infinite or unlimited, but would be merely endless or everlasting; for it would have a limit at its commencement, though none towards the future; but that which is infinite or unlimited, must have no limit whatever, in any direction, and therefore neither commencement nor termination.

3.—The Wisdom of any creature infinitely increased, is Infinite Wisdom.

4.—The strength of a creature infinitely increased, becomes Infinite Strength or Almighty Power.

5.—Foreknowledge in a partial degree is possessed by man; for he can, with perfect accuracy foretell future effects from given causes; it is nothing else but one branch of Universal knowledge, *i.e.*, knowledge of the past, present, and future; this Universal knowledge which man possesses in a very slight or partial measure, God possesses in a perfect degree; and inasmuch as the creation (material and spiritual), together with its boundless accompaniments of causes and effects, filling all past time, and extending throughout an endless future, must be infinite in extent, variety, and complexity; a perfect knowledge of all these, and of their past, present, and

9. A Moral sense is a faculty (either originally subsisting in, or subsequently acquired by an intelligent being) for taking cognisance of Moral qualities, and without which Faculty no such being would be capable of recognising or estimating Moral distinctions; it is an inherent or acquired mental power of distinguishing and appreciating Moral Right and Wrong (2nd Postulate, Introduction.)

10. But if God's Holiness is the sole Standard of Right and Wrong, utterly excluding all other Standards, so that all Moral-Right originates in and has reference to it, being nothing else but conformity to that Stan-

future operations, can be anything less than an Infinite Knowledge.

6.—And so of *other attributes*. (This not being a treatise on the nature of God, a subject which only occurs here incidentally, these other attributes in which man participates in an infinitely small degree with his Creator, need not here be further inquired into.

But Holiness is an attribute of God distinct from all his others, and not to be discovered in a finite form, in any of His creatures; for the Holiness of God is, 1st—infinite in extent or amount, as pervading His entire being, or essence, and consequently it *must be*, 2ndly, no less infinite in intensity or degree, otherwise this attribute of Deity would be both infinite and finite at one and the same time: whereas, on the contrary, the holiness (so-called), of any finite creature, being of necessity merely finite in amount, is no less of necessity finite in its intensity or purity, and therefore unconformable both in this intensity as well as in amount to the Infinite Moral Standard; and being thus unconformable, it is not holiness at all, but Sinfulness. For any quality that is merely finite in amount is utterly incapable (*absolutely*), of an intensity that is infinite in degree; for it is impossible to engraft any infinite quality on a basis that is only finite, *e.g.*, a purity that is infinite in intensity, on a Moral quality that is merely finite in extent or amount; otherwise such quality would be both finite and infinite at the same time. Any finite holiness, therefore, is not holiness at all, but is actual Sinfulness; for if holiness must be conformity to the sole Moral Standard, *infinity* is essential to its very existence, and therefore no *finite* being is capable of it. Hence the Moral Attribute of God —as a condition of its very being— is utterly unattainable by any finite creature; all other attributes such creature may partake of in a partial measure or finite proportion; but in His attribute, Holiness, Deity stands alone and unapproachable in the Universe.

And as it is beyond God's power to engraft an absolute quality that is infinite on a subject or basis that is merely finite, which would be creating such subject both finite and infinite, at one and the same time, therefore is it equally beyond His power to create any finite being holy, *per se*, or independently, or to invest that being with his own Moral attribute; holiness being attainable by such subject or being only by actual union or junction with the Infinite Spirit of Holiness. (See forward, Sec. 42.)

dard; and if a Moral Sense in an intelligent being is an inherent mental power of distinguishing and appreciating Right and Wrong, it follows of necessity that a Moral Sense must have reference to the sole Standard, and be in some degree a knowledge or perception of that Standard, for Moral Right is merely another name for Holiness; nothing short of Holiness is Morally Right, absolutely; therefore a Moral Sense or Faculty for distinguishing and appreciating Moral Right, acquired by a finite being, must confer upon that being a finite or partial glimpse or perception of God's infinite Holiness; which Holiness being an attribute or quality of the Infinite Spirit, must of necessity itself be a spiritual quality, and can therefore only be perceived or taken cognisance of by a spiritual or mental faculty in man; and as it is God's attribute of Moral Perfection or Holiness, whereby He stands alone and unapproachable in the Universe (Sec. 8, note), which constitutes the sole generic distinction between him and His creature man (man partaking with him in a finite degree of all His other infinite attributes), so also is it *a Moral Sense* or partial glimpse or perception of that Holiness which constitutes the distinction *in kind* between Man and the Brute creation, the latter evincing very faint but sufficiently definite traces of all the other mental faculties possessed by man. (See forward, Part II.)

11. A Moral Sense inevitably creates a Moral Obligation, so that the two are mutually and essentially involved and inseparable; this is an Ultimate Fact of which no further explanation can be given; any Being possessed of a Faculty for estimating Moral distinctions, and therefore endowed with a discriminating perception of Right and Wrong, is of necessity bound to regulate his mind and conduct by it; and to approve in judgment, to embrace in the affections, and to practise both in thought and conduct what is Right; and the converse; —a Moral Sense therefore renders any Being a Moral

agent, *i.e.*, one responsible to a Moral Law (3rd Postulate).

12. The Moral Law, or Moral Rule, to which any Moral agent is responsible, *i.e.*, which he is bound to act up to both in thought and conduct, can be nothing else in its requirements but the exact counterpart of the Moral Standard, God's Holiness. For the Moral Law is a Law requiring every Being responsible to it to do Right, and to refrain from doing Wrong: Right is everything conformable to the Moral Standard; Wrong whatever is unconformable to, or at variance with it: thus the Moral Law is incomplete, and therefore utterly invalid, apart from the Standard. For to require any Being to do Right, without indicating or defining what Right is, would be futile, and the Law requiring it, a nullity. Hence the Law and the Standard are essential and reciprocal adjuncts of each other. The Standard of necessity begets the Law in the case of every Being acquainted with that Standard. For a knowledge however slight or partial of that Standard (*i.e.*, of Right and Wrong), by means of a Moral Obligation, converts that knowledge into a Moral Law, dominant over the being who possesses such knowledge; and the Law requires the Standard to render it intelligible, and to give it validity. Thus Moral Law is nothing else but another term for an Obligation to conform to the Standard of Right and Wrong, and no alteration in the Law could take place, without a previous and corresponding alteration in an immutable Standard, which is impossible. This Moral Standard therefore is the Antitype or Seal, of which the Moral Law is the Type or Impression; the Standard being infinite and immutable, the Law must be infinite and immutable likewise.[1] [2]

[1] Sections 9, 10 and 11, will be rendered more explicit by the following explanation:—

The term Moral Law expresses a compound idea resolvable into the three following elements, viz.:—

1st.—The Standard of Right and Wrong. (Secs. 6 and 7.)

2nd.—A knowledge or perception of that Standard in some de-

A finite Being could only possess a *finite*, *i.e.*, a partial or imperfect, in other words, an *infinitely small* perception of an Infinite Standard, and knowledge or comprehension of an Infinite Law, which would therefore be an incorrect and deceptive one. Such an acquaintance with Right and Wrong would become worse than useless, as it would in most cases inevitably mislead. For unless a finite Being was cognisant of the entire Law, it would be impossible for him to form a right judgment, or arrive at a correct decision in questions of Moral Right and Wrong. Beings of different orders and capacities in Creation, and endowed with a Moral Sense, would perceive more or less of the Infinite Law, according to the extent or capacity of their

gree or other by an intelligent being, commonly called a Moral Sense. (Secs. 9 and 10.)

3rd.—An obligation on such being to conform to the standard. (Sec. 11.)

These three elements in conjunction constitute the Moral Law.

But inasmuch as the 2nd element, viz., a Moral Sense in an intelligent being, necessarily pre-supposes the 1st, a Standard of Right and Wrong, to which such Moral Sense has reference, and inevitably also creates the 3rd, a Moral Obligation, it follows that any intelligent or rational being possessed of a Moral Sense, is thereby responsible to the Moral Law, and thus becomes a Moral Agent.

[2] The Moral Law corresponds with the Standard and refers to it, thereby being itself immutable. For even if it were possible to vary or alter the standard (which, however, is impossible, the standard being an immutable attribute of God), the Law would still consistently point to it as its authority; and though the Law's requirements would thereby be varied, such change would be in the standard and not in the Law, which would continue correctly to represent and to enforce conformity to that standard.

In any Moral Agent, his Moral Sense indicates to him what is Right and Wrong, and thus in effect, or practically, becomes his Moral Standard: the Moral Obligation created by and inseparable from the Moral Sense, compels conformity to this, his Moral Standard, and thus constitutes his Moral Law. Thus the Moral Standard and its result and counterpart, the Moral Law, in the abstract, correspond with, and are exactly represented by the Moral Sense, and its result and counterpart Moral Obligation in a Moral Agent; they are the very same things, under other names, and in different beings; for the Moral Standard is an attribute of God, and the Moral Law is its result; a Law in no degree whatever restraining or coercing the Deity, but merely being the measure of His spontaneous actions or voluntary conduct; Moral Sense is a faculty in a Moral Agent, and Moral Obligation, dominant or coercive in *his* case, is its result.

respective Moral faculties, and would therefore take different (perhaps opposite) views of the same Moral question; a being with a smaller perception of the Law might pronounce that Wrong, which one with a larger Moral Sense might consider Right;—or the converse; and thus these two beings, though actually responsible to one and the same Infinite Law, would practically be subject to two different and perhaps contradictory Laws; and probably the opinion formed or Moral judgment arrived at by either being, might not be correct according to the true Standard,[1] which both of them were of necessity very partially, and therefore quite imperfectly acquainted with.

2ndly. It would in its results be ruinous as involving a Moral condemnation, in other words Damnation. (See Sec. 31.)

13. Hence, a Moral Sense or mental faculty for estimating Moral distinctions, in other words a knowledge of Right and Wrong, should be peculiar or proper to Deity, and ought not to be extended to, or acquired by, any finite Being whatsoever; for to any such Being

1st. It would be worse than useless as a rule of mind or conduct.

A finite Being possessed of a Moral Sense would find himself under Moral Obligations of too extreme and stringent a character for his powers and capacities;—he would be responsible to a Law or Rule totally unsuited to his nature, and of which, being infinite in its requirements, he would be unable both to perceive the extent and limit, and

[1] 'Not correct according to the true Standard.' The judgment of a finite Moral Agent *might* probably enough be incorrect by mistaking Right for Wrong in any Moral question (see page 8 and Note); but it *must* inevitably be defective by failing to perceive the infinite degree or intensity of Right required by the Moral Law in such questions; in the former case the judgment arrived at would be a *mistaken*, in the latter an *inadequate* one; but in both cases an incorrect one.

also of necessity incapable of acting up to it ;—for when once morally responsible, his partial and imperfect comprehension of the Law would in no degree diminish or detract from his entire obligation to it.[1] For though the knowledge of or acquaintance with the Infinite Law, in other words the Moral Sense, must be partial, or in degree, being directly proportioned to the capacities of different orders of finite beings who have acquired it, yet Moral responsibility—*i.e.*, an obligation to obey that Law—is absolute, and admits of no degrees, so that partial or limited responsibility to it is impossible. For the Moral Law being the counterpart of the Moral Standard,—God's Holiness,—and therefore, both being infinite, if a finite Being might be partially responsible—*i.e.*, responsible merely in part or under obligation to obey such a portion only of the Moral Law as his finite capacities can take cognisance of,—*i.e.*, escape Moral condemnation thereby,[2] it would involve of necessity such a reduction of the Moral Standard as is equivalent to this partition or reduced proportion of the Moral Law, in order that the Law, and the Standard out of which it arises might correspond with and continue consistently to reflect or represent each other. And if the Law is reduced to the capacity of any finite Being, in order that his responsibility to it may be partial only and not complete, the Standard must be equally reduced

[1] The same principle is carried out in the case of Human Laws. Every person is amenable to the laws of the country in which he resides, and incurs whatever penalties have been enacted for the breach of those laws ; nor is ignorance of the law admitted as a plea, either for exemption from, or mitigation of, such penalties.

[2] In such a case, the Moral Law would no longer be the Law to which that finite being was responsible ; but the fraction of it which he was cognisant of would be his Law, and such fraction would have no reference to the ultimate Standard, inasmuch as a Law which is finite in its requirements could have no relationship to a Standard that is Infinite.

with the Law. For the Standard and Law are not two things, but the Law comprehends the Standard as essential to it, without which the Law would be incomplete and invalid; any acquaintance however slight with the Standard in any Being requires conformity to that standard, thus constituting the Moral Law. In order that any Being might be capable of fulfilling the requirements of the Moral Law, either

1st, that Being must be made Infinite; or,

2ndly, the Law which is Infinite must be reduced and rendered Finite; and then

3rdly, the Standard must be equally reduced and become Finite also.

But any such reduction of the Standard and the Law to meet the capacities of different orders of finite Beings is an hypothesis utterly inadmissible (Sec. 6). The entire mental powers of man shrink and recoil from the base notion of tampering with the Infinite and Immutable Holiness of God, to accommodate it to the incapacity and inferiority of His creatures. If such a principle was once admitted, all holiness would be at an end, for there would be no limit to the reductions in a Divine Attribute required to meet the capacities of different orders of Finite Beings. The Moral Standard, instead of being *one* and absolute would be manifold and various. (Sec. 6.) Hence then a Moral Obligation, to the full extent of the requirements of the Moral Law, attaches to every Being who is responsible to that Law, in other words, who possesses a Moral Sense; a natural and inevitable incapacity in a finite Being to comprehend the rule in its fulness or entirety, would not exempt him as a Moral agent from its complete obligations, or from the condemnation arising out of the breach of those obligations, but would constitute a Moral defect for which that Law or Rule would of necessity visit him if possible with further condemna-

tion: in other words, any breach of the Moral Law by a Moral agent would not be palliated or excusable; but on the contrary aggravated and increased in guilt by his partial though inevitable ignorance of that Law. If therefore any finite being is morally responsible, he is so to the entire Moral Law, and not merely to such part of it as his faculties can take cognizance of; and this Law being Infinite, he is inevitably obnoxious to Moral condemnation and its consequences.[1]

A Moral Sense, therefore, or knowledge of Right and Wrong, should be limited to Deity, whose attribute of Moral perfection at once both constitutes the Standard, and is alone capable of meeting the requirements of the Moral Law which is the counterpart of that Standard: in other words,—the Moral Law is a Law for Deity alone, and utterly inapplicable to any of His creatures. being altogether beyond their capacities.[2 3 4]

[1] A Moral Sense possessed by any created beings is an incongruity in their nature attended by utterly ruinous consequences; for it requires *finite* creatures to attain and conform to the Holiness of God which is *infinite*, and then damns them everlastingly, for failing in these impossible requirements. Damnation is only another and the correct term for Moral Condemnation.

[2] The argument comprised in Section 13, may be varied and more concisely stated as follows:—

(1) A Moral Sense in any finite being, involves a Moral Obligation, *i.e.*, an obligation to do Right or to obey the Moral Law, thus constituting such being a Moral Agent.

(2) The Moral Law is the counterpart of the Moral Standard which is infinite and irreducible, and is therefore infinite and irreducible likewise.

(3) Therefore a Moral Obligation requires a finite Moral Agent to obey an infinite Law, or to conform to an infinite standard of Right and Wrong, which is impossible.

(4) Therefore every Moral Agent (*i.e.*, finite being possessing a Moral Sense), is inevitably guilty of breaking the Moral Law, and therefore obnoxious to Moral Condemnation.

(5) Therefore a Moral Sense ought to be peculiar or proper to God.

[3] A knowledge of Right and Wrong is nothing less than a knowledge of Holiness,—*i.e.*, of an attribute of God (Sec. 10); all God's attributes being Infinite like His Nature, can only be partially known by any of His creatures; a partial knowledge of His wisdom, love, power, &c., may be most beneficially possessed by any creature; but a partial knowledge of His holiness must be not only useless, but worse,—deceptive—and on account of the Moral Obligation essential in such knowledge, utterly ruinous to any creature.

14. The five following results therefore (together with others to be stated in future sections) would of necessity arise in the case of any rational finite being becoming possessed of a Moral Sense.

1st. He would acquire some vague and indefinite notions of Right and Wrong, Virtue and Vice, which from their doubtful and uncertain character (the inevitable consequence of a finite perception of an infinite Law) would be worse than useless to him as a means of correctly estimating Moral distinctions.[1]

(See forward, last paragraph of Note to Sec. 17.)

[4] The argument comprised in these thirteen sections may be more concisely stated as follows :—

1. God is infinite and immutable in His nature, therefore
2. All His attributes are infinite and immutable, therefore
3. His Moral attribute Holiness must be infinite and immutable,
4. That is, the one only Standard of Right and Wrong, must be infinite and immutable, therefore
5. The Moral Law exacting conformity to that Standard, must be infinite in its requirements,
6. The Moral Sense apprehends Right and Wrong, similarly as intellect assents to Ultimate Facts or Prime Truths.
7. Moral Sense and Moral Obligation are one and inseparable, therefore
8. Moral Sense with Moral Obligation renders a finite being a Moral Agent,—*i.e.*, responsible to a Moral Law:
9. There being only one Moral Standard, there can be only one Moral Law.
10. But no finite being can obey an infinite Moral Law, *i.e.*, conform to an infinite Moral Standard, therefore
11. No finite being can be holy, but must be sinful in his entire nature, therefore
12. No finite being ought to be responsible to the Moral Law, that is,
13. No finite being ought to possess a Moral Sense, or knowledge of Right and Wrong.
14. But if every finite being must be sinful in his entire nature (Sec. 11), therefore no single action of that being can be holy, but all of them must be sinful, like the nature they spring from.

[1] Moral Right is of *two kinds*, being either *Absolute* or *Relative*. *Absolute* Right has reference to the Moral Standard, and consists in exact conformity to the Moral Law.

Relative Right has reference to the Moral Faculty, and consists in a finite being's conformity to his Moral Judgments, which arise out of his partial perception of that law ; for Moral Obligation renders it a duty incumbent on every Moral Agent to conform to these Moral Judgments whatever they are; such Moral Judgments constitute his Moral Standard (though a defective and therefore incorrect one), and in conforming to them he would be Right relatively.

But no finite being can, by any possibility, be Right either *Absolutely* or *Relatively*.—For

1st. Reason demonstrates that no finite being could in any respect conform to an infinite Law, *i.e.*, be absolutely Right ; for he could not

2ndly. This inherent Moral Faculty would necessarily create in him Conscience; for he could not avoid comparing his thoughts and actions with these inherent notions of Right and Wrong, and thus becoming conscious either of their accordance or their disagreement with these notions;[1] and the Moral Obligation accom-

even comprehend, or be correctly acquainted with such a Law, much less conform or act up to requirements which are infinite.

2ndly. The Moral Faculty in any finite being, though incapable of comprehending fully a Law that is infinite, can nevertheless sufficiently discern that this Law extends further than his perception of it; and that within range of the perception by the Moral Faculty, there is no point where the Law's requirements terminate, but that they extend beyond that range; hence every finite being's natural notions of Right and Wrong must be not merely of a vague, indefinite, confused, and doubtful character, from his very indistinct and partial perception of the Infinite Moral Law (so that many Moral questions continually arise in which his Moral Faculty gets so perplexed that it can come to no decision at all, see Note 3); but also he must feel conscious that these notions fall short of the Law's requirements, and therefore cannot fail to be defective; but no being could conform to Moral Judgments which are doubtful and uncertain, and cannot be distinctly defined; so that his Standard of Right, which it was his duty to aim at, was neither definite nor distinct, but on the contrary vague and confused; and even if he could, he would be conscious that he was conforming to Judgments which were inadequate to, and fell short of the requirements of the Moral Law, and therefore constituted a defective Moral Standard, in acting up to which, he failed in doing Right.

Every Moral Agent, therefore, must be a Sinner, and a guilty one, (Sec. 21), both *Absolutely* and *Relatively*; in the first case from his inability to conform to an infinite Standard; in the second, from the impossibility of his conforming to his own vague, doubtful and undefined Judgments, which even if he could conform to them, he would be conscious constituted a *defective* Moral Standard, and therefore that his conduct even if *Relatively* Right by *conformity* to such Moral Judgments (an extreme hypothesis) would nevertheless be *defective*, *i.e.*, *Absolutely* Wrong.

[1] The word Conscience, as applied to a Moral Agent, expresses a compound idea resolvable into the following elements, viz. :—

1. A Moral Sense, or Faculty for distinguishing Right and Wrong.
2. The Moral judgment, or decision which that Faculty pronounces upon every thought and action of man.
3. The consciousness or internal perception in the mind of man of such judgment or decision within him.

Thus a guilty or condemning conscience, means a consciousness of the guilt or condemnation pronounced upon man by his inherent Moral Faculty.

But conscience, in its most comprehensive sense, is of two kinds, viz., 1st. The conscience of a Moral Agent which condemns him when he either transgresses or falls short of his Moral judgments; and 2ndly, an inferior kind of conscience common to all sentient beings, and which condemns them when they disregard some other being to whom they are under obligation.

Thus a dog often manifests a con-

panying this Moral Sense, and rendering him responsible to a Moral Law or rule of Right and Wrong, which far exceeds his finite powers, and is unsuited to his limited nature, would uninterruptedly subject him to a condemning Conscience from which there would be no escape. For a finite being's knowledge of, or acquaintance with the infinite Moral Law, would grow and increase in exact proportion to his endeavours to con-

science or condemning consciousness of having disobeyed his master. The first kind of conscience is the result of a Moral Sense; the second is produced either by the affections, or by a feeling of gratitude, or consciousness of subordination, or perhaps also from the fear of a repetition of punishment previously experienced; but in no degree by a *sense of duty*, which only a Moral Agent can be actuated by; *duty* being nothing else but an obligation to do what is Right, and the converse. It is in the former and higher meaning, that the word conscience is used throughout this Essay.

The perplexity attending on a variety of questions of Right and Wrong, in which man's Moral Sense has not a sufficiently extended perception of the Moral Law to pronounce decidedly upon them (thus creating doubts, or raising difficulties in the determination of their exact Moral character), causes what are usually termed 'Cases of Conscience:' for the degree of power in the Moral Faculty, or, in other words, the extent of its perception of the Infinite Moral Law, varies greatly in different individuals of Mankind, some having a more enlarged Moral Faculty, and others a more contracted one, as is also the case with the Intellectual Powers, and thus they differ greatly in their Moral judgments and decisions, and arrive at different conclusions on one and the same question of Right and Wrong; but even with the most correct and cultivated Moral Sense, and under the most favourable circumstances, 'Cases of Conscience' must inevitably arise, because the perception is merely finite and Law infinite; nor can the resolution of such cases be anything better than unsatisfactory guess work, as far as the ultimate Standard is concerned.

Hence as man's perception of the Infinite Law is merely finite, the whole of his Moral judgments may, or may not, be correct, and he must always remain in doubt whether any of his natural notions of Right and Wrong are in accordance with the true Standard. (1)

(1) Adam at the Fall experienced both kinds of conscience. 1st—He was conscious of having disobeyed God, his Creator, to whom he was under the greatest obligation, being bound by the affections, as well as by gratitude, and by a consciousness of subordination, and was thus self-condemned for his act of disobedience; 2ndly—By this act of disobedience in eating of the fruit of the tree of the knowledge of Good and Evil, he acquired a Moral Sense, called by Bacon 'the Moral Knowledge of Good and Evil,' which created in him an immediate sense of Shame and Nakedness, being a breach of the Moral Law to which (having rendered himself a Moral Agent) he had now by his own act become responsible, and therefore Morally Guilty.

form to it; for whenever he succeeded in effecting a step in advance towards practical Holiness, he would perceive the Law stretching onwards beyond it, or the degree of intensity in the Moral Standard apparently increasing with his endeavours after conformity to it; and thus that Law's requirements would appear to him continually increasing beyond his ability to reach or overtake them. Hence a finite being's perception of the Law, would exceed his ability to conform to this perception; and for any shortcomings or transgressions, however trivial, Conscience would be inexorable, for it knows nothing of pardon [1] or of any deliverance from Guilt. Thus a finite being responsible to an infinite Moral Law, with an approving Conscience, is an impossibility: [2] in other words,—a finite being endowed with a Moral Sense is of necessity a sinner, and in a greater or less degree feels himself guilty.[3]

[1] It will appear subsequently, that no such thing as Pardon of Guilt exists or is possible (Sec. 33).

[2] Query. If the Conscience of a Moral Agent is of necessity a condemning one, it must be because his perception of the infinite Law is greater than his ability to act up to this perception; for if he was able to act conformably to his Moral judgments, and thus be right relatively, it does not appear that his conscience must of necessity be a condemning one.

Answer. Conscience in any *Moral Agent*, whether a spirit of the other world, or man, an inhabitant of this, must of necessity be a guilty one, because such agent could never reach any point in the Moral Law where its requirements terminated; being infinite he would find them always extending further than any degree of conformity to that Law to which he might succeed in attaining; for, let him do what he could, and strive ever so strenuously towards Moral Right, so as, if possible, even to succeed in conformity to his Moral Judgments, he would nevertheless experience misgivings of conscience, thereby indicating that his Moral Faculty was not fully satisfied (but remained in doubt), as to his having attained to conformity with the Moral Law. Hence, then, as the requirements of an infinite Law must always far exceed the capabilities of a finite Moral Agent, so also would his perception of those requirements, *i.e.*, his Moral Judgments, be in advance of his Moral attainments; and thus the point in the direction of Holiness at which he had arrived, would (according to his own convictions or consciousness), be a failure of conformity to the Moral Law, and he would condemn himself as a sinner for the imperfection or shortcoming of that degree in the direction of holiness which he had reached.

[3] 1. Moral Sense in any finite being is a perception or knowledge of Right and Wrong.

2. Right and Wrong depend upon the only Standard, God's Holiness.

3. Moral Obligation is insepara

3rdly. A continual responsibility to a Moral Law which is beyond his capacities, and whose requirements he is unable to meet, and a constantly condemning or guilty conscience as its result, and no mode of pardon or means of escape from Guilt presenting itself, would inevitably beget a deep and confirmed and constantly increasing hatred of this Moral Law, which condemned him; which intense and progressively increasing hatred of Right, constitutes the essence of a Fiendish nature.[1]

4thly. A finite being possessed of a Moral Sense would be thereby rendered God's equal, by exercising a Moral judgment of his own (independent of Deity) on all Moral questions, which would in fact be nothing less than sitting in judgment upon God's Moral attribute Holiness (the Standard of all Moral qualities), of which he had acquired a very slight glimpse or partial perception; for, however incorrect and indistinct his notions of Right and Wrong might be, they would nevertheless inevitably become his Moral Standard, according to

ble from Moral Sense, and requires conformity to the Standard of Right and Wrong.

4. Conformity to an infinite Standard by a finite Moral Agent is impossible; therefore he is inevitably a sinner, and also a *guilty one* (see forward, Sec. 25).

5. Therefore a knowledge of Right and Wrong of necessity renders any finite being a Guilty Sinner.

6. In other words a Moral Sense acquired by such being is the author and origin of Guilty Sin.

[1] Conformity to the Moral Law in any *single thought* or *action* is termed *Right* and is an adjective; *Right universally* or in every particular, and *abstractedly*, becomes a substantive Righteousness, which is synonymous with Holiness; but, inasmuch as the Moral Law is *infinite* in its requirements, both '*Right*,' the adjective, and Righteousness, must be impossible to every *finite* being; who nevertheless (if a Moral Agent) is subject to these impossible requirements, and must therefore hate both the Law, and its object and origin, Righteousness; for Righteousness or Holiness is both the origin or foundation of the Moral Law (which is its counterpart), and likewise its aim or the object of its requirements. Every finite Moral Agent, therefore, must either be a Fiend (if a spirit of the other world. See Sec. 15), or must be progressing towards a Fiendish nature (if man in his *Natural State*).

This progress by the natural man towards a Fiendish nature is very considerably counteracted by the versatility of his Moral Sense (Sec. 16), and his thus mistaking Wrong for Right; a remedy, however, very little better than the disease. (See Sec. 29.)

which he would examine into and decide upon all such questions; and his Moral judgments and decisions arrived at by this Moral Sense (unconformable though they might be to the ultimate and true Standard), yet being inevitably associated with Moral Obligation, would nevertheless create in his mind a kind of Moral Law (having reference to this his Moral Standard) dominant in his nature, and which he would of necessity be unable either to coerce or to divest himself of, but which would refuse to be guided or controlled even by the Deity Himself; for whatever course of conduct his Moral faculty apprehended to be Right, that course he would feel bound by Moral Obligation to pursue regardless of all external interference; hence every Moral Agent inevitably becomes his own Judge on all questions of Right and Wrong, deciding such according to the dictates of his own Conscience, which admits of no appeal from its decision even to God Himself.[1]

5thly. A finite being possessed of a Moral Sense, is one whose own Moral character is compared and measured by nothing less than the Holiness of God, and so far also claims an equality with the Creator: for a Moral agent must be judged by the only Moral Standard, an attribute of Deity, proper to Him. The Moral Obligation involved in this Moral Sense, and requiring him strictly to conform to this Holiness or Moral Perfection, would produce not only continual self-condemnation (*i.e.* a Guilty conscience), for failing in conformity to Moral

[1] Though man possessed a general idea that his Moral Judgments were more or less defective, and therefore a misgiving as to their correctness, thereby producing in a greater or less degree a guilty conscience, even on the assumption that he might succeed in acting up to such judgments, yet these notions of Right and Wrong would constitute too decided a principle internally in his Moral nature to allow of any interference with them external to himself.

Moral Sense is a partial perception by a finite being of Holiness, an *immutable* attribute of God; hence arises man's internal feeling or conviction of the *immutability* of Moral distinctions; hence also immediate rejection by the Moral Faculty of any (the slightest) interference with its decisions, even though emanating from Deity Himself.

Perfection, *i.e.*, not being equal to his Creator in Holiness, but would also inevitably subject him to constant condemnation from the Deity Himself, whose Moral Law or Rule which he was bound to act up to, he was continually either falling short of, or transgressing; in other words,—whilst his existence (whatever might be its duration) lasted, he would, as a Moral Agent, suffer under a curse from God, the nature and effects of which, could only be partially inferred by any *a priori* reasoning. (See Sec. 31.)

15. The five different consequences just described would necessarily arise in the case of any rational, finite being acquiring a Moral Sense. If that being was of a higher order in creation than man (as the spiritual[1] inhabitants of the other world are even by Infidels—*i.e.*, unbelievers in Scripture—often admitted to be)[2] the perception of the infinite and *Spiritual* Moral Law (see Sec. 21) would be more extensive and penetrating, the condemning power of Conscience more extreme, and (if no method of pardon and escape from guilt appeared) the hatred of this Moral Law, and of its origin and counterpart Holiness, would be so immediate as well as intense, that the Fiendish nature would be generated at once; so that the Spirits of the next world, on acquiring a Moral Sense, would immediately become Fiends. In the case of mankind becoming endowed with a Moral Sense, there is a remarkable feature in his natural constitution which would produce a peculiarity in his Moral nature proper to be here noticed: viz.

16. The Animal Kingdom, but especially the Human

[1] Spiritual beings could better understand or appreciate a *Spiritual* Law (see Sec. 21) than man can, but as finite creatures they could only very partially and imperfectly comprehend an infinite one.

[2] The spiritual inhabitants of the next world are, in all probability, in no degree whatever superior to man as regards his spiritual immortal nature, but only so long as his spiritual being is clothed with or confined in a material case, and thus his faculties and ideas for the most part limited to material objects, and clogged or encumbered by these.

Animal, possesses a wonderful versatility, or power of accommodation. All the senses are providentially so constituted in order to produce that adaptation to external circumstances without which life would be wretched and scarcely endurable. Thus man's sense of *taste* is such, that what is painfully disagreeable to the palate at first, becomes by habit tolerable, and ultimately even pleasant; the same thing occurs with reference to his sense of *smell;* and in the case of *hearing*, it has often happened that a continually recurring noise which at first prevented sleep, has ultimately become necessary to enable him to obtain sleep. It would therefore follow, in accordance with this Law of his nature, that if mankind acquired a Moral Sense, or inherent Mental Faculty for recognising or estimating Moral distinctions, it would of necessity participate in this versatility pervading his other senses; his Moral taste would be so influenced or affected by circumstances, as to undergo perversion, or even inversion, as his physical taste continually does; and that which he condemned, and pronounced Wrong at one time, he might ultimately approve and declare Right.[1]

17. But though through the inherent versatility of his nature man's Moral Faculty had become inverted, and thus its decisions were reversed, and the opposite of Holiness, instead of tending towards conformity to Moral Right, nevertheless the Moral Obligation accompanying the Moral Faculty, would be in no degree either destroyed or even impaired; Man's natural Moral Standard (*i.e.*, his notions of Right and Wrong provided by his natural Moral Sense) would be altered,

[1] A similar versatility (only in a less degree) attaches to man's intellectual powers or Discursive Faculty, truth and error, in reference to man's intellect, being almost analogous to Right and Wrong in the case of his Moral Faculty; for a long familiarity with what it knows to be error, gradually so impairs the force of the erroneous impression on the mind that ultimately the error ceases to affect it at all, and thus he becomes doubtful as to its being error: and the converse.

and he would mistake Wrong for Right, but his Moral Law (Moral Obligation), would continue consistently to insist on conformity to such altered Standard; (Sec. 12, note 2), and thus being required to act conformably to his reversed Moral Judgments, he would be under Moral Obligation to do evil. Hence Moral Obligation in connection with a versatile Moral Faculty in the natural man, would in the main be nothing else but an Obligation to conform to his evil propensities, and to act out his worst vices; in other words, an obligation to follow a sinful course from a sense of duty.[1] (Introduction, p. 8.)

[1] This versatility in man's senses is one principal reason, along with others (some vague hope of ultimate pardon for guilt being one), why he seldom becomes completely converted into a Fiend while living upon earth; for his Moral Faculty, instead of maintaining its original character, which has direct reference to the Moral Law, accommodates itself to his prevailing habits and propensities, and ultimately becomes so inverted, as both to sanction and even to enforce the commission of his worst vices; thus the intense and progressively increasing hatred of Holiness, which constitutes a fiendish nature, can only be commenced, and is seldom even commenced, during life, inasmuch as his perception of Moral Right (partial and imperfect at best) becomes obliterated or even reversed, and he believes himself Right, while guilty of the blackest crimes. See Introduction. (Of this more in Part II.)

Query: Is not this versatility in the Moral Sense, and in the Intellectual Powers, the result of their connection and identification with the physical organs, or generally of the temporary union between man's spiritual being and his material nature? If so, this versatility would cease at death. Doubtless this is the case, for this versatility is more extreme in the Physical Senses than in the Spiritual Faculties. Hence, then, the Spiritual inhabitants of the next world must be exempt from it, and therefore both apprehend truth more clearly, and those of them who were Moral Agents (though inevitably fiends), would estimate Right and Wrong with more approximation to a correct decision.

The approximation of men's spiritual being towards a fiendish nature would, in individual cases, be both more decided and more palpably evidenced among all those sections of mankind who were conversant with a Divine Revelation, than among others who were ignorant of it; for the Scripture, when known and *believed* (*i.e.*, assented to by the intellect, though not embraced by the heart), is almost a perfect antidote or specific to the natural versatility of the Moral Faculty, and therefore when individuals acquainted with Scripture were found adopting and pursuing an evil course, it would not be from mistaking Wrong for Right (as is the case in heathen nations), but from a gradually acquired and ultimately a deliberate preference of evil (knowing it to be such), in obedience to the compulsion of their passions and appetites: hence

18. In reference therefore to Mankind (and in contradistinction to other orders of intelligent beings of whose natures we are of necessity ignorant), it follows that there is an additional reason why a Moral Sense, as a rule of life, would be not merely useless but even ruinous in the extreme—namely, the versatility pervading this in common with man's other faculties; and the consequent necessity to provide him with an immutable Moral Law, external to himself, in order to correct and strengthen his inherent Moral Sense and preserve it from becoming perverted, and even inverted, by custom, 'the principal magistrate of man's life.'

Not that any Law expressed in the imperfect language of finite man could ever pretend adequately to represent that infinite and Spiritual Moral Law which is the counterpart of Holiness; such external Law could be nothing more than a code of rules, by acting in conformity with which man's conduct, both spiritual and physical, would be in the direction of Holiness, instead of reversely tending towards Moral Evil.

19. But this Moral Law, external to man, which was required to constitute an immutable Code by means of which his versatile Moral Faculty might be preserved from perversion or inversion, could not possibly be the product of that Faculty, or be provided for Man by any mental powers of his own; for the decisions of his natural Moral Sense being either vague and uncertain on the one hand or perverted or reversed on the other,

would be generated in the mind and affections of such characters a hatred of Moral Right, because it condemned them in the prosecution of their deliberately chosen evil courses and vices.

Thus a knowledge of Revelation becomes a 'Savour of death unto death' to many; for to the finite perceptions of the Moral Faculty, the degree of Moral delinquency, or advance in the direction of evil, appears more extreme in the case of a man who deliberately chooses vice, knowing it to be such, than in the case of him whose Moral Sense, by inversion, has ultimately mistaken Vice for Virtue, and therefore pursued an evil course, believing it to be Right, as in the case with nations who are ignorant of Scripture; but alas! what an awful alternative! (See. 29 and Note.)

could never furnish him with a Law capable of *correcting* and *strengthening* the Faculty in which they originated; for the cause could by no possible means be corrected, or in any degree affected, by the converse; and any Law, obtained in this manner, so far from being *external* to man, could be nothing else but an embodiment in language, to an *internal Law* originating in man's inherent mental faculties. On the supposition, therefore, that man had become possessed of an immutable external Moral Code capable of correcting and giving stability to the decisions of his versatile Moral Sense, such Moral Code must have been provided for him by the Deity, as he could acquire it from no other source; the existence, therefore, of a Code of Moral Rules revealed by God as an antidote or preventive to the versatility of man's Moral Faculty being assumed,[1] our examination of its consequences proceeds as follows:—

20. The Moral Sense, if possibly thus preserved from its natural versatility, would (like man's other senses and faculties) acquire strength or power by being cultivated; and the converse. For man's Moral Sense is not absolute or definite in its perception of the Infinite Law, but continually liable either to expansion or contraction in its power of comprehension of right and wrong; for as the sight, hearing, taste and smell, become keener and more perfect by cultivation, and the intellectual powers become more vigorous and acute both in the investigation and detection of truth by the same process, so also those who most carefully attended to the dictates of conscience, and most earnestly endeavoured to follow out and act up to its directions, would acquire a keener moral perception, and a further and more extended ac-

[1] Divine Revelation, in the main, is divisible into two parts, viz.:—
1st—A code of Moral Rules for man to regulate his mind and conduct by.
2ndly, and chiefly—A method provided for him of obtaining deliverance from guilt and its consequences.
It is the 1st of these two parts we have to do with, in Sec. 19, and the following secs., omitting purposely all reference to the 2nd, which we shall come to hereafter.

quaintance with, and a more penetrating insight into the infinite Moral Law than others, and therefore would feel themselves more guilty and under heavier condemnation than they did before; hence it would arise that those who most excelled in moral attainments would be most deeply sensible of habitual shortcomings and depravity, and most constant and sincere in their admissions of self-condemnation (Newton's 'Cardiphonia,' vol. i. p. 224). On the contrary, others whose Moral Sense, by neglect and disregard of conscience, became blunted and deadened, would feel less of Moral guilt then they did at first.[1] This is another proof of the total inapplicability

[1] Man's Intellectual Powers on the one hand, and his Moral Faculty on the other, though so distinct and separate in character, and so entirely disconnected, in this respect present a very remarkable analogy; the object of the former is to investigate Truth and eliminate Error; of the latter, to apprehend Moral Right, and to detect and reject Wrong.

Truth, the object of the Intellectual Powers, is probably infinite, for it pervades and embraces the Universe, *i.e.*, the entire creation of God, both spiritual and material, throughout all time, past, present, and future; Moral Right, the aim of the Moral Faculty, is infinite also, as an attribute of the infinite Creator.

The Intellect, on detecting or arriving at Truth, experiences a gratification similar to that which the Moral Faculty feels on approximately apprehending and contemplating Moral Right.

The Intellect varies greatly in different individuals by natural constitution, some being born with a mind so vigorous that it grasps Truth in all subjects almost by intuition, and jumps to correct conclusions with hardly even the appearance of any intermediate process of reasoning; whilst others are by birth intellectually almost imbecile, and can with difficulty arrive at Truth, even under the most favourable circumstances; so also, on the other hand, many there are who possess naturally a Moral Faculty strongly appreciating Right and Wrong, and whose Moral perception, under difficult circumstances, is as clear and correct as so doubtful a subject admits of; whilst others possess a connate Moral Sense of so feeble a character, as scarcely to be able to estimate Moral distinctions at all.

Then again the Intellectual Powers admit of an almost unlimited degree of improvement by cultivation, and of deterioration by neglect; equally so does the Moral Faculty.

Also the most superior natural Intellect, even when cultivated to the highest degree, after its most successful researches, rises up from the contemplation of Truth with a deep-seated consciousness of how small is the portion that it knows, and how infinite the remainder, which is unknown; the great Newton, even after his most profound discoveries in Science, compared himself to a little child picking up shells by the boundless ocean of Truth, which stretched away without limit beyond him; so also a Moral Faculty of the highest order, by natural constitution, when further cultivated up to

of the moral sense to man's nature, for the standard of Right being infinite, the more extensive his knowledge of that standard, the more distant he must be from conformity to it, and the greater progress he made in the direction of Holiness, the more guilty he would feel; and conversely—the further he receded from Moral perfection towards vice, the less sensible he would be of guilt:—so that his consciousness of guilt would be in exact proportion to his advance in Moral attainments; and thus Moral improvement would produce only a conviction, or an inward feeling of increased depravity.[1]

the extreme point by the strictest habitual attention to conscience and to the external revealed Moral Law, by which alone the Moral Faculty is corrected and strengthened, turns from the contemplation of Moral Right with the conviction that it knows but in part: that those of its Moral Judgments which are purely natural are of so feeble a character, and so trifling an amount, as to be inconsiderable when compared with the subject (Holiness), of which they constitute an infinitely small fraction.

In one respect, however, this analogy fails altogether, viz., that Truth, the object of the Intellectual Powers, is generally arrived at only after an intermediate process of reasoning of greater or less extent (except in the case of that inconsiderable class termed intuitive Truths); Moral Right, the aim of the Moral Faculty, admits of no such intermediate process, but is a simple idea excluding all examination, and admitting of no analysis, but arrived at in a manner similar to that by which the primary qualities of matter are perceived by man's Physical Senses.

Also there is a remarkable difference between Truth and Moral Right, the two objects aimed at; for Truth, though infinite, may be known in part with absolute correctness; as far as the Intellectual Powers can reach in the pursuit of Truth, so far man can often be quite certain that they are correct in their attainments; for frequently that portion of infinite Truth which they have achieved, admits of demonstration; but Moral Right cannot be known in part with any degree of certainty whatever, the judgments and decisions of man's Moral Faculty alone, must always remain of a doubtful and uncertain character; for nothing less than a complete knowledge by man of the entire Moral Law in all its infinite perfection (a knowledge impossible for any finite being), could warrant him in concluding with certainty that his Moral judgments were absolutely correct.

Query: Does not this difference arise from Truth, the object of the Intellectual Powers, being a quality of God's works? Moral Right is a quality or attribute of Himself: man can know God's works partially yet correctly, but God Himself is incomprehensible both in His nature and attributes.

[1] 'Every Moral Agent must be a sinner both *Absolutely* and *Relatively;* in the 1st case, from his inability to conform to an infinite Law; in the 2nd, from the impossibility of his conforming to his own Moral Judgments' (Sec. 14, 1, Note 1). If by the cultivation of his Moral Sense these judgments became more extensive and correct, he would be *relatively* a more extreme sinner than before.

21. But Sin or Sinfulness[1] is of two kinds, viz.

1st. That which is unproductive of, or unaccompanied by Guilt.

2nd. That which inevitably creates Guilt, or out of which Guilt of necessity arises.

1st. Sinfulness unaccompanied by Guilt is merely nonconformity to an infinite Moral standard, and is therefore universal, being a necessary condition of the very existence of every *finite* creature. For whatever is not holy is sinful; and as no finite being is capable of holiness, he must therefore be sinful; for nonconformity to such a standard is so essential to the nature itself of any *finite* being, that it appears beyond the power of Deity to create him otherwise; for if a finite being could be conformable to an infinite moral standard, he would be both finite and infinite at the same time; and if this nonconformity or sinfulness was accompanied by guilt and its consequences, it would follow of necessity, that a God of infinite goodness, had called into existence countless immortal beings who, by a condition of their very nature, were subject to Moral condemnation and its curse. So long as any finite being was not conscious of the existence of such standard, *i.e.*, was without a Moral sense, and therefore being exempt from Moral obligation not required to conform to that standard, so long he would not be culpable in failing to do so; for he would neither condemn himself for a Moral defect or incapacity of which he was totally unconscious, nor would God condemn him either, for what was a necessary condition of his being, and for failing in that to which he was not required to conform; in other words, though sinful through nonconformity to, or want of holiness, he would nevertheless be guiltless, and his state would be one of conscious innocence, as he was in no respect a transgressor of any known law.

[1] Sinfulness, a quality of a finite being, in the abstract is Sin; Sin in connection with a finite being is Sinfulness.

But secondly, this sinfulness or sin which is both incidental and even essential to the nature of every *finite* creature as a condition of his very being, generates guilt, immediately on his becoming a Moral Agent by acquiring a Moral Sense: for Moral Sense not only reveals to him the existence of the Moral Standard, but also, by creating a Moral Obligation, requires conformity to that standard, thus rendering him responsible to the Moral Law (Sec. 10), hence he not only becomes aware of his nonconformity to holiness, of which he was previously unconscious, but also finds himself under Moral condemnation; for Moral obligation produces self-condemnation for such nonconformity, and the Moral Law pronounces condemnation from God for it (Sec. 14, 5thly): thus he becomes subject to a double condemnation, and is guilty both by his own verdict and by the judgment of Deity: this double judgment, internal in man, and external to him, is in reality one and the same; for moral sense or a knowledge of right and wrong in man is nothing but a partial acquisition of an Attribute of God, a slight glimpse or very partial perception of the Moral Standard (Holiness) external of him (Sec. 10), and thus the decisions of his Moral Faculty internally (*i.e.*, of Conscience), and of the Moral Law externally, of necessity correspond, or mutually and reciprocally reflect and confirm each other. Guilt therefore, *irrespective* of the Moral Law, has no existence, but is a term without any meaning: *under* the Moral Law Sin and Guilt are not two things but one; for they are so connected and involved that where the former is, there of necessity is the latter: and thus they become synonymous terms—a distinction without a difference.

Hence every finite being is inevitably sinful; every finite Moral agent is both sinful and guilty.[1]

[1] N.B.—There is clearly an important distinction between Sin, which is a mere natural and inevitable nonconformity to an infinite

22. Again:—God is a Spirit,[1] therefore His Moral

Moral Standard by a finite being; and Sin, which is a breach of the Moral Law by a Moral Agent; the latter is evidently culpable. and inevitably involves Guilt and Moral Condemnation; while the former is as evidently blameless and exempt from such Guilt and Condemnation; it becomes necessary to use the word *Sin* in both these cases, because there is no single term in language marking the distinction, and it would be indispensable to adopt a phrase. 'Moral Defect' will not meet the case, as it seems to imply a partial, or particular defect, and not a general or total deficiency or non-conformity to Holiness in every particular.

Throughout this Essay, wherever *Sin* is mentioned in connection with a Moral Sense, it means *Guilty Sin*, whether the word Guilt occurs there or not.

[1] Bacon in his 'Confession of Faith,' has the following passage, viz., 'I believe that God is so holy, pure and jealous, as it is impossible for Him to be pleased in any creature,' though the work of His own hands; so that neither angel, man, nor world could stand or can stand one moment in His eyes, without beholding the same in the face of a Mediator; and therefore that before Him *with whom all things are present*, the Lamb of God was slain before all worlds; without which eternal council of His it was impossible for him to have descended to any work of creation.'

In this passage the great Philosopher distinctly admits the position laid down in this Sec. 21, viz., the inevitable Sinfulness of all creation as a condition of its very being. 'God is so holy, and pure that neither angel, man, nor world could stand or can stand one moment in his eyes'; which is merely expressing in other words the position that God's holiness being infinite, all finite holiness, when compared with it, is nothing else but Sinfulness; the necessity of a Mediator or an Atonement anterior to any part of creation, which he contends for, seems favoured by the text, 'the Lamb slain from the foundation of the world,' from which, doubtless, he borrowed the idea: but it appears opposed to the text, 'God saw everything that He had made, and behold it was very good,' which term applied to the rational portion of his creation, would signify morally guiltless or perfectly innocent; also 'God made man upright, &c.'; if God's whole creation was *very good*, and man was created *upright*, it would not appear that at that time a Mediator or Atonement was requisite.

Nevertheless there is reason to believe that Bacon is right from the following consideration. God could not confer *Holiness* on any work of His creation, without first conferring on that work *Infinity*, both attributes peculiar to Deity, and in which no work of His creation could participate with Him (Sec. 8); hence God's works being *finite*, must inevitably also be *Sinful* as a condition of their very being; but it can hardly be supposed that God who *is* and is *alone* the Holy Being, could stoop to create sinful works; nor is it conceivable that He would abstain for ever from the exercise of His creative power and thus exist perpetually in a void and blank space; hence He must previous to creating have contrived a method to put away Sin and to confer Holiness, *i.e.*, an Atonement; (see forward), and remarkably enough, that very person of the Trinity by whom the Atonement is made, is the person by whom creation is carried into effect, viz., the second person.

[1] This must be conceded, the proof is too long for this Outline; but the fact sufficiently obvious.

attribute, Holiness, must, like his nature, be spiritual, and the Moral Law which originates in and is the counterpart of that Holiness, must be spiritual likewise; but a spiritual Law must in its application have exclusive reference to man's soul or spiritual nature, including his entire mental faculties; such a Law would claim to exercise the most absolute control over every single thought or idea of the intellect, to regulate every affection or feeling of the heart, and thus despotically to rule over every passion inherent in human nature; and whereas thoughts, affections and passions[1] are merely a variety of different operations, active or passive, of the soul or internal spiritual nature of man, and his bodily actions are nothing else but the carrying out by his material frame of these internal spiritual operations; therefore a Law in possession of authority to rule over these last, would thereby claim to effectually control and regulate the former which arose out of them:—In other words, if man became responsible to the spiritual Moral Law, it would be entitled to exercise the most absolute and unlimited control over his entire spiritual being, and through it, over his material. But that awful position

[1] Thoughts or ideas, are either impressions passively received by the mind, or operations actively produced by or proceeding from it through the Will.

Affections are either benevolent or malevolent, and are partly passive impressions, but chiefly active principles, *i.e.*, principles tending to produce action.

Passions are affections, both benevolent and malevolent, carried to an extreme degree.

Now 1st, no thoughts or ideas of the soul or spiritual being which is finite within man, could ever accord Morally with a Law which is both spiritual and infinite, external and independent of him; for whatever of a Moral character appertained to such thoughts or ideas, must inevitably fail in conformity to an infinite Moral Standard; and the absence of such Moral character in any thoughts or ideas would of itself constitute a sinful defect by the judgment or decision of that infinite and spiritual Law.

2nd. The affections of a finite being, if benevolent, must of necessity be defective, or fall short of the requirements, of an infinite Law: if malevolent, must run counter to or transgress those requirements.

3rd. The passions or extreme affections of any finite being, must also be benevolent or malevolent, and therefore equally either fall short of, or transgress, the Moral Law's requirements.

in which every one of his daily, innumerable thoughts and feelings, however trivial and transient, is rendered amenable to an *infinite* Moral Law,—so that even during life, a correctly informed Conscience could not fail more or less to condemn him in all and every of them, and after death in the world of Spirits such condemnation would be far more palpably manifested,—may be partially conceived, but never described. Yet this position is the lot of every man possessed of a Moral Sense, though on this side of the grave he can only be very slightly aware of its tremendous consequences.

Hence arises the inevitable and unintermitting Sinfulness and Guilt of Man after he has become a Moral agent. For even if through life he succeeded in never once transgressing the Moral Law by his external conduct or bodily actions (an hypothesis impossible to admit), yet, inasmuch as his every thought and affection is required to conform to an infinite and spiritual Law, to which Law it is impossible that any single thought or affection of a finite Being could conform, he of necessity becomes, both infinitely Sinful and Guilty (Sec. 25), in every thought and affection, and unceasingly so, throughout the whole succession of them.

23. Again, the continual experience by man of the impracticability of the infinite and spiritual Moral Law, and of the impossibility of his so acting up to its requirements as to escape from its constant condemnation,—for that his perception or consciousness of those requirements expands and increases without any limit in exact proportion to his endeavours to conform to them (Sec. 14, 2),—has a direct tendency to make him, first, slight and disregard it as a rule of life and conduct: afterwards, reject and abjure it altogether; and ultimately, even determinately run counter to it.[1] For if he felt more guilt and self-condemnation in

[1] The intense and progressively increasing hatred of Moral Right, which constitutes a Fiendish nature, is probably a degree further even

proportion as he progressed in the direction of Holiness he would naturally by degrees abjure such a course, and run into the opposite extreme towards Vice; this progressively increasing Moral deterioration (both in the mind and conduct of Man) commencing at an early period of life, would be so very gradual, that during the process it would be almost imperceptible even to the subject of it himself; though at advanced stages, on looking back at its commencement, the result would be very decidedly apparent and unmistakeable: hence a Moral Law insisting on a degree of Holiness beyond the capacity of man to attain to, inevitably tends to drive him further into vice, and to make him a more extreme sinner (if possible) than he would have been without it. For had mankind not acquired a Moral Sense and its result a Guilty Conscience, his Reason combined with experience, would have taught him the beneficial results of a virtuous course, and the injurious consequences of a vicious one,[1] and he would therefore, as far as he could to some considerable extent, and in a progressive ratio, have adopted the former and avoided the latter:—in other words, he would have aimed at and steadily endeavoured to follow out a virtuous course—not under the imperative compulsion of an inexorable Moral Obligation—but, from a rational conviction resulting from experience of its advantageous consequences. But when he discovers experimentally that the more moral his mental attainments and exercises, as well as his course of life, and the greater his endeavours in that direction with a view to satisfy Conscience, the more

than this, and only very partially (and that seldom), attainable by man during his sojourn in the flesh.

[1] God has so constituted the Universe that Virtue tends to advantage, Vice to disadvantage; hence the mistake of Utilitarian Moralists who have put the tendency first, and principle second; mistaking the principle or cause for the effect, and making the effect the cause; advantage creates Virtue, disadvantage Vice, according to their principles.

guilty he feels himself, and that the more he does, the greater apparently is the amount that remains to be done; it inevitably creates in his mind a feeling, first of dissatisfaction, and next of irritation, ultimately merging into exasperation, which generates a spirit of contradiction, impelling him to run counter to so exacting and inexorable an inward monitor, whose requirements only increase with his endeavours to conform to it:[1] and thus that his most effectual escape from a Guilty Conscience would be the obdurateness and insensibility of his Moral Faculty, acquired by an habitual course of Vice.

24. One more reason may here be adduced why a Moral Sense, even if corrected by an external Moral Law, would be utterly unsuited, and therefore both useless and even ruinous to mankind. It has been shown previously (Sec. 5, also 7, and Note) that Holiness admits of no degrees, being infinite and absolute; hence then Sin (the reverse of Holiness) or the breach of that infinite Law which is the counterpart of Holiness, admits of no degrees either. For every transgression, however great or however small, bears a similar ratio to a Law that is infinite: for every finite quantity bears precisely the same ratio to an infinite.[2] Therefore the most heinous crime, and the most trivial impropriety, when referred to the Moral Law (*i.e.*, contrasted with the infinite Moral Standard, Holiness), are equal:—in other words, an angry feeling and an atrocious murder are identical in guilt; and an impure thought or flagrant act of adultery, are equally criminal; also a sin of ignorance, arising from man's inability to comprehend fully an infinite Law (so that he both may, and does

[1] Hence the absolute necessity of a conviction or rational assurance in the mind of man that there exists some abundant provision for the removal of guilt and its consequences, to enable him to enter upon, and to persevere in, the hopeless endeavour of pursuing a virtuous course. (See 'Cardiphonia,' vol. i. p. 224.)

[2] 'Ratio, is the relation which one quantity bears to another in respect of magnitude.'—Wood's 'Algebra.'

continually commit sin, either by transgressing or by falling short of that Law, without being in the least aware of it), is equivalent in guilt to one of presumption. Moreover as the best action of which man is capable, when compared with the requirements of this infinite Law, is defective, and therefore has in it somewhat of the nature of sin, therefore such action is strictly on a par with his most heinous crime; and thus every Moral agent, whether Saint (*i.e.*, one who has achieved the nearest approach towards Moral excellence attainable by Man) or *Fiend*, is undistinguishable in Guilt. A Law therefore which recognises no difference, and makes no distinction between the blackest crime and the most trifling fault, and between man's best action and most heinous vice, but which visits each and all indiscriminately with one and the same Moral condemnation, is utterly inapplicable to him as a rule of life, and must be utterly ruinous to him in its consequences.

25. But if Holiness is infinite and absolute, admitting of no degrees (Sec. 5, also 7, and Note), and if therefore the Moral Law, which is the result and counterpart of Holiness, is infinite and absolute, and admits of no degrees (Sec. 10), and if Sin, the breach of that Law, admits of no degrees either (Sec. 24), it follows that Sin must be both absolute (*i.e.*, invariable), and infinite likewise; for if Sin was not infinite, but merely finite, it would be both variable, and admit of degrees; for whatever is *finite*, can be either increased or diminished, which anything *infinite* cannot be: for there are no degrees in anything *infinite*; it cannot be more infinite or less infinite. For in any scale on which the relative position of Moral qualities to each other is indicated respectively, and thus either the proximity or the distance of such qualities from each other is marked down, the Standard of Moral Right (infinite Holiness) being fixed and absolute, Sin (its reverse), must be both infinitely distant or removed from and therefore opposed

in an infinite degree to that Standard ; in other words, Sin must be infinitely sinful, as contrasted with, and as the exact reverse of a Law that is infinitely holy. For as Holiness is infinitely holy, so Sin, its reverse, must of necessity, as contrasted with it, be infinitely sinful. For if any two qualities are directly opposite to, *i.e.*—the reverse of—each other, and if either of these qualities be increased infinitely in degree, the other, which is not so increased, becomes nevertheless at once infinitely opposite to it: but Moral Perfection and Moral Evil are direct opposites; if then Moral Perfection be increased infinitely, Moral Evil becomes at once infinitely opposed to it: in other words, Sin (Moral Evil), is infinitely opposite to Holiness (infinite Moral Perfection), but to be infinitely opposed to what is Right (Holiness), is to be infinitely Wrong or Sinful ; so that as Holiness is infinite absolutely, so Sin, its reverse, is of necessity relatively infinite likewise. Hence then every Sin, *however trivial*, which man commits, is not only equal to every other Sin, *however great* (Sec. 24), but is also in fact *infinite*, *i.e.*, sinful to a degree that admits of no limit or measurement. This, however, the finite Moral Faculty can neither comprehend, nor duly appreciate, from its inability to perceive the infinity of Holiness: for *generally*, a faculty that is finite, can only very partially or slightly perceive and appreciate any quality that is infinite. The infinite degree both of Holiness, and of Sin, its reverse, are deductions arrived at by man's Intellectual powers, and not objects to be perceived by his finite Moral Faculty.[1]

[1] Not that any thought or action of a *finite* being could by possibility be *infinite*, but that the Moral character or quality of such thought or action, as compared or contrasted with infinite holiness, would be sinful in a degree, equivalent to the degree of holiness to which it was opposed.

But query, if it is impossible for a *finite* being to be *infinitely holy* (Sec. 7, and Note), is it not equally impossible for him to be infinitely sinful ?

Answer : Holiness is infinite *per se*, or absolutely and independently. Sin is not infinite, *absolutely* and independently (for it has no independent existence), but only *relatively* and as the reverse of holi-

26. But if Sin be infinite [8] as a breach of a Law that is infinite, it must of necessity for a similar reason be

ness; for holiness as an attribute of Deity is a *positive* quality; sin is merely *negative*, the absence of holiness, an inevitable deficiency in every finite Moral Agent (see Sec. 2, Note 2); whatever be the intensity or degree of holiness, such also and nothing less than it, will be the intensity and degree of sin, its reverse, and which arises out of contrast with it. Any quantity x, or number (say 10) is merely finite; but compare that quantity or number with an infinite one, and it is infinitely distant from it, or is contained in it an infinite number of times, *i.e.*, it is infinitely small as a fraction of it; so that a finite quantity may, by position or relatively, acquire an infinite quality. All qualities that are infinite independently or *per se*, a finite being is incapable of; for they are attributes of the Deity peculiar to Him; but every finite quality in a finite being may relatively become infinite by comparison or by contrast with, a similar or an opposite quality that is infinite in degree; holiness as an attribute of God is self-existent with Him, from everlasting to everlasting; it possesses an eternal entity separate and independent of all creation, and is as indestructible as Deity Himself. Sin on the contrary possesses no self-existence, no duration *from* eternity, though after its first commencement it may be everlasting as the quality of an immortal being. Nor is it separate from or independent of creation; for it necessarily pre-supposes a creation in which it first originates and continues to exist. Holiness is an essential attribute of Deity. Sin is a defect inevitable by creation to the nature of every created being; and *guilty sin* is a quality of such being, contingent on his acquisition of a Moral Sense (see Sec. 21). Holiness therefore exists independently of sin, but sin cannot exist independently of holiness. For get rid of or remove the Moral Standard (if it were possible), by destroying the Moral Sense in any and every finite being, and Sin (*i.e.*, Sin which involves Guilt), the breach of the Law, vanishes, for the Moral Law ceases with the destruction of the Moral Sense; but, notwithstanding this annihilation of Sin, Holiness would still exist everlastingly. Hence, then, though it is impossible for any Moral Agent to participate in the Moral perfection of Deity and become infinitely holy (Sec. 7 and Note), (which would, in fact, be to engraft an attribute which is both *absolute* and *infinite* upon a being that is merely *finite*), yet it both *may be* and *is* the case, that the Moral character and conduct of such a being is infinitely sinful *relatively* when brought to the Moral Standard, and contrasted with a holiness that is infinite in degree. In other words, if you make the Moral Standard infinite, the Moral character of any finite being must, of necessity, be infinitely sinful.

The argument contained in Sec. 24 (Sin admits of no degrees), and that in Sec. 25, and in Note 1 (Sin therefore is infinite), may be stated more concisely as follows:—

1st.—Every finite quantity or number is infinitely small, when compared with an infinite quantity or number; thus 10 is *infinitely small* when compared with an infinite number; equally so is 100, and equally so is 100,000; so that all finite quantities are equal when compared with or in relation to an infinite quantity; therefore there are no degrees in finite quantity when compared with infinite quantity.

2nd.—Every finite quality is infinitely small in degree, when compared with a similar quality that is infinite in degree; thus the strength of a fly or insect is infinitely small when compared with

spiritual as a breach of a Law that is spiritual: for a spiritual law could not apply to any Being which was purely material, but must be limited either to a Spiritual Being, or to one compounded of both a spiritual and material nature (Man); and in this latter case such Law would apply both primarily and entirely to Man's spiritual nature, and only secondarily, and through his spiritual to his material. For a spiritual Law could not reach Man's material nature, excepting through or by means of his spiritual; and though it both might and does in many instances apply exclusively to Man's spiritual Being, and stop there, not extending itself to his material (for it reaches, and claims authority over man's thoughts and affections, even where they are not carried out into bodily actions or conduct), yet it could not possibly operate conversely and attach itself exclusively to his material Being, independently of his spiritual; hence then a breach of his spiritual Law, can only be effected either by a purely spiritual Agent, or by the spiritual Being of a compound one. But if a spiritual Law is transgressed by a Spiritual

infinite strength; equally so is the strength of a man; and equally so is the strength of an elephant; that is to say,—all finite strength is equal as compared with infinite strength; finite strength therefore admits of no degrees when compared with infinite.

3rd.—If any two qualities are opposite or contrasted in nature, and one of them becomes infinite, the other as contrasted with it becomes infinite also; thus sour and sweet are opposite qualities; if then sweet becomes infinite in degree, sour, when contrasted with it, is rendered infinitely sour; and every degree of sour, is equally infinitely sour, when contrasted with infinite sweetness; in other words, every degree of sour is equal as contrasted with infinite sweetness; sour therefore, as contrasted with infinite sweetness, admits of no degrees.

Hence it is that sin and holiness being opposite or contrasted, and holiness being infinite in degree *absolutely*, sin is rendered *relatively* infinite or infinitely sinful likewise; also every degree of sin is infinite, and therefore becomes equal as contrasted with infinite holiness; in other words, sin admits of no degrees.

[3] It has been shown before (Sec. 5), that holiness is infinite; in Sec. 24, it has been proved that sin also is infinite; throughout the remainder of Part I., therefore, it must be understood that both holiness and holy, sin and sinfulness, signify *infinite* qualities respectively, whether the word infinite is prefixed to them or not.

agent, the Sin resulting therefrom must of necessity be spiritual in its nature. Hence then every sin is *spiritual* as well as *infinite*, being a breach of an Infinite and Spiritual Law.

Sins of Omission and Commission.

27. In the case of Mankind, all existence implies continuous or uninterrupted action (except, perhaps, during sleep or coma). This action is either purely spiritual, of more or less intensity, usually called thought; or else spiritual resulting in physical, that is, thought carried out into bodily action. No such thing as perfect passivity, that is, an entire cessation from all action both spiritual and spirituo-physical, is possible to Man: and as no action of a finite being can be conformable to an infinite Law, every one of their actions must be sinful *absolutely*. Yet *relatively* and in reference to Man's Moral Sense, or partial perception of the law, it is legitimate to describe some of his actions as good and others as evil. All those that incline towards the infinite Moral Standard, though of necessity falling short of it, may be considered right, and such as have an opposite tendency, wrong. This incessant and unbroken succession of spiritual actions in Man, each of them sinful absolutely (Sec. 22), is, by the operation of the Moral Law, subdivided into two classes, each class bearing an opposite character to the other: for the Moral Law acts in a twofold and opposite manner, positively and negatively. It enjoins every Moral Agent to do and not to do. Thus every one of these spiritual actions ranges itself under one or other of these opposite classes.

28. The Moral Law operates in a twofold manner, positively and negatively: its positive operation consists in requiring a Moral Agent to do or perform everything which is in conformity with the Moral

Standard; by its negative action he is required to refrain from doing anything at variance with or uncomformable to that Standard. The positive operation, therefore, requires *active* obedience; its negative, passive: a breach of its positive operation is a non-performance of the Law's requirements, and constitutes a sin of omission; of the negative, a transgression, or sin of commission. Of these two classes of sins, a sin of omission is by far the greatest,[1] as it is an indispensable preliminary to a sin of commission. No being could perpetrate a transgression or sin of commission, unless he has previously been guilty of a sin of omission. For example, no person whose entire conduct was habitually conformable to strict justice could possibly commit a positive act of injustice. For if any being was capable of fulfilling strictly the law's positive requirements, and did fulfil them, such a being would be inevitably precluded from and incapable of a sin of commission: whereas, on the contrary, a being refraining from every transgression or sin of commission, might, nevertheless, be guilty of sins of omission. For a being might in no degree transgress or act contrary to the Law, and yet fail in acting up to the positive requirements of the Law. The conduct required by the Law's *positive*, and that forbidden by its negative operation, are directly contrary to each other. A being strictly acting up to the first, will by no possibility simultaneously fail in the second. But the converse does not hold. For as the Law's positive operation requires, in any Moral Agent, an activity in doing Right, in the same degree as its negative requires a passivity in, or a refraining from doing Wrong, such agent might sin, by a failing in or a cessation from active obedience, even

[1] Though sin admits of no degrees, and all sins are equal when compared with an Infinite Law (Sec. 25), yet it appears a legitimate expression to describe one sin as greater than another, when the second presupposes the first, standing to it in the relation of effect and cause.

though he refrained from transgression or disobedience by means of sins of commission.

The same process of reasoning equally applies to the Human Mind. An activity in right thoughts or affections inevitably precludes those that are wrong, but an absence of wrong ones is, nevertheless, consistent with and may be accompanied by a deficiency of those that are right. For example, indolence or activity must exist first as a spiritual defect before it extends to Man's physical nature and becomes sinful conduct.[1]

He that by sinful conduct omits to do what is right, affords himself the opportunity for wrong-doing ; and as all human existence is incessant spiritual action, an omission to do right leaves the vacuum to be filled inevitably with what is wrong. If right actions were incessant, in other words, if the entire course of thought and conduct was a continuous performance of what is right, a wrong action would be impossible, as no interval would be left for its commission. An activity, therefore, in right-doing inevitably compels a passivity in wrong.

29. The foregoing Sections (15 to 29), sufficiently evidence, that the *general* consequences to *Mankind* of the acquisition of a Moral Sense (independently of the five to *every finite being* pointed out in Sec. 14), would be the two following, viz. :—

1st. That from the versatility inseparable from it in its natural state, man's notions of Right and Wrong would vary in accordance with his prevailing appetites, propensities and habits, and thus that he would be impelled by Moral Obligation to the practice of a variety of evil courses under the

[1] Hence it arises that the most effectual prevention to Transgression or Sins of Omission, is an active employment in a cause of duty. Hence also the truth of the proverb, 'The idle man tempts the Devil.' The idle man is continually guilty of sins of omission, and thus paves the way for sins of commission, and invites the assaults of the Tempter.

mistaken idea that they were either Moral duties or Religious observances. (Introduction, p. 8, and Note.)

2ndly. That on the hypothesis of man's Moral Sense being preserved from its natural versatility or corrected by a Revealed Code of Moral Rules, he would acquire an intense hatred of Right, approximating (as far as was possible in this world) to a Fiendish nature, from the utter impracticability of a Moral Law which was both infinite and spiritual —which condemned him in every thought and action of his life—to which Law he had become responsible, and in which condition of impossibilities, he had been placed by his corrected Moral Sense.

Of these two awful consequences to Mankind (both of them incalculably injurious and destructive), the first would be preferable ; for to practise Vice by mistaking it for Moral Right (ruinous as Vice must ever become in its results, being opposed to the Moral constitution of the Universe) would be less tremendous than the intense hatred of Righteousness and of God its source, incident to the 2nd ; in the first case a Guilty Conscience, *i.e.*, consciousness of Guilt, might possibly in this world be trifling, perhaps almost evanescent ; in the 2nd it would be overwhelming.[1]

30. It has before been stated (Sec. 11), that the inseparable union of a Moral Obligation with a Moral

[1] Hence a revealed Moral Law, unaccompanied by any provision for deliverance from Guilt, would only be a fearful aggravation of the ruin to mankind resulting from his Moral Sense ; it would produce in a great degree by anticipation during life, that Fiendish nature inevitable to him in the next world.

A revealed Moral Code would be a blessing to man exempt from a Moral Sense, as affording a rule of life for him to walk by ; and it was, perhaps, from time to time, as occasion required, provided for him by God in Paradise ; thus Bacon says, 'God gave man a Law and Commandment which was in his power to keep ;' but to man as a Moral Agent, it would be an additional evil, by correcting and strengthening that Moral Sense which is his ruin.

Sense is an Ultimate Fact, of which no further explanation can be given; hence the former is involved in the latter, or invariably accompanies it as effect follows cause; and this union constitutes a Moral axiom or intuitive truth (see Stewart, Sec. 199) as undeniable (but not at first sight so obvious), as the mathematical axiom that the whole is greater than its part.[1] Our intellectual faculties can perceive no means whereby the Deity who originally created or constituted these axioms, or intuitive, *i.e.*, Prime Truths, could interfere with or invalidate them except by annihilating and reconstructing the Universe on new and different principles: whilst man's intellectual powers remain as they are, he never could be brought to concede the possibility of a part being equal to its whole, which would be a contradiction in terms; nor, whilst his Moral Nature continues, could he admit that a Moral Sense could be possessed by a rational Being without a Moral responsibility, *i.e.*, an obligation to obey the Moral Law to which his Moral Sense has reference. 'It is absurd therefore to ask why we are bound to practise Virtue. The very notion of Virtue implies a notion of obligation. 'Every Being who is conscious of the distinction between Right and Wrong, carries about with him a Law which he is bound to observe.'[2] It would seem as if the Deity, by creating or constituting Prime Truths, had as it were tied His own hands from interfering with these His own principles. It may therefore be said, without either presumption or profaneness (but with all humility be it spoken), that Deity cannot (*i.e.*, that He has voluntarily put it out of His own power) separate Moral Obliga-

[1] As man's mental powers are chiefly resolvable into a Discursive Faculty, and its accompaniments, on the one hand, and a Moral Sense on the other (2nd Postulate, Introduction), it appears proper to distinguish self-evident propositions into two classes, viz., Intellectual Axioms, or those that the Intellect must concede, and Moral, such as the Moral Faculty must assent to.

[2] Stewart's 'Moral Philosophy,' Sec. 218.

tion from Moral Sense.[1] (See 3rd Postulate, Introduction).[2]

[1] Many writers consider that there are certain fundamental principles or Primê Truths (including axioms or self-evident propositions) which exist independently of God, and are beyond His power to interfere with. To human reason this view of the case appears a strictly correct one. Nevertheless, as such an hypothesis undoubtedly places a limit upon the infinite power of the Almighty Creator, it seems preferable to state the case as above, viz., to refer such Principles and Truths to His Creation—to consider them immutable, not absolutely or *quâ* Principles, but because He has made them so—and to admit His power to reconstruct the Universe on different principles, and thereby change many things which in the present constitution or dispensation are of necessity to human reason, unchangeable.

[2] The real state of the case, however, appears to be as follows. Moral Sense or a knowledge of Right and Wrong, is an attribute of Deity which ought to be proper and peculiar to Him (Sec. 13); a Moral Obligation constitutes an essential component part or adjunct of a Moral Sense; ([1]) and because immutability is another quality or attribute of God, and therefore His nature is of necessity unchangeable, it follows that Moral Sense and Moral Obligation are inseparable, for they could not be separated except by effecting a change in the nature of God. If, therefore, any finite being became possessed of a Moral Sense, he must, along with it, of necessity be subject to a Moral Obligation which is inherent in it. For in partially acquiring an attribute of Deity, he must hold such attribute in connection with its essential and inseparable adjunct. Nor could God Himself deliver him from this Moral Obligation except by making a change in His own nature.

This inseparable and essential connection between Moral Sense and Moral Obligation Dugald Stewart was the first Moralist who discovered and distinctly pointed out; but the reason of it, as an indivisible and immutable attribute of Deity, he failed to perceive. Equally remarkable, also, is his correct perception of the *immutability of Moral Distinctions* which he so strenuously insists upon; though here also he fails to detect the reason, viz., that Moral Right and Wrong have reference to and depend upon the Holiness of God, as its only Standard, and therefore must be as immutable as that attribute in which they originate.

([1]) Supplementary note, explanatory to the last note.

There is no such thing as compulsory Moral Obligation with God; His actions spontaneously arise out of and accord with His nature, and that with perfect freedom and without the slightest degree either of restraint or compulsion: as His nature is holy, His conduct, which cannot fail to be conformable to that nature, is holy also; so that it is impossible for God to commit Sin, not from any deficiency of power but of will, for He would be acting contrary to His own nature; but the nature of no finite being can be holy in the same sense that God is, for Holiness is proper and peculiar to Him (Sec. 8 and Note), and the actions (whether spiritual or material), of such finite being, will spontaneously accord with his own nature, and cannot, therefore, be holy; if then, such being acquires a divine attribute or knowledge of Right and Wrong, as His natural conduct is not conformable to this new Moral Sense, he becomes bound to render it so by coercion, *i.e.*, he is under Moral Obligation, or Ob-

31. But an obligation *generally*, perhaps *necessarily* (excepting Moral Obligation, which is clearly independent of its Penalty), implies or includes a Penalty of some kind for the breach of that engagement or that Law—either by non-performance, or by transgression—to which such Obligation has reference. A Penalty, in its most comprehensive sense, comprises the Evils resulting from such breach, whether those Evils inevitably arise out of it, as effect follows cause, on the one hand, or are an infliction by some superior external agent, on the other. To enter at all fully here upon the subject of the Penalty arising from the breach of Moral Obligation is impossible for two reasons:

1st. Because it is so extensive as to be utterly beyond the scope of this Outline, for it certainly comprises the greatest portion of, and most probably *all* the Evils existing in the Universe. For if any of these Evils are not Penalties for Guilt, or the consequences of Moral condemnation, it follows that a God of infinite goodness must have created Evils without cause.

2ndly. It would be out of place here in Part I., which is chiefly limited to *a priori* reasoning, a kind of argument only very partially applicable to the investigation of such subject. For man's knowledge of the Evils which constitute this Penalty, is for the most

ligation to do Right; and the conduct which on the part of God is spontaneous, is on his part involuntary or by compulsion, and he becomes bound to imitate and to attain to conformity with it (impossible though it be). The term Moral Obligation, therefore, is applicable—not to Deity—but only to such finite beings as have acquired a Moral Sense.

A Moral Obligation in the case of Deity is a necessity to act Righteously, and a consequent inability to do Wrong, arising out of the Moral Perfection of His nature, from which nature all His conduct emanates: for He cannot act contrary to His own nature. Thus God's nature and man's are contrasted or the exact reverse of each other; the former comprises an inability to do Wrong, the latter an inability to do Right; Moral Obligation, therefore, is inoperative or dormant in the case of the former; for in relation to the Deity it signifies a natural inability to do Wrong; but it is active and compulsory in the latter, and implies a coercive reversion of all natural conduct by man.

part derived from experience and observation; and they can only be partially predicated by reasoning from cause to effect.

In this place, therefore, it may suffice to remark that the Penalty involved in the breach of Moral Obligation, must be regarded:

1st. In reference to the world of Spirits.

2nd. In reference to this material globe and its inhabitants.

Thus the Evils constituting the Penalty resolve themselves into two Classes, differing both in their magnitude and in their nature respectively, and thus forming two distinct Penalties: for man as a Guilty Moral Agent, will during life suffer one class, and at dissolution, when his spiritual being enters on the world of Spirits, must there along with any other Guilty Spirits undergo the other class.

1st. As regards the world of Spirits.

(α) Holiness being infinite, and its counterpart the Moral Law infinite, and Sin (the breach of that Law) being infinite, it becomes a legitimate inference, that the Penalty due to that breach, must be infinite likewise: for the punishment must be coequal with, or bear a due proportion to the offence; and any Penalty which was merely finite in amount, would be thoroughly inadequate, and disproportioned to Sin, which was infinite.

(β) Holiness is also Spiritual; the Moral Law Spiritual; Sin the breach of that Law Spiritual; the sinner (*i.e.*, a Moral Agent or finite Being, possessed of a Moral Sense) in the world of Spirits, is a spiritual Being; therefore the Penalty must correspond in its nature (as well as be coequal in degree or amount), both with the Sin and with the Guilty Moral Agent, and be spiritual likewise; for a spiritual Being would be susceptible of, or obnoxious to, no other than a Spiritual Penalty.

(γ) The possession by a finite immortal Spiritual Being, of a Moral Sense, involves of necessity a Guilty Conscience (*i.e.*, consciousness of Guilt), with its inevitable result, a Fiendish nature, *i.e.*, an intense hatred of Holiness, and therefore of God its source, increasing in a progressive Ratio everlastingly ; and consequently a corresponding and progressive degree of love for Moral Evil as the exact reverse of Holiness. (Sec. 14, 2ndly and 3rdly.)

(δ) This Fiendish nature or hatred of God and Holiness, must render indispensable a separate place of abode for all such Spirits as have acquired it, which separate abode for Fiends is called Hell.

All therefore that man's total ignorance of the world of Spirits will allow him to ascertain by his unassisted mental powers respecting the Penalty for Sin in a future state, are these four facts, viz.:

1st. That this Penalty is infinite in degree or magnitude.

2nd. That it is also Spiritual in its nature.

3rd. That it involves a Guilty Conscience, producing a Fiendish nature, and

4th. That it renders inevitable a separate abode—Hell.

2ndly. In reference to this world, and to man its inhabitant, the Evils constituting the Penalty for the breach of Moral Obligation, in other words for Guilt, are for the most part referable to one or other of the six following heads, viz.:

1st. A guilty and condemning conscience and its results ; among the chief of which are, the whole of the false religions prevailing in the world:—(this is a most extensive subject ; respecting these terrible results, more will appear in Part II.) ; should this Guilty conscience adhere to a man till death, and thus accompany him into the world of Spirits, it would inevitably there convert him into

a Fiend, towards which condition he was progressively advancing during life. (Sec. 14. Notes 2nd and 3rd.)

2nd. Evils during life attaching to man's own person, or physical and spiritual nature, arising from a wrong act or an immoral course of conduct, including Evils entailed upon the constitution—physical and spiritual—of his offspring.[1]

3rd. Evils affecting his own external position and circumstances in life, including those inflicted on his family, and entailed upon his heirs from the same cause.

4th. Evils affecting his fellow-man, either as an individual or collectively, in society of which the guilty agent is a member, from the same cause.

5th. A dissolution in the body, in a greater or less degree, both of a painful character, and one inspiring dread in the Human mind.

6th. Direct inflictions by God, either,—

1st. Without the intervention of second causes; which is a very rare occurrence: for second causes are employed by God, which are of so

[1] Spiritual defects or sinful dispositions and tendencies, are no doubt often transmitted by parents to their offspring, and are thus cognate, as well as diseases or physical infirmities. A peculiar cast of mind or character is often observable as hereditary in particular families; this is doubtless, the result of the connection or identification of man's spiritual nature with his brain and nervous system; and thus the physical organ with its peculiarities, being in generation transmitted to the offspring, produces a similar cast of mind and character.

This consideration, along with many others, suggests, for investigation, a subject of the highest interest under the denomination of 'The Physiology of the Human Mind.'

It is an established fact, well known to Phrenologists, that a particular intellectual study or pursuit develops and gives prominence to that particular organ of the brain with which such study corresponds or is associated; does not this also hold in the case of Morals, though in a less degree, and is not the brain in a degree acted upon and moulded into shape by the Moral character of the course of life pursued by the individual? Decidedly it is; for some of the organs discovered by Phrenologists are *Moral* not *Intellectual ones;* thus amativeness is largely developed by a licentious course; acquisitiveness, if too much indulged, gives rise to covetousness, selfishness, &c.

subtle and imperceptible a character as to escape detection by man; or

2ndly. (Which is more common,) By a Providential disposition and arrangement of circumstances (usually regarded as accidental) out of which the evil would not otherwise necessarily arise: or,

3rdly. By the control and direction of natural agencies, atmospheric, electric, volcanic, and others, which powerfully influence this globe and its inhabitants, and from which are supposed to arise blights, famine, pestilence, epidemic maladies, murrain, earthquakes, storms, &c., and many other evils having a similar origin.[1]

[1] In addition to these *ills of life*, constituting respectively a larger or smaller portion of the penalty for Guilt in this world, it seems proper to notice others not included under these six heads, viz.:

1st.—Personal physical injury from wild beasts, and

2ndly.—From a fall or other accident.

3rdly.—From diseases other than epidemic.

In reference to the first; man at the Fall, without doubt forfeited his supremacy over the brute creation which otherwise would have preserved him from injury or attack by them; at present this supremacy is for the most part maintained by man, though not without risk and casualties, for he has to contend and do battle for it, as it is not otherwise submitted to by many kinds of animals.

And with respect to all three of the above classes, it may here be remarked that, if any hereditary exhaustion or reduction of the brain and nervous system (or perhaps, rather, a diminution of the vital fluid which circulates through them) by excesses of all kinds, but more especially venereal excesses, for in venery man parts with a portion of his vital fluid (all which excesses are in themselves sinful), had not become connate throughout the human race in their physical constitutions, ([1]) the *vis medicatrix naturæ* proper to man in his origi-

([1]) This gradually acquired, but now permanent and hereditary diminution of the vital fluid (constituting nervous energy) in mankind is the chief, and probably sole cause of the shorter duration of life *now* than in earlier periods of the world. Man now commences life with a smaller stock of vitality, and thus it is exhausted in fewer years as contrasted with the longevity before the Flood; also he transmits to his own offspring in generation, a proportion of his own reduced stock of the vital fluid; this vital fluid may also be either wasted or husbanded by the mode of life; celibacy is favourable to its preservation, for it is parted with in the act of generation (see the longevity of old maids, a well-ascertained statistical fact); single men frequently lead an immoral life; to such, the rule as to longevity does not apply.

To one or other of these six heads may be referred nearly all the Evils in the material world of which man has any knowledge.

Of these six classes of Evils, the first (a Guilty conscience and its results) is by far the greatest, not merely from its influence upon the spiritual immortal part of human nature, and the everlasting ruin it involves in a future state, but even in this world it is much more detrimental to man's well-being than the others:[1] moreover, though the last five classes do not necessarily attend upon it, yet a Guilty conscience inevitably accompanies them, being the unavoidable result of a Moral Obligation: for such Sin, which is a breach of this Obligation, cannot fail to beget a consciousness of Guilt.[2 3]

nal state by creation, would have rendered the far greater proportion of *injuries* very trivial from the ease and rapidity with which they would have cured themselves; also most of the diseases, either contagious, or epidemic, or otherwise contracted, which at present prevail in the world, man would either have been absolutely proof against (for it is well known that a feeble or delicate person is in general more susceptible of infection or contagion than a vigorous and robust one), or if he contracted them they would have been trivial, from the certainty and celerity with which he recovered from them or shook them off.

Many diseases, either epidemic or contagious, *possibly* had their origin in a distinct creation by God, as they have first appeared in the world at periods long subsequent to the Fall of man; or they may have had their origin in a combination of several causes, which causes were only brought together by the providence of God, at some period subsequent to the Creation; the latter is more probable than a new creation of disease by God.

[1] This is evident throughout the heathen world, where Divine Revelation, the only antidote or remedy for a guilty conscience, has not yet penetrated, and therefore where the evils resulting from such guilty conscience are more palpably displayed, or clearly exhibited. (Part II., Sec. IV., 3rdly.)

[2] The argument here rests on the supposition that no remedy has been provided for, and made known to man, whereby his guilty conscience may be removed; as it is only by means of Scripture that he arrives at any knowledge of the fact that such remedy both exists and is attainable.

[3] Moral Obligation is an Obligation *sui generis*, and totally distinct (not merely in degree, but absolutely in kind), from every other; thereby displaying its divine origin as an essential adjunct of or ingredient in an attribute of God, the Moral Sense; for its force is neither augmented by, nor at all dependent on, the penalty attending it; if no penalty whatever accompanied it, the Obligation would, nevertheless, still remain in full force, as any person may perceive by looking into his own mind; for the ques-

32. But if the Deity has put it out of His own power to separate Moral Obligation from Moral Sense (Sec. 30), then it is beyond His power to pardon Sin, which would be interfering between Moral Sense and Moral Obligation.

A finite Being, endowed with a Moral Sense, and

tion of penalty in no respect enters into or forms any ingredient of the instantaneous assent which man's Moral Sense gives to the proposition that he is bound to do that which he believes Right, and the converse; nor would a perfect willingness on his part to undergo the penalty for sin in any degree relieve man from the Moral Obligation; or give a Moral Sanction to his commission of such sin; whereas every other Obligation excepting one in which Moral Right constitutes either the sole or a partial ingredient in such Obligation, leaves man free to choose between conforming to such Obligation, or undergoing its penalty (see Stewart, Secs. 218, 219); but though the penalty in no way creates the Moral Obligation or increases it in degree, the latter being entirely independent of the former, yet it has pleased the Deity so to constitute the Universe, *i.e.*, the Spiritual and Material creation, that the highest penalties conceivable attend upon the Obligation as *sanctions* or *additional motives* (entirely distinct in nature from the Obligation, yet co-operating with it in a subordinate manner), and neeessarily arise out of it as effect follows cause; (1) for of the six classes of evils which constitute the penalty in this world, the four first which inevitably arise out of the breach of Moral Obligation, and could in no way be prevented except by a re-creation or new construction of the Universe upon different principles, are infinitely more severe than the fifth and sixth, which are voluntary inflictions by the Deity.

(1) Sin in general is not only a breach of the Moral Law, which is the counterpart or reflex of God's Moral nature, but is also an infraction of the Moral principles—emanations of that Moral nature—upon which the Universe, both Spiritual and Material, has been created or constructed; for God in creation evidently designed that a Right course both of life and conduct, approximating as much as is possible for a finite creature to Moral perfection, should operate favourably towards the welfare of the inhabitants of this world and the next; and any infraction of these principles would thereby produce derangement of, or interference with, the harmonious working of the complex machine, and thus give rise to all the evils both in the Spiritual and Material world, with which it has been predicated that Sin must be invariably attended. In many instances, this is palpably evidenced, for all excesses by man are sinful in themselves (thus excess in food is gluttony; in drink, drunkenness; and in the indulgence of the animal passions, lust); and contravene the laws of his natural constitution, and in this manner either produce a large proportion of the maladies to which he is liable, on the one hand, or by damaging and reducing the vis *medicatrix naturæ* prevent the easy and rapid cure by nature of such maladies, on the other.

consequently necessarily responsible to a Moral Law exceeding his capabilities, and therefore of necessity condemned by it—if Deity pardoned such a Being in one single transgression (and far more in the constant and incessant breach), it would be actually releasing that Being from the Moral Obligation imposed on him by his Moral Sense. God's *infinite* Law, inevitably *renders guilty* and therefore *entails Moral condemnation on* any *finite* Being responsible to it; and if God pardoned such a Being, *i.e.*, interfered by the exercise of sovereign power to *cancel his guilt*, and to *protect him from that condemnation* which His Law pronounces, it would be rendering His own Law a cypher and a nullity,—allowing a Moral Sense to be unproductive and independent of a Moral Obligation—and would be an act of self-contradiction on the part of Deity; for in this case God, by means of His attribute Holiness, would have become the origin of a Moral Law, involving on a Moral Agent an obligation to conform to it, and then sanctioned the continual breach of, or nonconformity to this Law, and therefore the destruction of the Obligation contained in it; for every pardon of Sin would be a sanction by God of a breach of Moral Obligation. For an Obligation which is no longer operative or in force ceases to exist; and a sanction by a Supreme Power of a breach of such Obligation, would supersede and invalidate it, and therefore destroy it. Such conduct by God would constitute an infraction of his own Immutability as well as the destruction of his Moral Attribute out of which such Obligation arises: the Moral nature of man, as he is at present constituted, would condemn the Deity Himself for the inconsistency of such an act of forgiveness.

Holiness and the Moral Law are Part and Counterpart, the latter being the Reflex of the former: Sin, a breach of the Moral Law by a Moral Agent, is therefore a breach or an attack upon God's attribute Holiness: therefore Holiness, and its Counterpart, the Moral Law,

must adjudge that Moral Agent Guilty, and visit him with Moral condemnation (Damnation) for such breach of the Moral Law. But Holiness, as an attribute of God, must be invariable and absolute; equally so must be its emanation and counterpart, the Moral Law; therefore both must be immutable and inexorable in their judgments: therefore a pardon of his Sin, by cancelling the Sinner's Guilt and delivering him from Damnation by a mere act of Sovereign power on God's part, would be reversing such immutable judgment, and therefore an attack upon and violation of His own attribute Holiness; and no less a violation and destruction of His Immutability; it would be acting directly contrary to His own nature: all God's attributes are indestructible, like His nature, and could not be destroyed without the concurrent annihilation of His very being; therefore no pardon of Guilt by God is possible, as it would involve the destruction of His being or existence.

As long, therefore, as Moral Obligation is inseparable from Moral Sense, and as long as it is beyond God's power to effect such separation, so long also is it impossible for Him to pardon Sin.[1]

[1] The chief evil comprised in the penalty for Sin,—an evil common to the penalty, both in the Spiritual and the Material worlds—is a Guilty Conscience, an evil so comprehensive as to include and entail all the other evils, because it inevitably involves condemnation from God; for the verdict which man's Moral Sense pronounces on himself is the counterpart of that which Deity pronounces on him; the two verdicts are inseparable; and this Guilty Conscience in the Spiritual world begets a fiendish nature, and in the material, originates and gives continuance to every *false Religion*, and consequently to those disastrous results which such a religion inevitably effects in the Spiritual and Physical nature of mankind; and this Guilty Conscience is as inseparable from a Moral Obligation (Sec. 14, 2) as the latter is from a Moral Sense; and it appears equally beyond God's power to separate the Guilty Conscience from the Moral Obligation, as it is to separate the Moral Obligation from the Moral Sense. But no pardon of sin could be complete or effectual, which did not eradicate a Guilty Conscience; a pardon of Sin by God (even if possible, which it is not), which left any finite being under the dominion of the *chief*, and through it of all the other evils of the penalty for Sin, would be no

33. Hence, then, it is not in the power of Deity, for it would involve the destruction of His very being to

pardon at all. Hence, then, it is no more in the power of God to pardon Sin, than it is in His power to separate Moral Obligation from Moral Sense. For any pardon of Sin, which includes the deliverance from a Guilty Conscience, can only be effected by God in some manner which obtains the entire assent and approval of man's Moral Sense, in other words—which is consistent with Moral Right, and therefore no act of mere sovereign power by Deity, could accomplish the destruction of a Guilty Conscience, even though it might remove the other evils which constitute the penalty; for these other evils arise out of the present constitution of the Material creation, and might be got rid of by a new creation of the Universe by God upon other principles.

If any being, not possessed of a Moral Sense, sinned against God by an act of disobedience to any given command by Him, it would be fully competent to Deity to pardon that Sin, and remit whatever penalty He had assigned to it; nor would such pardon and remission of the penalty be an infraction of God's Immutability; for in giving the command and assigning the penalty for its breach, He might expressly reserve to Himself the power of enforcing or remitting it. But if any *Moral Agent* committed Sin, it would be a breach of the Moral Law, to which he was responsible, and he would suffer under a double condemnation; for any breach of this Law would be a Sin both against God and against his own Moral Sense, and would subject him, therefore, to condemnation from both; and if it could be supposed that God might pardon such Sin, and thereby sanction the breach of His own Moral Law,—which, however, would involve the violation of his own Immutability, — yet Moral Sense would altogether refuse to recognise or be bound by, that act of pardon (Sec. 14, 4thly), and would maintain in the Moral Agent a Guilty Conscience, notwithstanding such pardon. In the case of every finite being responsible to an infinite Moral Law, the three things, Moral Sense, Moral Obligation, and a Guilty Conscience; *i.e.*, an internal conviction or consciousness of Guilt, are equally inseparable, and Deity could not summarily extend to that being any pardon which included the removal of his Guilty Conscience, any more than He could separate Moral Obligation from Moral Sense; for to enable any Moral Agent to commit Sin without suffering from an internal conviction of Guilt, and therefore of self-condemnation, would be to destroy his Moral Obligation altogether, in which case his Moral Sense would be destroyed along with it, as the two are indissoluble or inseparable. (See 3rd Postulate, Introduction.)

The Moral Sense in a Moral Agent renders impossible any such pardon of Sin by God as would include a deliverance from a Guilty Conscience, unless some method can be contrived which fully satisfies the requirements of the Moral Law; for these four things, the Moral Standard (God's Holiness), the Moral Law (its result and counterpart), the Moral Sense (or knowledge of the Standard and Law), and Moral Obligation (or responsibility to the Law), are indissolubly bound up together, or inseparable; —for the Moral Standard creates the Moral Law in the case of any person acquainted with that Standard, *i.e.*, possessed of a Moral Sense; and the Moral Sense involves a Moral Obligation as an essential ingredient in it; no single one of these four could be removed or destroyed without a

extend such pardon for any breach of His Moral Law by a Moral Agent as would include the removal of the

concurrent destruction of the other three; but to pardon Sin, would be to destroy Moral Obligation, which could not be effected without the simultaneous destruction of Moral Sense, the Moral Law, and of the holiness of God; which holiness of God, an essential quality of His nature, could not be destroyed without the concurrent destruction of His very being; this every person will perceive, who carefully looks into his own mind, and examines the dictates of conscience on this subject.

There is, therefore, and can be, no such thing as *pardon for Guilt;* any breach of the Moral Law by a Moral Agent, *i.e.*, by a being responsible to that Law, must inevitably be productive of Guilt and Moral Condemnation; nor could Deity by any subsequent interference destroy or remove such Guilt and Condemnation without Himself becoming accessory after the fact, to that Sin which produced them, which participation in Sin by Deity, would be fatal to His own attribute, Holiness, and therefore would involve the destruction of His very being.

The Spiritual or Mental powers or qualities of man, both *Moral* and *Intellectual*, are subject to the greatest variations, or even to total destruction during life: thus, on the one hand his Moral Faculty may be cultivated and improved considerably in its capacity of distinguishing Right and Wrong; or on the other hand by neglect, and by the disregard of the dictates of Conscience, it may become so deteriorated, that he may lose all power of estimating Moral distinctions, and so from a given point of Moral character or status, he may either progress in some degree in the direction of Holiness, or equally recede towards habitual Vice and depravity, without injuring or destroying his Spiritual existence (Introduction p. 16), and in some cases Imbecility and even Fatuity, gradually takes place, producing a total suspension of both Moral and Intellectual powers or qualities, without injury to life, which is prolonged indefinitely notwithstanding.

But in the case of Deity, nothing analogous to the process above described is in the least degree possible; the Immutability of God's nature renders His attributes totally invariable or absolute; they admit of no changes whatever, and moreover are as indestructible as His very being; hence, then, His several distinct Moral attributes, which together constitute His Moral perfection or Holiness, are essentially inherent in His nature, and could by no possibility be got rid of, or varied without the simultaneous annihilation of his existence; so that man's Mental qualities (Moral and Intellectual), *may be*, and often *are*, impaired or even destroyed without injury to life; whereas on the other hand God's attributes (Moral and Intellectual powers) could not be destroyed or even varied without the destruction or annihilation of His being; and as the Moral Law is an inevitable emanation and counterpart of His attribute of Holiness, in the case of any creature possessed of a knowledge of Right and Wrong, any breach of that Law must be a breach of Holiness, and must either operate upwards to the annihilation of Deity on the one hand, or downwards to a Moral curse and ruin of the Sinner on the other; but the 1st being impossible, the 2nd becomes inevitable; in other words, the commission of Sin being a breach of the Moral Law, and thus an attack or assault upon Holiness, cannot fail to react or recoil upon the Sinner, thus entailing on him a Moral curse or ruin, which is

penalty resulting from that breach: for this penalty is not a voluntary infliction by God which He can abstain or desist from; it is a necessary result of such breach, as effect follows cause; and He has so constituted the Universe, *i.e.*, the spiritual and material Creation, that Moral Condemnation (in other words damnation), and its consequences, must inevitably attend upon any such breach of this Moral Law. For the Moral Constitution of the Universe is merely the reflex or counterpart of the Moral Attribute of its Creator; and that which is impossible for His Moral Attribute, Holiness, is not the less impracticable in His Creation. Man's reasoning faculties can discover no means of conferring on the Deity a power of rescuing a Moral Agent from guilt and its Condemnation, except by transferring the Moral Obligation and its consequences to a substitute or surety. If some substitute for a condemned Moral Agent could be found able to fulfil the requirements of the Moral Law, and then willing to take on himself the guilt and condemnation arising from the breach of it, under these conditions it would seem as if Deity might release the condemned Moral Agent from all Moral Obligation, and from the guilt and Condemnation it entails, and thus separate *practically* a Moral Obligation from a Moral

beyond the power of Deity either to prevent or rescue him from.

The argument contained in the last half of this section (32), may be more concisely stated as follows, viz.:

I.—Holiness is essential to the nature of God, and could not be got rid of without the destruction of His very being.

II.—The Moral Law is the inevitable result of Holiness, and could not be destroyed without the destruction of that attribute.

III.—An Obligation to obey that Law upon every being acquainted with it, is an essential ingredient in that Law: in other words, a Moral Sense and Moral Obligation are inseparable.

IV.—A Guilty Conscience or consciousness of Guilt in every *finite* being responsible to that *infinite* Law is inevitable.

V.—Therefore no pardon of Sin, involving a deliverance from Guilt, and from the consciousness of it (a Guilty Conscience) in any Moral Agent, is possible without the simultaneous destruction of Moral Obligation, and of the Moral Law, and of Holiness, and of the very being of God.

Sense ; this, however, would not be an act of pardoning the sinner and remitting the penalty—for the Moral Law being both the result and counterpart of God's immutable Holiness, must be inexorable, and can by no possibility either recognise or admit of any such thing as pardon, which would be to sanction Sin by relieving it from its penalties ; but it would be merely transferring the entire guilt and its Condemnation to that sinner's surety or substitute. In such a case the Moral Obligation and its results would in no degree be either destroyed or even diminished, but merely transferred to another party ; for the condemned Moral Agent would still retain his Moral Sense and continue conscious of Moral Distinctions, which he was unable to conform to, but the Moral Obligation and responsibilty to the Moral Law attending it, together with the condemnation and its penalty inevitably arising from that responsibility, would be transferred to his surety. To this method of deliverance from guilt and its condemnation, by means of a surety and an atonement for the guilty party, man's Moral Sense gives its entire assent; but to nothing short of it; for by such atonement the Moral Law, to which the Moral Sense has referred, is both fully vindicated and its requirements entirely satisfied; which satisfaction of the Moral Law is no less a complete satisfaction of, or entirely consistent with, Holiness out of which that law arises. For the Surety, by fulfilling the law himself, is clear from its condemnation; and by vicariously assuming the guilt, and by undergoing the penalty due to the breach of that Law, he releases the condemned Moral Agent from all consciousness of inherent guilt, which he feels he is divested of by transference to his surety, and from the other evils of the penalty which such Moral Agent has inevitably incurred.

34. Perhaps it may be considered by some, that for the finite intellect of man to indulge in speculations concerning the nature or attributes of the Infinite Creator,

is in general an unwarrantable course, equally opposed to reason and to religion.[1] Should this be the case, there is nevertheless one step in this direction that man may take without presumption, and without fear of transgressing the soundest dictates of reason. It is the following:—if he perceives that a particular act, or a certain line of conduct by man, is essentially indicative of *imperfection* or inconsistency, he may safely determine that a similar act or line of conduct is utterly incompatible with the *Perfection* of Deity; in other words, that the nature of God would render it quite impossible for Him to be capable of such a cause. No conduct essentially indicative of *imperfection* could possibly be attributed to the Creator; man's natural convictions revolt at the idea.

35. [2] But if there be any one thing more indicative of the imperfection of human nature than another, it is the act of undoing what a man has once done. If a man ever undoes what he has once done, it necessarily implies one of three things, *viz.*, either

1st. That what he had done was badly and imperfectly done, and therefore required undoing; or,

2ndly. That though well or perfectly done at first, a change of circumstances had rendered it unsuitable or valueless, indicating thereby either a want of foresight, or ignorance of the future, on the one hand, or an inability to control or to accommodate his work to foreseen future circumstances, on the other; both of which are more or less habitual in all mankind, yet they constitute two of his chief deficiencies or imperfections: or,

[1] Query. Is it opposed to either? Decidedly not: for though God is *incomprehensible*, being *infinite*, yet has He made it our duty and our most profitable employment, to study Him as far as our finite capacities enable us.

[2] In this section (35), first we *infer theoretically* and by *a priori* argument, that God (as a consequence of His Perfection), cannot do and undo any work of His. Secondly, we *know* practically, as a fact, as far as our knowledge extends, that no destruction of the nature of annihilation, does actually take place in any of His works.

3rdly. A capriciousness of conduct quite inconsistent with sound reason: for to do anything well or perfectly, and then wantonly to destroy it, would be nothing less than the act of a man destitute of reason.

If therefore the act of doing and undoing is an infallible indication of human *imperfection*, it is utterly inconsistent with man's convictions of the *Perfection* of Deity to attribute such conduct to Him. It is impossible to suppose—

1st. That any work of God was badly or imperfectly done; or,

2ndly. That He is deficient either in foresight, or in ability to control the future; or,

3rdly. That He could be actuated by that caprice or versatility of character too often evinced by Man.

His works do indeed manifest continual changes, but they have been created with a view to these: the mutability or *apparent* imperfection which seems inherent in most of them, is by design and not from defect: and the dissolution they undergo is merely the fulfilling the end of their creation, and in no respect an undoing by Deity of His own work; for such dissolution is a mere change of form originally designed, and provided for in the act of creation, and not at all an annihilation of material.[1] To do and undo, is work in vain, or unprofitable labour, neither of which could possibly be attributed to Deity

[1] The dissolution of every living animal is the separation of its spiritual being from its material case or envelope; its spiritual being passes into the spiritual world; its material case, which was originally formed out of matter, and supported by matter in the form of food and breath, is resolved into the matter out of which it was formed, and becomes earth. There appears to be no reason for limiting this process to man, or for denying to all other living creatures an inferior spiritual being, which passes into the world of spirits, and occupies there an inferior or subordinate position proper to it. The argument appears decidedly to point towards such a result.

May not the argument include vegetation and vegetable life also? For everything that germinates possesses a sort of life, or living principle peculiar to itself.

without hypothetically investing the Creator with one of the chief imperfections pertaining to His creature man. For Infinite Wisdom, combined with unlimited Foreknowledge, and possessed of Almighty Power, to create and destroy any work, is inconceivable: God's Perfection is an effectual bar or obstacle to His thus doing and undoing His own work.[1]

36. The immutability of God's Works (except where the changes are foreordained, or have been provided for beforehand) is necessarily guaranteed also by His attribute Immutability (Sec. 2), as well as by the *Perfection of His Being* (Sec. 35), for the works of God in general partake more or less of the characteristics of His attributes: for if God effected a change in any work of His—other than a previously designed or foreordained change—such change would of necessity

[1] The absence of doing and undoing by man, or in other words the durability or permanence of his work, is in general a very correct measure of his capacity, or test of his wisdom and greatness. In general, he is a wise and great man, whose works (whether literary, scientific, or philosophical, poetical, artistic, political, religious, or other), neither require undoing by himself, nor by others after his death, but endure; and his works are valuable, and therefore himself wise and great, in proportion to their longevity, *i.e.*, to the time that they continue to endure; on the contrary, the highest degree of folly in any man is to be continually doing and undoing his own works, so that nothing done by him has any permanence, and thus his work is barren, and productive of no result; and the next degree to it is to execute his works so imperfectly, that from their worthlessness and inutility, they require to be undone by others, after his decease, or else perish and pass away of themselves for want of the durability which constitutes a large ingredient in the perfection of any work; thus, as the continued value or excellence producing durability in a work, evidences man's wisdom and greatness in direct proportion to such durability; so brevity of duration arising out of inferiority or worthlessness as correctly indicates and measures his incapacity and folly. If then durability in a work indicates greatness in its author, the converse must hold, and greatness in the author should produce durability in his works; therefore in conformity with this Law, God's infinite Perfection or Greatness ought to confer endless durability on His works. And this is found to be the case; for in all the works of Deity with which man is acquainted, everlasting durability is a prominent characteristic: they appear to possess a kind of immortality of essence or entity, admitting only of such destruction (a destruction originally designed), as it is involved in alteration of form, but in no case whatever of annihilation of substance or material. (See Sec. 2, Note 3, p. 20.)

indicate a change in the mind of God before it became communicated to His work, and would therefore be an impeachment of His Immutability. Any act by God requiring a second act to undo it or alter it, He is incapable of; it would be a breach of His Immutability: but every change or dissolution in God's Works provided for in the original act of Creation, and taking place in its appointed time, and under its proper circumstances, would be quite possible for God, and even essential as a consequence due to His attribute of Almighty Power, and no impeachment whatever of that Immutability. He may and does create His works with a view to designed or fore-ordained changes; but when once so created, for Him to interfere and alter them, seems a breach of His attribute Immutability; and much more therefore for Him to create or call into existence out of nothing, and afterwards annihilate or reduce to nothing again.

37. Hence, then, if the Deity had created any orders of beings immortal, it is impossible, without impeaching both His Perfection and His Immutability, to suppose He could afterwards deprive them of their immortality.[1] And if these immortal beings had by any means acquired a moral sense and the ruin that would inevitably accompany it, as their everlasting misery

[1] For Deity to create any beings immortal, is to design for them a perpetuity of existence, from interfering with which perpetuity He had as it were tied up His own hands; otherwise their existence would be merely conditional and on sufferance, however long it might endure; a kind of prolonged mortality; an existence which—though extending through countless ages by its Creator's tolerance or non-interference—possessed no claim or title to be everlasting. If Deity retained to Himself the power of destroying at will an immortal being, it would be a contradiction in terms, making that being immortal and mortal at the same time; to create any being mortal is to design that being to undergo dissolution at an appointed time; but to create a being immortal, is to design that being never to undergo dissolution at any time. Hence, then, if Deity destroyed that immortal being, it would be reversing or defeating His own original design; an act of self-contradiction by God; a doing and undoing His own work; a breach or destruction of His attribute, Immutability.

could not be prevented by Deity annihilating them, and thus depriving them of the immortality or endless existence He had conferred, there would remain only the other method of rescuing them, viz., by a surety and an atonement, and by thus practically getting rid in their case of the Moral Obligation and its accompanying penalty which is inseparable from a Moral Sense. (Sec. 33.)

38. But as no *finite* Being could fulfil the requirements of an *infinite* and spiritual Law, and as every finite Being responsible to that Law is inevitably condemned by it, it follows that no finite Being could make an atonement for the breach of that Law, or could act as the Surety or Substitute for any other Beings under its condemnation. In order to an atonement in such a case as this, the Surety or Substitute must himself be a Being both infinite and spiritual in his nature; first to enable him to fulfil the requirements of an infinite and spiritual Law; and secondly to render him (a single individual) capable of undergoing the infinite and spiritual Penalty or curse due to each one of immortal Beings more or less numerous: in other words, only the Infinite Spirit, *i.e.*, God Himself, could become the surety and make an Atonement for such ruined immortal Beings.[1]

39. But on the other hand, so supreme and exalted is the Great Author of the Universe in His nature and essence, that it is impossible to conceive of Him as a Being

[1] Each one of the innumerable thoughts, words and actions of a finite being (man), in consequence of its non-conformity to the infinite Moral Law, must be of necessity infinitely sinful (Sec. 24), therefore the surety must undergo the infinite penalty due not merely to each of the innumerable sins of one sinner, but also to each of the innumerable sins of a countless multitude of sinners (all mankind, past, present, and future). What numeration can express or represent so vast an amount of infinite sins and infinite penalties.

N.B.—One sin being infinite will equal all the sins, and one infinite penalty all the penalties: an atonement therefore, sufficient for one infinite sin and for its penalty, will equally suffice for all the countless sins and their penalties.

at all susceptible of any Penalty or curse. For Penalties are Evils originating in the inevitable sinfulness of created and therefore finite subjects, and attaching to such subjects; and the infinite Creator being exalted far above every subject of His creation, must of necessity be beyond the reach of any Penalties; in order therefore to make an Atonement, God must for a time stoop to adopt, or engraft on Himself the inferior nature of the created Being whose Surety or Proxy He designs to become (for the Substitute must partake of the same nature with those under Moral condemnation whom He undertakes to Redeem from Guilt), and thus consist of a twofold nature: this union or blending of the two natures in one Being would both enable this compound Being, by means of his Deified Manhood, to fulfil the requirements of an infinite and spiritual Law on the one hand, and render Him capable of undergoing as Man's Substitute the infinite and spiritual Penalty or Curse due to the breach of it, on the other.[1]

40. But the requirements of the Moral Law to which man, when a Moral Agent, had become responsible, being *infinite*, nothing short of Holiness (*infinite* Moral Perfection) would satisfy those requirements: for whatever the Moral Standard *is*, *that* does the Moral Law require of every Moral Agent, and will be satisfied with nothing less In order therefore to escape the incessantly accruing and accumulating, and otherwise infinite condemnation of the Moral Law with its Penalty or Curse, Man must become possessed of, or invested with God's infinite Moral Attribute. For it would not be sufficient that the surety should merely assume or vicari-

[1] Two reasons here for God assuming man's nature: 1st., as God alone, He is incapable of any Penalty or Curse; 2ndly, He must be of the same nature with those He designs to redeem; 1st reason undoubtedly valid; query 2nd. I think valid also; man being Guilty, must be redeemed by Guiltless man.

It is remarkable, that as the Fall of Man arose from the engrafting upon his human nature an attribute of God, the Moral Sense, so his rescue could only be effected by God engrafting upon Himself man's human nature.

ously take upon Himself the inherent quality (Guilty sinfulness) of Man as a Moral Agent, and undergo its Penalty in order to effect his Redemption ; it is no less indispensable that He should transfer to man simultaneously His own attribute of Moral Perfection (Holiness). For merely to assume and remove Man's Guilty sinfulness, would only restore man to his state of unconscious Innocence by original creation, which, however, after his acquisition of an indestructible attribute of God (the Moral Sense) is impossible. For so fast as Guilt and its condemnation was being transferred to Man's Surety, so fast would the Moral Sense inherent in Man generate anew or restore a Guilty Conscience in Man's spiritual being: for he would feel conscious that as a finite being he continued unconformable to the infinite Moral Law to which he was responsible: therefore Man after becoming a Moral Agent, requires not merely to be *divested* of Guilt, but simultaneously to be *invested* with Holiness. For immortal Man is susceptible of, and must be subject to, one or other of three Moral states or conditions of being ; he must be either

1st. Innocent, as by original creation ; or,
2ndly. Guilty, after acquiring a Moral Sense; or,
3rdly. Holy.

Now in his second state, with an inherent Moral Sense, *i.e.*, with an attribute of Deity engrafted upon his human nature by which his whole Spiritual being had become changed, *to recede to his first state* of Innocence would be impossible, unless that change could be reversed or changed back again, and thus his former state be reproduced by the destruction of his Moral Sense (which however is an indestructible attribute of God) ; there would be no alternative for him therefore but *to advance to the third state* and become holy, which could only be effected by the assumption of his Surety's Moral attribute ; otherwise his redemption would be a nullity only nominal and nothing more : for Holiness is a positive quality

and required by the Moral Law (to which Law his Moral Sense had made him responsible), not a mere negation or absence of Guilt. Hence it follows that Man and his Surety must in every respect change places with each other, and thus a double and mutually reciprocal as well as simultaneous transfer must be effected between them. This double transfer would be partly *actual* and partly by *imputation*. It would be *actual* where, or so far as, an actual transfer was possible; but where such actual transfer was *not* possible, it *must be* merely by *imputation*.

1st. The Surety would change places with Man.—The infinitely holy Surety would (not actually but by imputation) become infinitely sinful: the Surety who is absolutely Guiltless would (not actually but by imputation) become infinitely Guilty; and the Surety who was absolutely exempt from the infinite Penalty or Curse due to Guilt, would (not by imputation but actually) become subject to and have to undergo that infinite Penalty or Curse.

2ndly. Man would change places with his Surety, and thus his position would be in every respect the exact reverse of that which his Surety was occupying on his behalf. Infinitely sinful Man would (not actually but by imputation) become infinitely Holy: infinitely Guilty Man would (not actually but by imputation) become absolutely Guiltless: and Man who was subject to and who had to undergo the infinite Penalty or Curse due to Guilt would (not by imputation but actually) become absolutely exempt from that infinite Penalty or Curse.—

For 1st. The infinite sinfulness of Man could by no possible means be transferred to the infinitely holy Surety actually, for Holiness is a condition of the very being of God, who thus by no possibility could be rendered sinful *actually*; therefore the Surety must be merely *accounted* sinful, or ren-

dered *sinful by imputation*: the Surety not being sinful *actually*, could not be *actually* Guilty; but being sinful merely by imputation, must by imputation only be Guilty: but the infinitely holy and therefore Guiltless Surety might undergo *actually* the infinite Penalty or Curse due to Guilt, and in order to redeem man must actually do so.

2ndly. The infinite Holiness of the Surety could by no possibility be actually transferred to man, for no finite being is capable of Holiness; therefore as his Surety assumed both his sinfulness and his Guilt *by imputation* merely (in other words *was accounted* both sinful and Guilty), in the same manner, *i.e.* by temptation, would man both be entitled to, and become possessed of, his Surety's Guiltlessness and Holiness: and the Surety having suffered *actually* the Penalty due to Guilt, such Penalty would no longer be due from man, and therefore he would be *actually* exempt from it.

41. But with a view to the formation of a Substitute to redeem the lost and guilty human race, as man is a compound Being, and consists of a spiritual inmortal nature temporarily enclosed in a mortal shell or case, which latter undergoes dissolution after an appointed limited period; this union or blending of God (Sec. 39), who is the infinite Spirit, would be with Man's immortal Spiritual Being, and not with his temporary material case. It would be man's soul which became Deified or united to God primarily, and his body merely in a secondary or subordinate manner, through its connection with his soul; and this body would present the appearance of, and be in fact nothing more than the body of an ordinary man, and liable to all its infirmities and trials, though containing within it a Soul Deified, *i.e.*, in actual union with the Infinite Spirit God. And the infinite Spiritual Penalty due to Guilt would be borne almost exclusively by the *com-*

pound spiritual Being, and only in a very partial degree by His *body*, which, like any other Man's, continuing both *finite* and *material*, would be utterly incapable of undergoing a Penalty which was at once *infinite* and *spiritual:* and inasmuch also as a Penalty which was *infinite* and *spiritual* could by no possibility be inflicted in a world where all things are both *finite* and for the most part *material*, it would be indispensable that the compound spiritual Being should undergo the dissolution or death of His body; and so enter upon the spiritual world, and into Hell, the abode of the Lost Spirits or Fiends;[1] this dissolution, and entry of Man's Surety into Hell would be indispensable for three Reasons:—

1st. Because the ultimate dissolution of the body is *a condition* of Man's very being by his original creation; (for though his body was created immortal in the Sense of indestructible in material, it was not at all immortal in the sense of immutability in form or structure (Sec. 35), as in that case the Earth could not have supplied even standing room, far less sustenance for his rapidly increasing numbers),[2] [3] and a *painful dissolution*, in a greater or less degree, is one ingredient

[1] [This is not the usually received interpretation of 'ad inferos' (εἰς ᾅδου) of the Articles. See Harold Browne, 'An Exposition of the Thirty-nine Articles,' p. 78. ED.]

[2] The same rule holds with animals, who multiply so fast that if not destroyed they would quickly monopolise the earth; hence (independently of their being food for man), the necessity of their being slaughtered by man, or destroyed by each other, as they do not rapidly enough perish by disease or age.

[3] 'A population column.—"For the benefit of those who discuss the subject of population, war, pestilence, famine, &c., it may be as well to mention that the number of human beings living at the end of the hundredth generation, commencing from a single pair, doubling at each generation (say 30 years), and allowing for each man, woman, and child, an average space of four feet in height, and one foot square, would form a vertical column having for its base the whole surface of the earth and sea, spread out into a plane, and for its height, 3,674 times the sun's distance from the earth. The number of human strata thus piled one on the other, would amount to 460,790,000,000." *Fortnightly Review.*'—Extracted from *The Morning Advertiser*, Tuesday, June 12, 1866.

in the Penalty due to Guilt, therefore Man's Surety, as possessing in combination a perfect manhood, must partake with him of this painful dissolution.[1]

2ndly. Because as far as man's knowledge extends, Hell is evidently both the proper and the only place in the spiritual world, where the infinite and spiritual Penalty due to Guilt *is* and *could be* inflicted; for certainly it could not take place in Heaven, the abode of the blessed: and we know of no third place in the spiritual world.

3rdly. Because Hell, as a place of abode after death, constitutes a large part of the Penalty for Sinful and Guilty Man (Sec. 31, 4th), and therefore it would be indispensable for his Surety to undergo this part of the Penalty also, on Man's behalf.[2] [3]

[1] 'Partake *with Him*,' for the Surety undergoes the penalty for Guilt *in this world*, as if Himself was a Guilty man, but He does not redeem Guilty man from the minor evils of the penalty during life, but only from the infinite penalty after death; also from the *chief evil* of the penalty during life, viz., a Guilty Conscience. (See forward, Secs. 47, 48.)

[2] Hell is Guilty man's permanent or everlasting abode after death; but his surety being infinite, Hell would be only for him a temporary abode. (Sec. 46.)

[3] For any being to become the Substitute or Surety for Guilty man, and so rescue him by making an Atonement, the following conditions would be indispensable:

1st.—That being must possess in himself a complete and perfect manhood; for *lost man* must by *man* be redeemed.

2ndly.—Such being must possess a Moral Sense in order to render him a Moral Agent, *i.e.*, Morally responsible.

3rdly.—He must fulfil the requirements of the infinite and Spiritual Moral Law, to render him Guiltless, and thus to exempt him from that Law's condemnation and penalty on his own account.

4thly.—He must, as man, undergo the penalty due to Guilt in this world (Death and other evils). (1)

5thly.—He must *for* or *instead* of man, undergo the infinite and spiritual penalty due to Guilt in the world of spirits.

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(1) Sicknesses and trials of all kinds, as well as death form the penalty for Guilt in this world, from which, though his Surety partook of them, regenerate man is not exempt; (see this explained hereafter); they are infinitely small, and therefore not to be taken into account, when compared with the infinite spiritual penalty after death; also they are accompanied by such alleviations and consolations, and even joyous spiritual experiences, as renders them less than nothing. (Secs. 47, 48.)

42. But to Man's reason it appears quite impossible that God the Infinite Spirit could contract His infinity and reduce Himself within the body of a Man; for that which is finite has a limit; but that which is infinite has no limit; and it seems impossible for a Being which has no limit, to introduce Himself within a being which has a limit: and if God did so, He would no longer be infinite, but would by such contraction of His being become finite, which in fact, would be divesting Himself of one of His essential attributes. But He might nevertheless effect an actual union or identification with the soul or spiritual being of man; in which case the infinite and all-pervading and invisible Spirit filling all space, would have formed a junction with the finite, internal, invisible spirit *in* man: for it is in no degree impossible for an infinite or unlimited Spirit to unite Himself with, or include and incorporate within Himself, a finite. And this finite spirit or soul of man being (in a manner invisible to mortal eyes) both actually incorporated with God and likewise united to a human body, there would exist a perfect man (body and soul), in actual union and identification with God Himself. And this compound Spiritual Being, being chiefly external to man's body, but partly internal in it, might carry into effect the atonement, by first fulfilling the requirements of the Infinite and Spiritual Law, and secondly by undergoing the infinite, spiritual penalty due to the breach of that law, and thirdly, by transferring to man's account His own inherent Holiness.

43. But in order to become the Surety and make an Atonement, this compound Being, consisting of God united with human nature, must Himself be perfectly free from sin. And this would be the case. For it is

6thly.—While assuming to himself on man's behalf, infinite Guilt, and for man undergoing its infinite penalty, he must transfer to man's account infinite Holiness.

Now to meet these six conditions nothing else but a compound being consisting of perfect God and perfect man, would be available.

not man's body or material frame or case that is sinful primarily or independently; it is his living body, *i.e.*, his body whilst united with his soul which is sinful, but which when separated from the soul (dead) becomes sinless. For a dead body being merely matter is utterly incapable of any moral qualities whatever, and could not therefore be sinful any more than it could be holy (1st Postulate, Introduction). Nor could anything *purely material* be responsible in any degree to a moral law which is spiritual (Sec. 22). The sinfulness of man's body therefore can only be secondary, and the consequence of the sinfulness of his soul or spiritual nature through his acquisition of a Moral Sense extending to his body whilst the two remained united. And this sinfulness of man's *finite, spiritual being* is the inevitable result of his responsibility to a law which is both *spiritual* and *infinite* likewise. But when this human soul became united to, or blended with God and therefore rendered an integral portion of the Infinite Spirit, thus partaking of His infinity, being no longer finite it would be in no degree sinful, or obnoxious to condemnation from the infinite and spiritual law; and thus the body or physical nature of this compound Being would be sinless likewise, as united to a soul which was in no degree sinful. Hence the union or blending of the Infinite Spirit with the human soul, would render not merely that soul or spiritual nature sinless, but equally also the body which was united to it, and thus the entire compound Being (man's Surety) would be perfectly free from sin.

44. But in order to rescue or redeem the guilty human race, this *single* compound Being must make an atonement, and undergo the infinite penalty, due not to *any one individual only*, but to individuals more or less numerous (Sec. 38). And this He would do. For as everything that is infinite is absolute, and cannot therefore be either increased or diminished, so nothing

that is infinite and therefore absolute can be either multiplied or divided; for multiplication is nothing else but increasing any quantity or number by adding to it its equivalent in amount the number of times indicated by the multiplier; and division is merely reduction by a converse similar process, and anything infinite being incapable of increase or diminution is equally beyond the reach of multiplication or division. An *infinite penalty* therefore due to each one of many individuals will in the aggregate be no greater but exactly equal to such penalty due to one only of them; and conversely one infinite penalty attaching to a numerous body of individuals collectively would not be reduced in amount to each by subdivision among them (for it does not admit of reduction by subdivision),[1] but would continue an infinite penalty to every one of them in particular. Hence then the Infinite Compound Being, when assuming by imputation infinite and spiritual sinfulness and guilt, and then undergoing the infinite and spiritual penalty due to guilt for any one of the human race, would in effect at the same time be making an atonement sufficiently comprehensive for every individual of mankind, however numerous.

The same argument equally applies to the transfer by the surety of his own infinite holiness to man by imputation: such holiness *being infinite* would suffice not only for one individual of mankind, but be sufficiently comprehensive for the whole human race.

45. But an *infinite* and spiritual penalty might be inflicted in two different modes, viz.:—

1st. Upon an *infinite*, compound being capable of

[1] Every fraction or portion of an infinite quantity must itself be infinite; for if not, then such fraction is merely finite; and then a *finite* multiplication (equal to the number of fractions) of a *finite* quantity would make an *infinite* quantity, which is absurd; no finite multiplication of any finite quantity could make an infinite quantity; therefore every fraction of an infinite quantity must also be infinite.

undergoing it, such penalty might be summary, and therefore only temporary in duration:

2ndly. On a *finite* immortal and spiritual being, incapable of undergoing an *infinite* and spiritual penalty, it might be reduced in magnitude, and so become finite in order to *meet* his *finite* powers of endurance, but be rendered *infinite* in duration or everlasting.

For a penalty *finite* in magnitude but *infinite* in duration would be strictly equivalent to a penalty *infinite* in magnitude, though *finite* or *temporary* in duration. For though the payment of a debt infinite in amount might be a brief transaction by an individual capable of making such a payment; yet by any one incapable of it, a finite payment by continuous and incessant instalments extending through all eternity would be indispensable to cancel an infinite debt.

46. To any *finite*, *immortal* being therefore under moral condemnation, the penalty due to guilt in the world of Spirits must of necessity be an everlasting one, viz.: Because he is incapable of undergoing an *infinite* penalty, and must therefore suffer its equivalent, viz. a *finite* one as great in amount or magnitude as he was capable of enduring, infinitely prolonged.

But upon God, united with human nature, undertaking to become the Surety and make an atonement for any immortal beings ruined by the acquisition of a moral sense, and who was therefore capable of undergoing an infinite spiritual penalty, such penalty might be summarily inflicted, and would therefore be only temporary in duration.

47. But the evils which compose the penalty for guilt, have been referred to *under*, and indeed naturally resolve themselves *into*, two distinct classes (Sec. 31), thus constituting two separate penalties belonging to *contrasted* periods and circumstances, as well as conditions of being, and differing not merely in their respective magnitudes but very much also in their nature, viz.:—

1st. Those evils which attend upon guilt in the spiritual world, and are both *infinite in magnitude* and *spiritual in nature.*

2nd. Those which accompany guilt in this world during man's life, and are therefore of necessity *finite* in *magnitude*, *temporary* in *duration*, and very much also *material* in *nature.*[1]

Of these two penalties, a guilty and therefore condemning conscience is the chief evil or largest ingredient in each, being essential as well as common to them both.

The former, viz.: a Penalty *infinite in magnitude*, in the case of any *finite* being, signifies the most extreme *finite Penalty* which such being is capable of undergoing, but *infinite* in *duration* or everlasting (Sec. 45).

The latter, viz.: the Evils during Man's life, of whatever description they are (Sec. 31), must nevertheless be both limited in degree or magnitude, and finite or temporary in duration.

Hence, then, the latter, however extreme in degree, must be *infinitely small* as compared with the former. Any Evils, however great in magnitude, which are limited to the power of endurance possessed by a finite being, and which are also merely *finite* in *duration*, must bear an *infinitely small proportion* to such as are *infinite* in *duration*, and thus in effect be totally inconsiderable as compared with them.

The Evils therefore which attend upon Guilt during man's life, are by the most correct estimate or calculation *infinitely small*, and consequently *utterly insignificant* when compared with those which Guilt entails in the spiritual world; and hence a deliverance from the evils incident to Guilt in the world of Spirits after death may with

[1] These two penalties combined, constitute Moral Condemnation, in other words, Damnation; but inasmuch as the 2nd penalty (the evils which attend upon Guilt during man's life), is infinitely small, and therefore utterly insignificant when compared with the 1st (the everlasting penalty in the world of spirits), it is to this latter that the term Damnation is both usually and correctly limited.

the strictest accuracy be described as constituting for man a *complete deliverance*, *i.e.*, a deliverance from *all* the Evils, with the exception of an *infinitely small* and therefore comparatively inconsiderable and insignificant Penalty during man's life.

48. But Redemption by the Atonement delivers man:—

1st. *Absolutely* from the Evils constituting the Penalty for Guilt in the world of Spirits after death, by transferring that Guilt and its Penalty to his Surety or Substitute.

2nd. From the *chief Evil* of the Penalty in this world, a *Guilty* and therefore a *condemning conscience:* for a knowledge *of* and belief *in* this transfer of his Guilt to his Surety and of his Surety's holiness to him (Sec. 40) relieves man from all *condemning Consciousness* of *inherent Guilt* during life; such relief however not being *absolute*, but *conditional*, and directly proportioned to the degree or amount of his belief in that transfer.

3rd. Though Redemption by the Atonement does not deliver man from the *minor Evils* of the Penalty for guilt *during life* (Sec. 31), for these *minor Evils* are either engendered in his physical constitution (being the consequences of Sin and Guilt), or they are incident to his external circumstances from the same cause—deliverance from Sin and Guilt during life being only by imputation and in reversion, not actual or present—yet it greatly reduces and mitigates those Evils:

α. For as regards man's physical constitution, as well as external circumstances: a Believer in the Atonement is one who on principle constantly aims at pursuing a Godly, *i.e.*, a Virtuous course of life, by conforming as much as possible to the new Revealed Moral Law (Sec. 69), and therefore of avoiding a Vicious one; the former conduces to

health of body and to his well-being in life, *i.e.*, prosperity; the tendency of the latter is to beget disease or debility, and to introduce ruin into his temporal circumstances.

β. As regards Society; a sound and correct Religion, based upon and involving the Atonement, is both the origin and the chief element of all *real civilization*, and therefore of the many blessings it confers on mankind collectively. Contrast the state of Christian countries where Law and order prevail and where Morality is aimed at and in some degree achieved, with the darkness and demoralization and insecurity under heathenism in other districts of the Earth.

γ. Without the Atonement (from which Redemption originates) God is an angry Judge, being inevitably the Vindicator of His own broken Law; but with it He becomes a reconciled and loving Father, the outraged Law having become vindicated and satisfied by that Atonement, and the Surety by this means rendered the Mediator betwixt God and man. Thus a way of access to God by prayer *through the Surety*, is opened up, by which God can be approached by man; and in answer to such prayer the trials of life are generally either modified and reduced, or strength is imparted the better to bear them.

δ. The spiritual consolations which Religion brings home to the soul of redeemed man, often very far outweigh the trials, afflictions, and bodily sufferings incident to him in life, so that frequently he is able to rejoice in even extreme tribulation; while Faith (a condition of Redemption, being the inevitable fruit of Spiritual Life in the soul) (Secs. 52 and 53), apprehends by anticipation, and realizes, as it were, beforehand the complete deliverance in reversion from Guilt and *both Penalties* provided for man after death.

Thus Redemption provides an extreme mitigation of the Penalty for Guilt *during man's life*, though not a full deliverance from it; and is therefore so far (*i.e.*, during life) partial in its results. For as a Moral Agent man continues still to suffer under the burden of a *sinful nature* (a condition of his being, Sec. 26), and longs for deliverance even though rescued from *Guilt* and *its consequences* by their transfer to his Surety; though conscious of his title to his Surety's holiness he feels that he has it not in present possession, but only in future reversion, and earnestly desires to be actually invested with it; and continuing still sinful, he is liable to the Evils sin entails during life, though accompanied by many alleviations and counterpoises.

49. But the infliction of a Penalty that was both infinite and spiritual on an infinite compound Spiritual Being united with human nature (man's Surety, Sec. 46), would not extinguish or annihilate that compound Spiritual Being: for the infinite Power inherent in the infinite Spiritual nature or Deified soul of that compound Being, to resist or bear up under the pressure of the infinite spiritual Penalty, would effectually prevent such annihilation or destruction. For the infinite spiritual Penalty actively inflicted, and the infinite spiritual Power passively and reciprocally to undergo and resist or bear up under the pressure of such Penalty, would exactly measure or counterbalance one another, both being infinite and therefore equal, and acting reciprocally each to the other. So that the Penalty could in no degree overwhelm or permanently subdue and subvert the Power, nor could the Power overthrow or cast off its equivalent the Penalty; and thus the result either as respects the destruction of the Spiritual passive Agent on the one hand, or his avoidance *of* or escape *from* the spiritual Penalty on the other, would be *nil*, each being counteracted by the other; though at the same time his finite body or material case would under

infinite spiritual pressure on the soul suffer dissolution and destruction, not being created immortal as the soul was, nor like that soul sustained by immediate or direct and primary union with God, but only by indirect and *secondary*, *i.e.*, by union with the soul. For it is the soul, not the body of the Substitute which is Deified (Sec. 41), and the might of Deity inherent in the passive compound Spiritual Agent would during the interchangeable conflict between infinite Penalty and infinite Power be suspended, or in abeyance, the Power being *for the time* (*i.e.*, temporarily), paralysed (so to speak), or rendered inoperative under its equivalent, the pressure which it was unable to cast off or escape from, and which exactly measured or balanced it. Thus the infinite pressure of the Penalty paralysing, and as it were temporarily rendering *inanimate the soul* (even though that soul was both immortal and Deified), would cause the dissolution of the finite material case, united to this lifeless soul (for the soul being for a time without animation, the body must equally be dead also), and during its continuance would exhaust or maintain in suspension the antagonistic reciprocal infinite and Spiritual Power in that soul opposed to it. But inasmuch as such Penalty being infinite in magnitude would be summarily inflicted, and therefore only temporary in duration (Sec. 46), no sooner had the proper period for its continuance expired, than the might of Deity would revive and return in its full force or strength, the pressure of the infinite Penalty being *withdrawn* or *removed*, and thus all that had taken place would immediately become reversed; the compound Spiritual Being, or Deified soul, would by its own inherent infinite Power rise out of its place of vicarious punishment in Hell (Sec. 41, 2ndly); revivify and then take again from the grave and resume its material case, which under the infinite spiritual pressure had undergone a painful dissolution as part of the Penalty for Guilt in

this world (Sec. 41, 1st), which body again united to a soul in union with Deity, the entire compound Being (Deified soul, with material human nature) having completely undergone both the Penalties for Guilt, would henceforth and for ever be exempt from every particle of them both. But inasmuch as the future permanent abode of this risen Substitute would be the world of Spirits (for His previous residence on earth as a man, associating and conversing with mankind and participating in all man's trials, was part of that Penalty for Guilt from which He was now for ever exempt), therefore in order to fit Him for His new abode where all is spiritual, and from which everything material is excluded, His body or material case would by an act of New Creation emanating from and effected by His own independent and unaided creative power, inherent in His Godhead, become transformed into a Spiritual one, and thus the entire compound Being would no longer be heterogeneous (consisting of a spiritual and material nature combined), but homogeneous, entirely spiritual throughout.

50. But this Resurrection from death by the Surety would constitute the very hinge or centre upon which man's salvation turned or depended.

For 1st, it would furnish indisputable evidence or proof that the Substitute, presenting merely the appearance of an ordinary man (Sec. 41), nevertheless contained within himself a soul in actual union with God, and was therefore a Being compounded of perfect God and perfect man; and thus was competent to effect an Atonement for man. For the spontaneous rising from death after a limited period, without any external adventitious aid, is an act which only God Himself was capable of performing. By the sanction and assistance of God, other individuals of mankind might perform the miracle *of*, or become the agents *for*, raising other persons

from death on particular occasions; but no Man (except one united to God) *being* himself *actually dead*, ever did or could raise *himself* from death.

2ndly. This Resurrection would afford equally indisputable proof—not merely that this compound Being was one competent to make an Atonement—but that this Atonement was now in fact fully completed and perfectly finished by Him: for the death of the body, though not the chief evil of the Penalty for Guilt in this world, is undoubtedly the most prominent, obvious and universal one, and the one most impossible to deal with or counteract; and by the act of Resurrection, the Substitute would evidence unmistakably, not only that this Evil was capable of removal, but also, that He Himself had both undergone, and overcome it likewise, and had thus guaranteed to *all mankind* a similar Resurrection, and to His *redeemed people*, along with it, a deliverance in reversion, from the remainder or the chief Penalty for Guilt.

51. But in order that this Resurrection (the final and crowning act, as well as evidence of the completed Atonement), may be available for man's salvation, the knowledge of it must be so fully brought home to him, and the attestation of the fact must be so perfect, and clear from all doubt, as to *compel* a conviction in his mind of its absolute and unassailable truth. For if the slightest suspicion of falsity or deception, or even of incorrectness in the account, could arise, or the smallest defect in the evidence of the fact was open for man's scepticism as to miraculous agency to seize upon, the doubt thus engendered as to the reality of the *Atonement* (that most stupendous compound miracle, one so marvellous that the natural man recoils from it as both incredible and incomprehensible) would leave in full force and unimpaired vigour in the mind of man, that Guilty Conscience which is the chief Evil and ingredient

in the two Penalties for Guilt, in this world and in the next, and to which Guilty Conscience the Atonement is the sole antidote. For by the Atonement man's Guilt is transferred to his Substitute and his conscience thereby relieved from it. So that the Atonement by itself would not procure salvation for man; a knowledge of, and full conviction in his mind, of its reality would be requisite also, to which an undeniable attestation would be indispensable.

For as in human affairs the validity of a will or deed depends no less on the attestation than on the execution by the testator or agent, so that an unattested will or deed is worthless, however strong the presumption or probability from internal evidence, or from external circumstances may be, that it has been duly executed; even so, this last grand deed or act (the Resurrection) by which the Atonement for Guilty man was completed, equally requires an indisputable attestation, to render that Atonement—through the influence of the Spirit of Holiness on the soul of man—available for his salvation.

To effect an undoubted and undeniable attestation of this otherwise *most incredible* of *all miracles*, and thus give it validity as the concluding Act in the Atonement for man, nothing short of the four following particulars in the evidence would suffice:—

1st. That the evidence be that of man's senses; not of one sense only, which might be deceptive, or misinformed; but of at least three out of the five, viz., sight, hearing, and touch, each one thus guaranteeing or establishing the correctness of the other two, and which three combined would admit of no possibility of doubt or mistake. The risen Substitute would be *seen* by man; conversed with, or *heard* by man; and *felt* or handled by man.

2ndly. This exhibition or manifestation of Himself

by the risen Substitute would be made, not to a single individual of mankind only, but to persons more or less numerous.

3rdly. The testimony of these witnesses would be more unimpeachable if during life they voluntarily endured labours, dangers, and sufferings in attestation of the accounts which they delivered, and solely in consequence of their belief in those accounts.[1]

4thly. In order that the testimony of *these Witnesses* might not be limited to their own contemporaries, but become available for all future generations, some among them must commit their accounts to writing, which written histories, known and recognised as theirs among their contemporaries, and quoted or referred to under their names in the literature of the *very next generation*, and by this means also of *each succeeding one*, would by this long and continuous succession of testimony, extending to present times, leave no possibility of doubt as to the authorship or authenticity of these written statements.[2]

Such evidence, as is comprised in these four particulars, would be unimpeachable by man through all time; no impartial mind could resist it; nothing but a bigoted resolve to reject the most conclusive evidence which exists, or which can be produced for any fact whatever in history, could disbelieve or refuse credit to it.

52. The argument thus far carried out conducts to the following inevitable conclusion, viz., that in order to rescue mankind from Guilt and its consequences, a

[1] Paley's 'Evidences.'

[2] Herein consists the incalculable importance of the *works* of the early fathers; wretched nonsense most of these works; yet invaluable as evidences of the authorship and authenticity of the Books of the New Testament; a great but merely adventitious value, indicative of no merit in these patristic writings.

compound Being, consisting of an infinite Spirit united to human nature, must, as man's Substitute, 1st fulfil the requirements of the infinite and spiritual Moral Law on his behalf on the one hand, and 2ndly assume to Himself man's Guilt, and simultaneously transfer to man's account His Holiness, and then undergo for man the infinite and spiritual Penalty due to Guilt on the other. (Sec. 40.)

But an infinite spiritual Penalty requires of necessity *another* or a *second infinite Spirit* to inflict it: the argument requires and will be satisfied with nothing less than

1st. An infinite and spiritual agent actively to inflict an infinite and spiritual Penalty; and

2ndly. An infinite and spiritual, and also compound subject, passively to undergo on man's behalf this infinite and spiritual Penalty.

For one and the same infinite Spirit could not be supposed to fill the two offices simultaneously, viz., as the active Agent inflicting and the passive recipient or subject of the infinite Penalty so inflicted: nothing less than two infinite powers would be sufficient to accomplish *the present problem;* for one infinite power would, as it were, become temporarily exhausted by the act of inflicting a Penalty that was infinite: any act admitting of nothing less than an infinite power to perform it, would for the time, or during the performance, exhaust or call out the whole energy of that power, leaving to it no remaining energy to undergo or endure the infinite Penalty inflicted. For endurance itself, though a passive operation, requires a power to support it, and prevent it from succumbing and ceasing: and nothing short of the entire power of an infinite Spirit (which power is of necessity *infinite* as the attribute of an infinite Being) must be put forth or exerted in the act of inflicting an *infinite* Penalty, leaving *no remaining power at all* (much less an infinite one) to bear up under, or passively resist and undergo such *infinite Penalty*, and prevent it

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from crushing, to annihilation, the being upon whom it was inflicted. For in order that one and the same Spirit might simultaneously both inflict and also endure the infinite Penalty, we are driven to the conclusion that *one* infinite Spirit must be endowed with *two infinite powers* to be exerted at the same time in two opposite directions antagonistic to each other; the one power wholly exhausted for the time in actively inflicting, and the other equally exhausted in passively undergoing or bearing up under the Penalty.

Now, 1st, a *double* infinite power in a *single* infinite Being is an impossible and therefore absurd hypothesis, and

2ndly. This conflicting and antagonistic operation simultaneously carried out by one and the same Being is equally absurd, and not only absurd, but no less derogatory to the harmonious consistency of character in a single infinite Spirit; for it would be self-contradiction in any single Being (even if possible) to act passively and actively at one and the same time, and in reference to the same operation.

Moreover, for one and the same *infinite Spirit* to inflict on Himself a Penalty which was *infinite*, and therefore tantamount to a temporary destruction, or a suspension of existence (for all power in the infinite Spirit would for the time become paralysed or inoperative under the infinite pressure, and the body of the compound Being be dissolved from the same cause) (Sec. 49), would be a suicidal act or self-inflicted death, itself an infraction of the Moral Law, which Moral Law this infinite spiritual compound Being is bound to fulfil exactly, in order to rescue fallen man.

Again, the Infinite Penalty actively inflicted, being summary, and therefore only temporary in duration (Sec. 46), would require to be removed or taken off after a limited period; which removal also from the passive Agent He could not Himself accomplish, His

own power being temporarily paralysed and inoperative under infinite pressure, thereby preventing His escape from the Penalty (Sec. 49), and thus a second Infinite Spirit would be necessary, not only actively to inflict, but also actively to remove the Infinite Penalty, and thus set free the passive compound recipient.

Hence we have no alternative but to assume the existence of two infinite Spirits, the one actively both to inflict and afterwards remove, the other passively to undergo or endure the infinite spiritual Penalty.

53. But man when a Moral Agent must not only be rescued from Guilt and its Penalty by the transfer of them to his Surety, and justified, *i.e.*, accounted righteous before God by the righteousness of his Surety *imputed* to him (Sec. 40), but he must in addition, *actually* in his soul or spiritual being undergo a continuous process of renewal or incipient progress in the direction of holiness. But as holiness is the peculiar and exclusive property or attribute of an *infinite* Spirit (no *finite* Spirit being capable of holiness independently or *per se*), it is only by an actual union or junction in some degree or other of man's soul or spiritual being with an infinite Spirit by which such Incipient holiness could be carried into effect. This partial union or junction would infuse into man's spiritual being a new principle of holiness, of which human nature independently would be utterly devoid and incapable; and the degree of Incipient holiness, or, of this New nature in man would be exactly proportioned to the extent or amount of the union effected; in some cases it would be more, and in others less; the amount being regulated during man's life, by the sovereign will and determination of the Spirit of Holiness Himself; but in every case, whether more or less in degree, it would be a *new principle* not possessed previously, and not attainable by any other means or by any exertions of man's own. Thus in every such individual, there would exist

two distinct natures, viz., the old or original Nature, tending towards a Fiendish one (Sec. 14, 3rdly, Note 7), and the new Spiritual Nature antagonistic to it, and progressing towards Holiness; and the conflict between these two natures would never cease during life. The souls of men who were thus in union with the Infinite Spirit would be not only united to Deity, but equally also by that means in union with each other.[1] The

[1] It may here be remarked, that though man in his natural state is undoubtedly capable of what is termed morality, for it is not an impossibility in the nature of things (though scarcely ever met with, and almost without example) that he may be in conduct unexceptionably truthful, honest, sober, chaste, benevolent, &c., throughout his whole life, and thus be a better member of society, and a more valuable friend and neighbour; yet even when endowed with these and other moral virtues in the highest degree attainable by human nature, he is no nearer holiness than if he was the slave of their opposite vices, for holiness in its nature and essence is proper or peculiar to an infinite spirit, and therefore distinct *in toto* not merely in degree, but absolutely in kind, from morality. If the above moral virtues are compared with the infinite moral law, which is the reflex and counterpart of holiness, they are at once condemned by it, and pronounced *sinful*, as being *finite*, and therefore *defective*. And not only are these miscalled virtues defective through inadequate quantity, but they are also sinful as to quality, being adulterated and debased owing to the source from which they originate, viz., man's fallen and degenerate human nature, which is sinful throughout its entire essence or being (Sec. 13, Note 7, 11), so that even if it were possible to expand infinitely the highest Morality attainable by Man, it would not constitute holiness, but would contain an equally expanded admixture of Moral evil owing to its origin, and therefore fail utterly in conformity to the Moral Law and be sinful; and as there are no degrees in Sin, but all Sin is both equal and infinite also (Secs. 24 and 25), there is no difference in the eye of a holy God, or in the judgment pronounced by the infinite Moral Law, between the sinfulness of these defective and debased or adulterated virtues and that of the blackest crimes.

There is but one Being who is independently holy, *i.e.*, the Deity, consisting of Three distinct Persons or Individuals in union with each other, viz. the *Creator*, the *Redeemer*, and the *Sanctifier*, and of these Three Persons each is Infinitely and therefore equally holy: the latter, who may be denominated or described as the Infinite Spirit of Holiness, is the source from which all holiness is propagated by contact or union: any genuine holiness which exists in the Universe is derivative from Him as its origin or centre. When He unites Himself in any measure to the spiritual being or soul of Man, there is implanted in that soul a principle of Incipient holiness which *there* exists as long as the union with the spirit of holiness, from which it is derived, continues. Such soul of man, immediately on such union, becomes at once and during life a compound spiritual nature, consisting of two distinct elements, viz.:—

1st, The natural element, which,

modus operandi of this Infinite Spirit upon the soul of man, together with its results, is exhibited in the four following sections.

54. The Kingdom of *Nature* (*Procreation*, by which mankind is continued and multiplied), and that of *Grace* (*New Creation*, by which a select portion of his race is born again and sanctified), both originating in the free and sovereign Will of God their Author, acting in the former case as a *Creator*, in the latter as a *Sanctifier*, present a most perfect analogy the one to the other; and in no particular is this analogy more remarkable than in the origin and continued existence of *man* and

by the acquisition of a Moral Sense, is altogether evil, and tending towards a Fiendish nature;

2ndly, The new element or principle of holiness antagonistic to the old and continually opposing and resisting it.

And as the soul thus becomes compound and diverse, so also every thought or spiritual action of that soul becomes compound and diverse also: there is contained in every thought of that soul the two elements or double nature, 1st, the original natural element, which is altogether sinful; and, 2nd, the new element, or principle of Incipient holiness antagonistic to it; and just in proportion as one or other of these two elements preponderates and prevails over its opposite, in exactly that proportion will the thought of that soul or external action of the man tend towards or in the direction of holiness, or of its reverse, Vice. Where the soul of any person is in actual union with the Spirit of holiness, there the Moral Virtues enumerated above (veracity, honesty, chastity, sobriety, &c.) are genuine and real, as having their origin from that Spirit, though adulterated and deteriorated by the sinfulness of the human nature through which they are transmitted and with which they are more or less compounded; and therefore, though genuine in kind on account of their origin, they are, during man's life, incomplete and imperfect; whereas the similar virtues, so called (but a misnomer), in the natural man, are spurious and fictitious, mere modified or moderated vices, masked under a fair external appearance, but having their origin in the sinful nature of man, and therefore containing not one particle of genuine holiness.

Also as there is this absolute contrariety between the virtues of the natural and the regenerate man, so too are the vices of each equally dissimilar; for the vices of the natural man are the mere spontaneous carrying out of his own natural propensities and instincts; whereas in the regenerate man his indwelling principle of holiness is for the time borne down and overwhelmed by the united action of internal natural corruption with external temptation, and so far from being spontaneous, Vice never gets the mastery over Incipient holiness, without a struggle of more or less severity, and the indwelling principle of Spiritual life or holiness continually begets Repentance or deep sorrow for the fall, and Faith, which apprehends the Atonement as its means of pardon and deliverance. (Sec. 54.)

of the *new man*, as appears by the ensuing comparative table.

KINGDOM OF NATURE.	KINGDOM OF GRACE.
1. *Procreation*, by the following successive stages :—	1. *New Creation*, by the following successive stages :—
2. Generation: *i.e. natural seed* introduced into the womb of the Mother by connection with the Father, and the origin or first cause of Natural Life.	2. Regeneration : *Spiritual seed*, or the new principle of Spiritual Life or Incipient Holiness infused into the soul by actual junction with the Spirit of Holiness ; the origin or first cause of Spiritual Life.
3. Birth : the commencement of Natural Life. Hence	3. New Birth : the commencement of Spiritual Life. Hence
4. The *Natural*, otherwise the *Old Man*, consisting of *Body* and *Soul:* called *Old* because first in existence.	4. The *Spiritual*, otherwise *New Man*, consisting of *Body*, *Soul*, and *Spirit:* called *New* because second in existence.
5. Respiration and Circulation are the primary and immediate operation of *Natural Life*, and originate in it as their first cause.	5. Repentance and Faith are the primary and immediate operation of *Spiritual Life*, and originate in it as their first cause.
6. Respiration and Circulation may be considered as both a *double* and *single operation* at one and the same time ; for though distinct in character each *from* the other, they are so conjoined and inseparable, as well as essential each *to* the other, that one cannot exist without the other, and thus the two become identified and constitute one compound operation ; for where one is, there is also the other ; also this conjunction is not of the nature of *cause* and *effect*, which are conjoined facts, for Respiration and Circulation are not *cause* and *effect* at all, but are concurrent and reciprocal and involuntary actions, each resulting from Natural Life as its first cause, and both of them working together, yet neither of them the cause of the other.	6. Repentance and Faith may be regarded as both a *double* and *single operation* at one and the same time ; for though distinct in character each *from* the other, they are so conjoined and inseparable, as well as essential each *to* the other, that one cannot exist without the other ; and thus the two become identified and constitute one compound operation ; for where one *is* there is also the other ; and this conjunction is not of the nature of *cause* and *effect*, which are conjoined facts, for Repentance and Faith are not *cause* and *effect* at all, but are concurrent and reciprocal and involuntary actions (involuntary as not arising from the Will, for no man by a mere act of the Will, could give himself Repentance and Faith), but each resulting from Spiritual Life as its first cause, and both of them working together, yet neither of them the cause of the other.

7. Respiration and Circulation are both of them connate, *i.e.*, commencing with Natural Life at Birth, and therefore both are simultaneous in their origin, neither of them preceding the other, as one cannot go on without the other, for when either stops, the other ceases.

7. Repentance and Faith are both of them connate, *i.e.*, commencing with Spiritual Life at the New Birth, and therefore both are simultaneous in their origin, neither of them preceding the other, as one cannot subsist without the other, for if either ceased, the other would do so likewise.

8. Respiration and Circulation are indications or evidences of Natural Life, and presuppose or prove its existence; also they are themselves inseparable from it and depend absolutely upon it; Natural Life is essential to the continuance of Respiration and Circulation, and conversely they are reciprocally essential to the continuance of Natural Life, their cause or origin, in the same manner as *effect* is reciprocally essential to its *cause*; for where there is no effect there is no cause; for a cause barren of its effect is no cause at all.

8. Repentance and Faith are indications or evidences of Spiritual Life, and pre-suppose or prove its existence; also they are themselves inseparable from and depend absolutely upon it: Spiritual Life is essential to the continuance of Repentance and Faith, and conversely they are reciprocally essential to the continuance of Spiritual Life, their origin or cause; for though Spiritual Life, from its first commencement, is immortal and inextinguishable, yet equally inextinguishable is its inevitable effect, Repentance and Faith, for to extinguish the *latter* (Repentance and Faith) would simultaneously destroy the *former*; which, however, is impossible in both cases.

9. Respiration and Circulation are continuous and unintermitting, *i.e.*, without cessation throughout Natural Life whatever be its duration.

9. Repentance and Faith are continuous and unintermitting, *i.e.*, without cessation, from the commencement of Spiritual Life, till the termination of Natural Life by death.

10. Food (solid, fluid, and atmospheric) is indispensable, the two first to supply the waste constantly taking place in the Circulating Medium, and the third to enable Respiration to oxidise it, and by this double means both replace and augment the particles of matter which are continuously passing off, either from the surface of the body, or through its intestines, thus preserving and prolonging Natural Life, by the combined operation of Digestion, Circulation, and Respiration.

10. Spiritual Food (the means of Grace) is requisite to maintain Repentance and Faith in a vigorous and healthy condition, and thus preserve, as well as augment, Spiritual vitality, and prevent it from becoming reduced or enfeebled, *i.e.*, starved for want of its proper Spiritual nourishment: for Spiritual Life, though immortal and inextinguishable *absolutely*, has a tendency to droop or dwindle, *i.e.*, subside to a low ebb, through external influences and temptations, and the internal corruptions of the Natural Man, acting and reacting each on the other.

11. Thoughts, *i.e.*, either spiritual active operations of the soul or passive impressions *on* the soul of Man (Sec. 21), as well as bodily actions, *i.e.*, thoughts carried out into active bodily exercise, *contingently* arise out of Natural Life to which Respiration and Circulation is essential: for they are greater or less in amount, in proportion to the activity in kind of the vital principle, which varies in different Individuals, and to the occasions which call out its energy.	11. The fruits of the Spirit, love, joy, peace, &c., with all other Spiritual operations, active or passive, arise out of Spiritual Life (not essentially as Repentance and Faith do), but *contingently*, and in proportion to the vigour or degree of vitality in that Life, and are thus larger or smaller in amount, as the case may be, or as occasion necessitates; some of them may even be wanting, or non-existent *partially*, and sometimes *absolutely* (*e.g.*, joy and peace), in particular cases.
12. Respiration and Circulation terminate simultaneously at dissolution, each ceasing at the same moment with the other.	12. At death, *Repentance* terminates on the transfer of the Regenerate soul to heaven, where no Sin exists to repent of; and *Faith* becomes lost and extinguished in sight and present experience: a simultaneous cessation in both.

55. Thus the infusion of Spiritual Life into the soul of man by the Spirit of Holiness, or in other words, his Regeneration, is immediately productive of two simultaneous effects, viz:

1st. It reveals and exhibits to man the Sinfulness and Guilt of his condition by nature; for it both revives or renews, and at the same time strengthens and augments, that consciousness of Guilt inevitable in every Moral Agent (Sec. 14, 2), which, however, he had either lost, or else which had dwindled to a mere misgiving, through the versatility of his Moral Faculty (Sec. 15), or through its obdurateness and insensibility, the result of his extreme and progressively increasing depravity. (Sec. 22.)

2ndly. It both renders necessary, and itself supplies as its first and inevitable fruits, Repentance for Sin, and Faith in the *Atonement*, a compound operation and the only means for rendering available

that Atonement which is the sole antidote or remedy for such Sinfulness and Guilt.

This Repentance and Faith, each by itself and both concurrently, operate towards the justification of man in the following manner respectively.

1st. A genuine Spiritual Repentance is a real and deep-seated sorrow *for* and hatred *of* Sin and Guilt in the heart and affections; sorrow and hatred, not so much on account of their consequences both present and in reversion, as of their nature, and because Sin and Guilt are directly opposed to that Spiritual Life (the new principle of Holiness infused into the soul) from which Repentance and Faith originate. For Spiritual Life, or Incipient Holiness and its inevitable fruits or results—Repentance and Faith—are so essentially conjoined and inseparable, that whatever opposes and resists the one, equally opposes and resists the other; and therefore Repentance, which is both a sorrow for, and hatred of Sin, is a sorrow for and hatred of that which in resisting and opposing its origin (Holiness) resists also itself: for Sin and Repentance are each in their very nature antagonistic, to the other: this sorrow for and hatred of Sin, which necessarily both begets and includes a corresponding, and an equivalent love of Holiness, its parent, and therefore also of God, the source of Holiness—all which is included under the term Repentance—prepares the renewed heart or regenerate soul of man to receive with gratitude, and embrace with the affections, the method of rescue and escape from Sin and Guilt presented and offered to it by the Atonement.

2ndly. A genuine and spiritual Faith co-operates with Repentance towards Justification in the three following particulars:—

α It perceives the suitableness or exact adaptation

to Guilty man's need or requirements, of the scheme contrived for his Redemption by God in the Atonement.

β It gives a full and complete, and also a *practical* assent, to the reality of the Atonement; not a mere intellectual or speculative or theoretical one, but such an assent as reaches the heart and affections, and thus influences and acts upon the life and conversation.

γ It apprehends and seizes on the Atonement and appropriates it to itself, resting and relying upon it wholly for justification, and both embracing it with the affections, and constantly adhering or clinging to it during life.

This Repentance and Faith being a compound operation, *i.e.*, two operations combined in one, the effects of each are so interwoven together that it is very difficult, (almost impossible) exactly to distinguish or separately describe them; for in fact they arise out of the two conjointly; but something like the above may be considered as the effects of each by itself separately.

Such Repentance and Faith, the immediate and inevitable fruit or result of Spiritual Life in the soul, and in no other way whatever to be acquired, the Natural Man is utterly incapable of: for he is Spiritually dead (*i.e.*, he consists merely of Body and Soul without any indwelling or union with that Soul of the Spirit of Holiness), and possesses no more power of giving himself Spiritual Life than a dead body has of giving itself Natural Life: to obtain Spiritual Life he must commence at its origin and proceed by its successive steps, viz.:—

1st. Grace, the New Creation by the free Gift of God.

2nd. Regeneration.

3rd. The New Birth, the commencement of Spiritual Life.

That which most resembles Repentance in the natural

man, is a mere Remorse for Sin and Guilt arising *from* or an ingredient *in* a condemning Conscience, which is inevitable in every Moral Agent in some degree or other (Sec. 14, 2). This Remorse is not on account of the nature of Sin and Guilt, or accompanied with any hatred to them for their opposition to Holiness, but merely on account of their consequences, both here in present endurance, and hereafter in future prospect, and is thus the exact reverse of genuine Repentance. For a willingness to continue in Sin, if divested of its Penalties, is quite consistent with such a spurious Repentance. The Natural man, by the acquisition of a Moral Sense, acquires along with it a hatred of Holiness (Sec. 14, 3rdly, Note), and therefore also a hatred of genuine Spiritual Repentance and Faith, the inevitable fruit or result of Spiritual Life or Incipient Holiness in the Soul of the Regenerate Man.

Also, as the Repentance of the Natural man is not genuine but spurious, being either the result of the Refuse or Remnant of a condemning Conscience (which condemning Conscience, through the versatility of the Moral Faculty, is an almost evanescent quality), or a remorse for Sin on account of its Penalties present and future, equally so is his faith, or that which most resembles it, spurious also. In general, man as a Moral Agent has contracted such a hatred of Right and therefore also of God, its source (Sec. 14, 3rdly), that the idea of an Atonement or of Justification as God's free gift, is an offence to him; he both disbelieves and rejects it altogether, and that too without even considering its nature or conditions. But at the best, and under the most favourable circumstances, the faith of the Natural man is a mere partial transient quality of the intellect not reaching the heart; it is only a theoretical or speculative assent to the terms in which the Atonement is described or set forth before him—a kind of tacit admission accompanied with much indifference, that it is a

cleverly contrived scheme which seems adapted to its object, though almost too incredible for serious belief—but in no degree a practical embracing of that Atonement as its rule and guide during life, and its confident hope and reliance for eternity; for having either *nearly* or *entirely* lost his consciousness of Guilt through the versatility (Sec. 15), or the obdurateness of his Moral Sense (Sec. 22), he neither perceives his need of, nor the suitableness of the Atonement to his case: thus his faith is one barren of all results, in other words a *dead faith*, in perfect contrast to that living and saving Faith which springs from Spiritual Life; for that faith must be dead whose origin is the natural or Spiritually Lifeless soul of man.

56. Hence, as Spiritual Life with its inevitable fruit, Repentance and Faith, is indispensable to enable man both to mourn for and hate sin, on the one hand, and to apprehend and appropriate to himself the Atonement, on the other, it follows that this Atonement (though abundantly comprehensive enough for all Mankind) is available only for the spiritual and not for the natural Man, for a fraction of, and not for the entire human race. There are two results of the Atonement upon Mankind, the first, special and complete or perfect; the second, general and merely partial:

1st. The special and complete result is the Justification, and, therefore, the inevitable Salvation in reversion of the Regenerate or Spiritual race, selected from mankind through all time, and constituting the Church of God existing upon earth; a result not limited to this mundane state, but extending throughout the countless ages of eternity.

2nd. The general and merely partial result is, that by the atonement God's forbearance to the world at large lying in wickedness is secured for a time, so that all Mankind indiscriminately is suffered to

live and propagate upon earth until the Church of God is completed and gathered in, and the final consummation of all things takes place.

Now, in the first of these results of the Atonement, and the alone important one (the second being temporary, and, therefore, insignificant), the Natural Man *is* and *can be* no more interested than if no Atonement had been effected ; for he is totally destitute of repentance and faith, the only means to render that Atonement available for his justification. Justification and salvation are limited to the regenerate or spiritual race, a mere fraction of mankind at large, and all others have no concern or interest in either of them.

In the second, or general result of the atonement, the Natural Man fully participates with the Spiritual. He occupies the earth, propagates his race from generation to generation, and equally shares and enjoys the blessings of creation, and that too, often in a greater degree or larger measure than the Regenerate, who is usually a tried and afflicted being, looking forward for his happiness in the world to come (trials and afflictions to the Regenerate being important means of grace, and, therefore, auxiliary to the increase and vigour of Spiritual Life). (Sec. 54, 10.)

57. Three remarks will properly come in here at this point of our argument.

1st. Repentance and Faith are mere temporary fruits of the Spirit, existing only concurrently with Natural Life, and, therefore, terminating with death (Sec. 54). Hope also, and Prayer, appear to belong to the same class, for in Heaven there can be nothing either to hope or to pray for, all being present possession and enjoyment. On the other hand, Love, Joy, Peace, Spiritual Gratitude, Praise, and others, perhaps, exist merely in

a partial degree during Natural Life, but in a prevailing and perfect measure throughout eternity.

2ndly. Man is justified—not by Faith, as is usually asserted—but by the Atonement, which Faith and Repentance (the first fruits of Spiritual Life) concurrently as a conjoined or compound instrument apprehend and appropriate: Repentance being a hatred and rejection, or repudiation of Sin; Faith an apprehension of the Atonement, and of its results,—deliverance from Guilt, and from its future Penalty.

3rdly. Regeneration or the New Birth, from which originates *Spiritual Life*, with its inevitable fruits, *Repentance* and *Faith*, and with *all other fruits of the Spirit combined*, constitute *Sanctification*, a general term which comprehends all these fruits in union, and is a continuous process towards Holiness in the soul of Man, *by the Spirit of Holiness* during Natural Life—issuing in perfect Holiness after death in the world of Spirits.

58. But this Infinite Spirit, in union with the soul of redeemed and justified Man, who begets and continues to cultivate in that soul a new principle of Incipient Holiness, or Spiritual Life, the commencement of Sanctification, must be a third individual, distinct from each of the two former spirits by whose co-operation the Atonement was perfected (Sec. 52.)

1st. For each of the two former Infinite Spirits has his own proper office respectively: the first, as the Vindicator of the Moral Law, whose office, therefore, it is to inflict the infinite Penalty or Curse upon the transgressor of that law, or upon his surety or substitute; the second, as the substitute for guilty man, to undergo on his behalf the penalty so inflicted. Both of these Infinite

Spirits would become temporarily exhausted[1] in the performance of his own infinite official function, respectively, *external* of man (Sec. 52), and, therefore, incapable for the time of undertaking the additional work of sanctification *internally* in man.

2ndly. It would appear incongruous for the same individual who was engaged in inflicting the penalty on guilty man's substitute, and whose peculiar character, therefore, during his exercise of that office, was that of an Avenger, or Vindicator of the broken Moral Law, to be employed at the same time in infusing into man's soul (which, as a moral agent in his natural state, was alienated from, and hostile to God) a love to the Deity: the two offices combined in the same individual, at the same time, would appear incompatible and unsuitable, as being the performance of opposite and contradictory official functions simultaneously. Equally incongruous and no less impossible would it be if the compound being (man's substitute), crushed temporarily almost to annihilation, or at least paralyzed under the load of the infinite penalty, and whose peculiar character in that position was one of *passive endurance deprived of all active power*, should, at the same time, in union with the soul of redeemed man, be *actively engaged* in working out his sanctification.

Moreover, sanctification by the operation of the Infinite Spirit of Holiness *internally* in the soul of man is altogether a distinct work from Justification by an Atonement for Guilt, wrought out for man *externally* of him, by the first and second infinite spirits conjointly co-operating; and sanctification

[1] [M. Cousin has thus defined the Creation :—'God passing into activity, but not exhausted in the act.' Sir W. Hamilton's 'Discussions,' p. 8. Ed.]

comes second in order to justification in the scheme of salvation contrived for man ; for sanctification implies, or pre-supposes an atonement for guilt, either first actually completed ; or, secondly, in *process of completion ;* or, thirdly, engaged or promised to man, to be carried into effect for him at some future period, to which promised atonement he is looking forward, and on the faith of which he is resting or relying for justification. But if sanctification was actually progressing in the souls of believers living at the very time that the atonement was only in *process of completion*, but yet unfinished, as both *may* and *must* have been the case at some period of the world *subsequent* to the *creation* of *man* (for this atonement requires a substitute compounded of *human nature* with an Infinite Spirit), then, in that case, there must have been a third Infinite Spirit to carry on that work of sanctification at the very same time that the first and second were engaged upon the work of atonement. Hence, in effecting a perfect redemption for sinful and guilty man, *i.e.*, in providing for him a method both of sanctification as well as justification, *three* infinite spirits appear to be indispensable, and it would seem both contrary to reason and inconceivable that *two* only would be sufficient.

It should here be observed that there is a remarkable distinction between the joint work of the first and second spirit in perfecting the atonement, and the work of the third spirit in generating spiritual life, the commencement of sanctification. The joint work of the two former, when commenced, would appear to be a mere temporary operation, completely finished after a period of time of longer or shorter duration ; whereas the work of the third must be continuous and incessant. From the creation of man to the end of time, as long as

there are believers upon earth (and at every period there *have* been and *will be* such), so long must the Spirit of Holiness operate in the souls of those believers, commencing by creating in them Regeneration and the New Birth, together with its inevitable fruits, Repentance and Faith, and continuing to operate by sanctifying them, which is a continuous process of regeneration, and its results upon the soul of each during life.

59. These three spirits engaged together, or co-operating, each one in the performance of the function of his own proper office respectively, towards the completion of a perfect redemption for man, must all three be equal to each other, every one of the three being infinite. Moreover, the qualities or attributes of each must be both similar and equal: thus each must be holy, and the moral perfection or holiness of each must be infinite, and, therefore, equal, for finite qualities could not compose or subsist in an Infinite Being (Sec. 3); also finite holiness would be no holiness at all, but sin (Sec. 7, note); each must possess power, and, therefore, an infinite or Almighty power, able to do all things; each must possess knowledge, and that an infinite knowledge or omniscience, and, therefore, also equal in each of the three: similarly the wisdom, love, mercy, &c., of each must be infinite, and, therefore, equal: also as each spirit is infinite in extension or magnitude, each must possess ubiquity, and be everywhere present. In fine, each of these spirits being infinite, and also possessing in himself all the infinite attributes of Deity, must be nothing less than perfect God in his own person.

60. But at first sight it would appear impossible that three Spirits, each of them *infinite in extent* or *magnitude*, could co-exist together; for as any one of the three, being infinite, must, of necessity, himself fill *all* space, it would seem that *no* space would be left for any other spirit, much less for two infinite ones. This

objection, however, is merely an apparent, not an actual, difficulty or obstacle; for,

1st. It is the property of all matter, whether solid, fluid, or gaseous, to occupy space alone, excluding all other matter from that portion of space which itself occupies; hence the term *solid*, from *solus*,[1] *alone*, is applicable to all matter, fluid and gaseous included,[2] and indicates this its peculiar property. But,

2ndly. This property is confined to matter, and does not extend to spirit, for matter does not exclude spirit from space, nor does spirit exclude matter. The human animal[3] (confessedly by universal consent, excepting only by those calling themselves Materialists) is admitted to consist of a material frame, co-existing along with a spiritual being, which is identified with it, and which both together occupy one and the same space, the spiritual nature constituting the vital principle, and conferring life on the material, which without it undergoes dissolution, and becomes inorganic matter. This spiritual being or soul of man, constituting his immortal nature, of which we know so little, clearly cannot be supposed to occupy or be confined to any interstices in the material frame, for as nature abhors a vacuum, none such are known to exist; it, therefore, must co-exist, and occupy the very same space with the matter which contains it, and is probably identified with the brain and nervous system in particular. But whether the soul fills entirely the space comprised within

[1] [Solidus comes from the Graeco-Italic sollos, Greek ὅλος. ED.]

[2] Though gas is in a high degree both elastic and compressible, expanding or contracting its bulk in proportion to the pressure applied to it, it nevertheless retains the property of excluding other gas from space; for two gases mingled will not contract to the same bulk by a given pressure, that one of the two singly will, but require an increased pressure.

[3] And perhaps also all other living creatures.

the external bounds or surface of the material frame (in which case it must assume the human form), or whether it only *partially fills* that space, or whether any portion of the soul extends beyond that surface [1] (in either of which last two cases it must possess form of some kind—though, perhaps, not a fixed or definite and permanent, but a variable one, susceptible of particular, not general, expansion and contraction, and, therefore, of variation in form, though not of magnitude—for whatever has limit has shape or form)—of all this we know absolutely nothing. It is sufficient for our present argument to know that the soul and body of man co-exist together, neither excluding the other from the space which itself occupies, and, therefore, that matter does not exclude spirit from space, nor does spirit matter. But,

3rdly. The Infinity and Ubiquity of God (two expressions descriptive of one and the same attribute, for an infinite spirit must be everywhere present, and a spirit everywhere present must be infinite) involve the inevitable conclusion, that he fills and occupies all space without any limit to his being. He, therefore, co-exists not only with his material creation, but equally also with his spiritual, occupying the same space with both ; hence, that portion of space contained within the bounds of the human form is occupied by three distinct and separate entities, viz., 1st, man's material frame ; 2ndly, his soul, or spiritual being ; 3rdly, such a

[1] It is highly probable that the spiritual being of Man is capable of occasional or temporary extension beyond the surface of his material frame, sympathy and the variety of phenomena connected with it seem to indicate an actual union or junction of two or more souls, where there is no contact of bodies ; also the phenomena of Mesmerism, or Biology, in which are exhibited two persons, *en rapport*, the one absolutely controlling the other, with no contact of, or even near proximity of their bodies, seem to point to a similar conclusion.

portion (or so much) of the infinite spirit as can be comprehended within that quantity of space; for if the infinite spirit and human soul do not co-exist, and occupy the same space together, but the former is excluded from the portion of space occupied by the latter, in that case the former *has a limit*, and is, therefore, no longer infinite, but merely finite; also the ubiquity of the former would be destroyed, and he would no longer be everywhere present, but only present where he was not excluded from space by his own vast (perhaps almost infinite) spiritual creation. The Infinity and Ubiquity of God, therefore, require that he should fill *all space without limit to his being*, including that portion of space occupied by every human soul, or by any other spiritual being: that God the infinite spirit and the finite spirit in man should co-exist together, occupying the same space, yet distinct and separate, and in no respect commingled or blended together; the latter not excluding the former from space, which would render Him finite, by creating a limit, nor the former the latter, which would be annihilation. But, under these circumstances, we have only to expand the finite spirit infinitely, and there are in that case two spirits, each of them infinite in magnitude, occupying together one and the same infinite space, yet each of them distinct and separate from the other. A similar argument leads to the conclusion that *three distinct* and *infinite spirits* may co-exist together, and occupy one and the same space respectively.[1]

[1] If the three separate and distinct Spirits engaged in perfecting a Redemption for Man are each of them *infinite*, in that case they must occupy space conjointly and collectively and not separately; *i.e.*, they must co-exist together, occupying one and the same space, and not separately fill or occupy three distinct spaces: for the space occupied by one spirit, being an Infinite space, could not be either multiplied or even increased.

The remark may here be made, that though the three Infinite Spirits are equal to each other, in magnitude, in power, and in all the other attributes of Deity, yet that in co-operating together to perfect a Redemption for Man there is clearly a subordination among them of *office*, arising out of the function of each, respectively ; but this subordination is altogether distinct from any inequality of person or of essence (Sec. 59). For the Spirit engaged in inflicting the infinite Penalty, must have a priority of office over the Spirit united to human nature upon whom that penalty is inflicted. The active agent must stand first, the passive recipient or subject second: also, as the atonement by Faith in which Man is justified, must precede or have priority over that Faith and the Sanctification which follows (a priority *not of time* but of *relation* or *relative position*, for in the early ages of the world such Faith must have had to look forward to an unaccomplished future Atonement), both which Faith and Sanctification are engendered in the soul by the Spirit of Holiness, this last spirit must stand third in the work of Redemption. This gradation of first, second, and third, in official function by the three Spirits, respectively, is perfectly consistent with the most complete and absolute equality of the three, both in essence and attributes: it is the work performed by each, respectively, which is graduated, and in regular subordination of rank and position, successively, and not any subordination or inequality in the respective Agents.

61. It may here be remarked, that this co-existence of the Infinite Spirit with the human soul,

1st. Explains, or places in a strong light, how it comes to pass that every thought of Man is known to God. For thoughts are either active operations, or functions by the soul, originating in the Will, or they are impressions made *upon* the soul while in a passive state, usually termed sensations ; indeed, the nerves emanating from the spinal column, or

prolongations of the brain (with which brain and nerves, the spiritual being of Man, is believed to be identified, or at least more particularly connected and united), have been ascertained to consist of two distinct classes, viz., nerves of Will, and nerves of Sensation, the two acting conversely to each other. Now these operations or sensations of the soul are not viewed by God from an external stand-point, but actually take place where He is Himself present, and, therefore, perfectly cognizant of them: for the Infinite Spirit exists *within* and *throughout*, and prevades internally the entire being of Man, as completely as he exists externally of Him, and is, therefore, better acquainted with Man's thoughts and feelings than Man is himself, by possessing a more perfect and refined or delicate perception of them, even of the most trivial and transient, than Man himself is capable of.

2ndly. It explains how God, and God alone, is the universal hearer of prayer of Mankind, and, indeed, of all His creatures. For prayer is not the mere utterance of the lips, addressed to an invisible Being, external of Man; such utterance *may*, and *often does*, take place without coming from the soul, in which case it is a mere form possessing no reality. Prayer is the lifting up of the soul towards God, or its spontaneous drawing nigh to Him; the spiritual cry, accompanied with desire or longing of the soul *to Him*. For the portion of the Infinite Spirit within Man, and his human soul or Spiritual Being (though both occupying one and the same space), are perfectly distinct and separate, each from the other, and in no degree whatever united or commingled together (Sec. 60). And as the Infinite Spirit is present in the soul of every human being, wheresoever located, on this our Globe, (which no finite Spirit can be), He, and He only,

is cognizant of such elevation or approach of the soul *towards Him*, such spiritual cry or utterance and desire of the soul *to Him*.

62. But in this case (Sec. 60), we have three Infinite Spirits filling merely the same space, and no more, than that which any one of the three occupies singly. The three united are no larger than each one of the three separately by itself; any one of the three is equal in magnitude both to the other two conjoined, and to the three united: moreover the attributes of any one of the three are equal to the attributes of all three combined: *e.g.*, the *power* of each being infinite (as that which is infinite cannot be increased, and, therefore, cannot be multiplied), therefore the *power* of each is equal to the combined *power* of the three; the holiness of any one being Infinite, is equal to that of the three united; the combined holiness of the three is no greater or more extensive and intense than the holiness of each one singly: and so of all the other attributes. In fine, these three Spirits are each of them God in all respects (Sec. 59), and the Deity is a compound Spiritual Being composed of these three Spirits in union; the respective and distinct offices of each in the work of Redemption, indicate that three distinct individuals must have been engaged in it (a joint co-operation of the three to one particular end and object), and the completion of the work evidences their concurrent or united Will and Action, and, therefore, the union and identification of the three. In theological phraseology, there is Unity in Trinity and a Trinity in Unity.

63. It has before been remarked (Sec. 14, 3rdly, Note) that Man, *in his natural state*, after acquiring a Moral Sense, and becoming a Moral Agent, would inevitably contract an intense and progressively increasing hatred of Right, of which it would be impossible for him by any power of his own to divest himself. For being responsible to an infinite and spiritual Moral Law, to

which he could in no respect or degree conform, he would in every thought and action of his life continually suffer under the consciousness of Guilt and Condemnation, and under its Penalties, both those present in this world, and by anticipation, those prospective and in reversion after death. To any such being, therefore, Free Will in the case of all Moral qualities would be impossible; for having acquired or contracted an intense hatred of *Right*, and, therefore, of all those Moral qualities included under that general term, he would inevitably be no less subject to and actuated by a corresponding and equal Love of Moral Evil, with all that that comprehensive expression contains. Free Will, therefore, or the ability voluntarily to choose between Right and Wrong, *i.e.*, to desire and to embrace with the affections Moral Right, and to hate and reject Moral Evil, is impossible for Man as a Moral Agent so long as he continues in his *natural state*; to acquire this inversion of his natural desires and affections, he must be made partaker of the New Creation, by Grace, Regeneration, the New Birth and its inevitable fruits.

64. It was proved (Secs. 23, 24) that Sin admits of no degrees, but that all Sin is both infinite and equal, and hence that every finite Moral Agent, being of necessity sinful, *is*, whether Saint or Fiend, equal and indistinguishable in Guilt; it now appears (Sec. 63) that no Moral Agent possesses a Freedom of Will enabling him *even to desire* a change from his natural state of sinfulness, he being subject to and actuated by a love of Moral Evil. Hence there can be no possible degree of merit or Moral superiority or any predisposing cause whatever in the Moral status of one person above another, inclining the Deity, to prefer one to another in His selection of those on whom to confer the new nature or Spiritual Life indispensable to Salvation. Such Election must, therefore, be referred to the Free, Sovereign and Arbitrary Will of God, acting inde-

pendently of all merit, or Moral superiority, or of any qualification in the individual disposing or influencing God in such choice or selection. This election of one, and passing by another of the human race—both being equally Guilty—is, according to Man's judgment, an act of partiality or of caprice, *i.e.*, an act without assignable reason or cause for it, and, therefore, of injustice by God. But Man, as a finite Moral Agent, possesses merely a finite or partial, in other words, an infinitely small perception of an Infinite Moral Law, which is the reflex or counterpart of the Infinite Moral Standard, Holiness; he is not, therefore, qualified to form a judgment or arrive at a correct decision upon any Moral questions whatever (Sec. 13, 1). *Prima facie* it may be inferred that a Moral Agent possessing only an infinitely small knowledge of an Infinite Moral Law, would of necessity be incorrect in his judgment (Sec. 13, 1), but even if he happened to be correct, it would only be by mere chance or accident. Man, therefore, according to reason, has no right whatever (being absolutely disqualified) to exercise any opinion, or to sit in judgment upon the conduct of God.

65. But Deity possesses, along with His other attributes, that of foreknowledge in an infinite degree. This and His other attributes being essential to His nature, had no commencement in time, but are qualities of His being from all eternity. Bacon speaks of God as the Being 'before whom all things are *present*' (Sec. 22, Note 1); in which case the entire future would be simultaneously under His eye. He, therefore, knew beforehand, from all eternity (and ages before the commencement of any part of His creation), every individual of the human race, then uncreated and not in existence, whom He had before determined or destined to be the subjects of His election and the recipients of His grace, from which spiritual life originates. Hence, the conclusion is inevitable, that

election *by*, combined with foreknowledge *in*, God, constitutes predestination to life, of a selected and favoured portion or fraction of mankind, the remainder of His race being passed by and abandoned.

66. But the Moral perfection of Deity includes among other attributes the perfection of mercy and goodness. If we look on mankind at large, we see plainly enough that in general his moral nature (except where it has been perverted or inverted) unhesitatingly approves of justice and truth; and this approval is the more strongly manifested in cases where the just and truthful conduct entails on the agent self-sacrifice in any degree. This approval by man's moral nature of disinterested justice and truth entitles us with the correctest reasoning to attribute these qualities in the highest perfection to the Deity. A similar process of reasoning entitles us to attribute to God an infinite degree of mercy and goodness. (Stewart's 'Outlines of Moral Philosophy,' Secs. 286, 288.)

67. If, then, the Creator be infinite in mercy and goodness as well as in justice and truth, and if any order of beings whom He had created immortal had been overwhelmed in everlasting ruin by acquiring a moral sense, seeing that no other mode of rescuing them existed, except by God Himself adopting or assuming their nature, becoming their surety, and so making for them an atonement, it is in no degree whatever opposed to reason to expect that under those circumstances He would condescend so to do; on the contrary, such conduct by God would only be strictly in accordance with that infinite goodness of His nature which we are with the most correct reasoning entitled to attribute to Him.[1]

[1] The question here naturally arises, how is it that, if Deity be infinite in mercy and goodness (seeing that the Atonement is amply sufficient for the *Justification* of Mankind at large, and both the Ubiquity and

68. But for man thus redeemed by a knowledge of and belief in the finished atonement provided for him (Secs. 50 and 51), and, therefore, no longer responsible to the Moral Law (even though still a Moral Agent, so far as being cognizant of Moral distinctions through his possession of a Moral faculty), a new external law or code of rules to walk by during natural life would be indispensable, together with new motives for obedience.

69. A NEW EXTERNAL LAW. (Secs. 18, 19, and Note.)

For the law, which man as a Moral Agent is subject to, is not external to him, but internal in him: in other words, Conscience, the product and the reflex of his Moral Sense; and this Moral Sense being an infinitely small perception or glimpse of an infinite Moral stan-

Eternity of the Holy Spirit is equally so for the *Regeneration* of all), a fraction only of the Human Race is elected for Salvation, and the remainder passed by and abandoned? This question goes a step beyond our argument, comprised in Part I. Man's reasoning powers have not as yet discovered a solution of it; yet, as somewhat bearing on the subject, it must be recollected:

1st. That the Fall of Man was *not* at all a voluntary infliction by the Deity; it was a deliberate infraction *of*, or attack *by*, Man (in acquiring a Moral Sense) upon the Moral principles on which the Universe is constructed, and which, being the reflex or counterpart of an attribute of God, it was beyond his power to change or interfere with: God did not inflict ruin upon Man as a punishment, but Man, after due warning, voluntarily pulled down ruin on himself and his whole race, who were in his loins at the time of the Fall.

2ndly. The *nature* and *extent* of the Atonement, by God adopting Man's nature, taking upon Himself Man's Guilt, and undergoing for Man the infinite Penalty due to it, warrant and even compel the conclusion that God *is*, and *must be*, a Being of infinite mercy and goodness.

3rdly. Man, as a finite Moral Agent, and therefore possessing merely an infinitely small knowledge of an infinite Moral Law, is utterly disqualified from forming any correct judgment upon the conduct of God.

It follows therefore of necessity that some cause, consistent with infinite mercy and goodness, exists, though unknown to Man, for God acting in this apparently partial manner (by passing over the majority of Mankind), but which will at a future period be, no doubt, arrived at by Man's Reasoning Faculties.

dard, and partaking also of the extreme versatility of man's other faculties, is both deceptive and variable in the greatest degree ; therefore Conscience, its reflex, can neither be a sound nor correct guide on Moral questions, nor even a *fixed rule*, but a most variable one, subject to mutations, and even to inversion, according to circumstances and habits of life. Deity, therefore, having accomplished a perfect redemption for man in the stupendously miraculous mode heretofore described, and having rescued him from the inevitable condemnation and curse of the moral law, could never be supposed to abandon him on the ocean of life, destitute of all moral guidance, but we are warranted in concluding that He would by direct revelation (the only method by which it could be supplied) provide mankind with a new external finite moral law adapted to his requirements and to his material circumstances and finite position, in order, by its acting upon his moral sense, to correct and give stability to conscience, and then operate conjointly with it in directing his moral course of life. This external law, therefore (differing entirely in its nature and extent from that infinite moral law, the counterpart of holiness, of which it is a mere synopsis or reduction, as well as an adaption to man's position and material circumstances), is not one by the fulfilling of which man can by any possibility be justified, or by the breach of which he is damned. All mankind (except an elect few) are eternally lost by their responsibility to the infinite moral law acquired at the Fall. The justification, and, therefore, salvation of the elect arises out of their fulfilling by proxy or surety the requirements of the infinite moral law, and undergoing by the same proxy the infinite penalty due to the breach of it. The revealed external law or code of moral rules (never intended for, and quite ineffectual in respect of, justification) is, nevertheless, applicable equally to mankind at large as well as to the redeemed portion of

his race, being invaluable to the world as the basis of all real civilization. This section, 69, in our argument lands us in Part III., the revealed system, with which the moral system has now for many sections been running parallel, but which in this Part I. we have decided to keep clear of; it is, therefore, no further to be pursued here, as it will be fully examined in detail when we arrive at Part III.

70. New Motives for Obedience.

For the original and inherent motive to obedience in every Moral Agent is an inexorable Moral Obligation, requiring such Moral Agent to conform to an *infinite*, and consequently *unknown*, and, therefore, *impossible* Moral Law, and damning him for failing in such conformity; and this Moral Obligation being transferred from Man to his surety by redemption, is by such transference abolished and utterly got rid of in his case, and, therefore, the motive ceases with it. But a new motive, arising out of his altered relationship to God as his Redeemer, would take its place. For without redemption by the atonement, the relationship of Deity towards His creature Man is that of an inexorable judge, the vindicator of His own outraged Moral Law; but with it, not only is He transformed into a reconciled and loving Father, but Man also, by the regeneration conditional to redemption, loses his natural hostility to God, engendered in his nature by the acquisition of a Moral Sense, and becomes reciprocally filled with love to God, and, therefore, actuated by an earnest desire, producing a strong endeavour to obey Him, and in all things as far as possible to conform entirely to His Will.

Man's original motive, therefore, arising out of Moral Obligation, produced only hatred and fear, merging in despair; his new motive, on the contrary, springing

from redemption, begets love and an earnest endeavour to conform to God's revealed and practicable Moral Law.

71. The argument pervading Part I. has brought out along with others the following conclusions, viz.:—

1st. That holiness being conformity to an infinite Moral Standard, no *finite* being is capable of holiness.

2nd. That Man, being ruined everlastingly by the acquisition of a Moral Sense, the Deity contrived a mode of rescue for him by an Atonement, in which God the second Person of the Trinity assumed Man's nature, and by imputation his guilt also, suffered the penalty for it on Man's behalf, and by imputation transferred to Man His holiness.

3rd. That Man being thus justified by the Atonement, his regeneration or new birth simultaneously takes place by the third Person of the Trinity (the Holy Spirit) actually uniting Himself with the soul of that justified Man partially, and in some degree or other; and by His maintaining that union, and dwelling in and with that soul, thus effecting its sanctification, a continuous process in the direction of holiness during natural life.

But at death, when that soul casts off its material case, and enters on the world of spirits, though both justified and sanctified, it is not in a state to be admitted to Heaven, into the presence of Deity; for sanctification being a mere partial union of Man's soul with the Spirit of Holiness, it is only partially holy; and every inhabitant of Heaven must be either innocent, as by original creation, or holy: *innocent* that soul cannot be, having acquired a Moral Sense; *holy* it cannot be, for no finite creature is capable of actual holiness; the holiness which it possesses is not actual or inherent in its nature, but its surety's holiness external to it,

and transferred to its account by imputation. The moral *position*, therefore, *externally*, of that disembodied soul, is merely that it is justified from Moral Condemnation by belief in the Atonement *external* to it, and its *condition internally*, that it is sanctified by its partial (not complete) union with the Holy Spirit, by which some partial amount of genuine holiness is superadded to its natural sinfulness, thus superseding and removing that sinfulness in exact proportion to the amount or degree of genuine holiness superadded by such union. For exactly in proportion as genuine holiness increases by more perfect union with the Spirit of Holiness, in that proportion does natural sinfulness abate and decrease. In order, therefore, to fit this soul for Heaven no other course remains but that this partial and incomplete, though real and actual, union of the soul with the Holy Spirit during natural life, should at death become a perfect and complete union, thus removing entirely this natural sinfulness, and replacing it by perfect holiness ; in other words, that this soul, redeemed in so stupendously miraculous a manner by God, the second Person of the Trinity, adopting human nature, should, on the other hand, be swallowed up in God the Holy Spirit, the third Person, and thus become an integral portion of the Deity, partaking at once both of His infinite nature and of His holiness.

72. This absorption into Himself from time to time by the Infinite Spirit of Holiness (the third Person of the Trinity), of the innumerable finite disembodied spirits of Redeemed humanity in all ages of the world, would in no degree augment or enlarge ever so slightly the magnitude of the Infinite Spirit (for nothing infinite admits of increase), or exercise any appreciable influence on the nature of Deity, though it would invest those finite spirits with an *infinite nature*, without which they would be incapable of Holiness, and, therefore, of

Heaven: for as the second person of the Trinity, in order to Redeem Man, took on Himself Man's nature, so Man thus Redeemed, to be made fit for Heaven, must be invested with the nature of the third Person (Infinity and Holiness), being already possessed of an attribute of God, the Moral Sense.

And as the Deity consists of three Persons so intimately united as to constitute one compound Being, yet each of the three preserving His own Individuality or distinct and separate existence, the *three* making *one* and the one consisting of three (Sec. 62), even so the soul of Redeemed Man, after death, is swallowed up in the Infinite Spirit of Holiness (God the Holy Ghost, the third Person of the Trinity), and so closely united *to* and identified *with* Him as to partake of His attributes, especially those of Infinity and Holiness, which two are inseparable—each necessary to the existence of the other—while it continues to preserve its own Individuality or distinct and separate existence, as it were a branch or limb of the Holy Spirit, and through Him of the Deity Himself.

73. It thus appears that the ruin consequent upon the Fall was evidently occasioned by the transfer or removal of the Moral and Spiritual position and circumstances of a *finite* creature (Man) into a condition of Infinites, thereby creating a mass of incongruities utterly destructive of Him.

For 1st. Holiness is *infinite* Moral Perfection.

2ndly. Infinite Moral Perfection being the sole Standard of Moral Right and Wrong, Right and Wrong are necessarily *infinite* Moral qualities, Right being conformity to the *infinite* Standard; Wrong, its reverse, non-conformity or opposition to it.

3rdly. A Moral Sense acquired by Man, *i.e.*, a discriminating perception or partial knowledge of

Right and Wrong, must be a partial knowledge of *infinite* Moral qualities or a *finite* glimpse of *Infinite* Moral Perfection or Holiness.

4thly. This Moral Sense inevitably creates a Moral Obligation, *i.e.*, an obligation to conform to Moral Right, an *infinite* quality, therefore,

5thly. Moral Sense and Moral Obligation together, create a dominant Moral Law which is *infinite* in its requirements.

6thly. Conformity to *infinite* requirements by any *finite* being is impossible, therefore he cannot avoid a breach of these *infinite* requirements in every thought or act of life, either by shortcomings or by transgressions, both of which are sinful, infinitely.

7thly. Sin, which is a breach of an *infinite* Law, must itself be *infinite*.

8thly. Therefore, Guilt, an inevitable accompaniment or quality of Sin in a Moral Agent, is *infinite*, and *infinite*, also, is the condemnation it entails.

9thly. The Penalty due to *infinite* Guilt, and resulting from *infinite* condemnation, must be an *infinite* Penalty.

10thly. An *infinite* Penalty being beyond the power of a finite being to undergo, he must suffer its equivalent, an extreme finite one, *infinitely* prolonged.

The fall of Man, therefore, by the acquisition of a Moral Sense, consisted in his removal of his spiritual being, by his own act, from its natural and proper finite position and circumstances, and transferring himself to a condition of *Infinites*, and (therefore, in his case), of *Impossibilities*, utterly overwhelming and ruinous to his nature by original creation.

Then, on the other hand, his Redemption by an Atonement was no less a joint operation of *Infinites* acting under *infinite* conditions and circumstances.

α. The Substitute who is to make an Atonement for ruined Man, must have an *Infinite Spirit* compounded with human nature.

β. This *Infinite* Compound Being must fulfil the *infinite* requirements of the Moral Law to exempt him from its condemnation on his own account.

γ. He must, as Man's Substitute, assume to himself Man's *infinite* Guilt.

δ. He must passively undergo on Man's behalf the *infinite* spiritual Penalty due to Guilt.

ε. Whilst assuming to Himself *infinite Guilt* and undergoing its *infinite* Penalty, He must simultaneously transfer to Man's account *Infinite* Holiness.

ζ. An *infinite* spiritual Penalty requires and presupposes an *Infinite* Spirit actively to inflict it.

η. In order to Man's Sanctification, a 3rd *Infinite* Spirit to regenerate the soul of Man is indispensable.

θ. As no finite being can be *holy*, and no finite Moral Agent can be *innocent*, and as every inhabitant of Heaven must be either holy or innocent, redeemed Man (a Moral Agent) after death must become *united to Deity* in order thus to partake of His *Infinity* and His *holiness*.

PART II.

AN EXAMINATION OF THE CONDITION OF THE ANIMAL KINGDOM, TO ASCERTAIN HOW FAR IT EXEMPLIFIES THE PRECEDING THEORY OF MORALS.

I. The Globe we inhabit is peopled by various orders of living animals, at the head of which stands pre-eminent the human animal called Man. The far greater portion of the Animal Kingdom, and more especially the class distinguished as Vertebrate, is endowed with various degrees of intellectual power, usually denominated Instinct in the Brute Creation, and Reason in Man.

II. It is generally contended that the Intellectual powers (including the Discursive faculty) possessed by Man, differ not merely in degree, but totally in kind, from what is called Instinct in other animals. This generic distinction between Reason and Instinct does not appear valid, but on the contrary it would seem that they are homogeneous, and that what is termed Instinct in the brute, is only a much lower degree of what is known as Reason in Man, and conversely: for

1st. The more sagacious of the brute creation occasionally manifest a sort of power of soliloquising, strictly analogous to the deductive reasoning employed by man, but of a lower order. Thus it has been observed that when a dog, seeking his master, has tracked him by scent along a road to where it

diverges into two, if, on putting his nose to the ground, he ascertains that his master has not taken one of the two roads, he immediately adopts the other without testing it by his scent, showing that he infers his master must have taken the latter, because he had previously ascertained that he had not taken the former.

2ndly. The more sagacious living creatures manifest a *contrivance* or *invention* under *novel circumstances*, not to be classed with Instinct;[1] *e.g.*, a hare, often hunted, soon discovers that it is tracked by means of the scent it gives out, and, therefore, doubles and returns upon its track in order to baffle the hounds; also wolves, in hunting an antelope, form a semicircle and drive him over a precipice, having learned by experience his superior fleetness; and the Royston crows in Romney marsh, being unable to pick the whelks out of their shells, rise with them in the air, and then drop them on the beach to break the shells.

3rdly. The sagacity of animals increases remarkably with their age, the old ones exhibiting much more of it than they did when young, proving thereby that their Instinct is cultivated by *experience*, which is strictly analogous to what takes place in the human Intellect. Thus it is an undoubted fact that an old fox or hare possesses far more craftiness and cunning than it did when young; also in hawking, old herons, instead of soaring to escape

[1] Contrivance, or the employment of means towards a particular end, indicates *Design*; which design can only be attributed to an intelligent Being, *i.e.*, a Being possessed of intellect; according as the contrivance is either simple on the one hand, or complex and elaborate on the other, or according as the means employed to accomplish the desired effect are either single or multiplied, so the intellect or intelligence of the designing agent, is either of a lower or higher order. But the simplest contrivance, or the introduction of a single means between the designer and the end to be accomplished, implies or indicates intellect of some degree or other.

the Falcon, throw up their ballast (fish, &c.), and run down the wind, thereby always distancing their pursuer, a manœuvre of which the young and inexperienced birds have not discovered the advantage.

4thly. Living creatures which are by nature gregarious, and associate in numbers, generally display more sagacity than the solitary who live together in pairs; thus proving that they mutually and reciprocally cultivate and improve each other's Instincts; which is preeminently the case with man, whose intellectual powers derive such incalculable improvement from converse with his fellow-men, either living or dead: as illustrations of this superior sagacity in gregarious living creatures, among insects—the termites, the ant, and the bee, may be cited; rooks among birds, and beavers among quadrupeds.

5thly. Domestic animals, or such as associate with mankind, acquire an amazing increase of sagacity; thus the shepherd dog, and others of the dog tribe, when domesticated, can be taught almost anything, which proves that the natural instinct of animals receives very great improvement by cultivation and by being brought into communication with the superior intellect of man. Thus Instinct and Intellect would appear to belong to the same genus, the former being so powerfully influenced and increased by association with the latter; and not only so, but even without direction from their masters, in particular cases these domesticated animals will occasionally manifest a degree of judgment and discrimination approximating closely to the reasoning powers of man.

6thly. The intellectual powers in men differ immeasurably in different individuals.

α. By natural constitution:—It is abundantly evi-

dent that the *physical powers* of men *vary* greatly by birth, one being born strong and robust, and another weak and delicate; but this variety is even greater *in mind* than *in body*; the intellect of one being even by nature profound and comprehensive, and that of another obtuse and imbecile. Phrenologically, the heads of children too young to have undergone organic modification through mental cultivation present very striking contrasts in the formation of the brain; some exhibiting a large development of those organs indicative of intellectual power in a high degree; while others are so deficient in those same organs as to approach in a degree a mental condition of idiocy.

β. By cultivation or neglect:—what a contrast, even in civilized society, between the intellect of one man,—cultivated and wrought up to the extreme of human capacity, and that of another—neglected and allowed to deteriorate!

But when *natural superiority* and a *high degree* of *cultivation* concur on the one hand, and natural *inferiority* and *neglect* on the other, the contrast is most strikingly displayed, and becomes so excessive that it is not too much to affirm that the intellect of Newton, Herschel, Adams, or Le Verrier differs more widely from that of the Hottentot or South Sea Islander, than the intellect of the latter does from the higher orders of instinct in the brute creation. As far as intellect is concerned, the Hottentot and the shepherd dog approximate more nearly, and class together better by far than Newton and the Hottentot; the two last, indeed, would seem (intellectually) to have nothing in common, and in mind to be in no respect similar, but altogether contrasted.

From these considerations it would appear that Instinct and Reason are merely different degrees of one and the same faculty; that Reason is only an

immeasurably higher order of what is called Instinct in the brute, and the converse; and that, therefore, as far as Intellect is concerned, man differs only *in degree*, and not *in kind*, from the other inhabitants of our globe.[1]

III. In one respect, however, man differs not only in degree, but totally in kind from all other living creatures, *viz.*, in the *possession* of a *moral sense* or natural and connate faculty for taking cognizance of Moral qualities, or estimating Moral distinctions. This faculty exists universally in Man, for in every language throughout the world are to be found terms synonymous with right and wrong, thereby proving that the people who use them have certain ideas corresponding to these terms, and distinguish between the two. These ideas of right and wrong are in no respect the result of the discursive faculty, nor are they essentially connected with Man's intellectual powers,[2] for,

1st. This Moral Sense is in general displayed most conspicuously in children, whose reasoning powers are immature and imperfect. Indignation at injustice, or a sense of shame at detected falsehood—two indications of a Moral Sense—are more strongly manifested in children than in grown people; so that as intellect improves by age and experience, Moral Sense for the most part deteriorates, or loses

[1] Stewart, speaking of Man's intellectual and *moral powers combined*, says: 'The difference between us and the brute is in kind and not in degree; and it constitutes the *single instance* in which the regular gradation which we everywhere else observe in the Universe, *fails entirely*.' ('Outlines of Moral Philosophy,' Sec. 109.) This is perfectly true, if the *Moral Faculty* be included in the comparison, for the brute creation possess no trace of it: but if the Moral Faculty be excluded, the regular gradation is restored; for Man's intellect differs from that of the brute, not in kind, but only in degree. How strikingly does this remark by Stewart *demonstrate*, as it were, that this Moral Faculty in Mankind was not a part of his mental Constitution by original creation, but was in some manner subsequently acquired! See Introduction, Note, p. 15: also forward, Sec. V.

[2] See on this question, 'Abercrombie on the Moral Feelings,' pp. 142 and 143.

its power of delicate and refined perception and discrimination of Moral distinctions.

2ndly. In adults a very strong and correct approximate appreciation of right and wrong is often observable in persons whose intellectual powers are of the lowest order, approaching even to imbecility; and the converse.

3rdly. A person may pursue a course of cultivating the intellect, and impairing or destroying the Moral faculty at one and the same time; in which case intellectual improvement on the one hand, and the deterioration of the Moral Sense on the other, will rapidly progress together.

4thly. Physicians have observed that in the earlier stages of insanity the Moral Sense or power of estimating the guilt and turpitude of wrong actions is often greatly impaired, or even entirely obliterated, where the discursive faculty, or power of reasoning correctly, remains perfect and uninjured.[1]

5thly. Though Reason will generally induce to a line of conduct similar to that which Moral Sense inculcates, the two act from totally different principles, and in a manner entirely opposite to each other; for reason looks to the consequences of the conduct, in order to ascertain whether it is desirable or advantageous; Moral Sense, on the contrary looks only at the conduct itself, and discards all reference to the consequences. Reason induces to an action, because it is advantageous in its results; Moral Sense banishes all consideration of consequences from the question, and insists upon a line of conduct (merely because it is right) which may often be ruinous and even fatal to the

[1] See the medical evidence in Oxford's trial for shooting at the Queen. See also 'Abercrombie on the Moral Feelings,' p. 149.

agent. Indeed, the pleasure and satisfaction which the Moral faculty derives from the adoption of a course of which it approves is exactly proportioned to the personal sacrifices which that course entails, so that the Stoics affirmed that virtue was its own reward: whereas, on the contrary, the satisfaction derived by the intellect alone would be exactly proportioned to the advantage, either to the agent himself or to others, attending that course.

These five considerations, therefore, prove that it is altogether incorrect to suppose that Man's notions of right and wrong are the result of his reasoning powers; they arise entirely from a mental faculty peculiar to him, and totally distinct from reason or intellect.[1]

Now, though very strong traces of intellect, or of something strictly analogous to it, are manifested by the brute creation, not a vestige of anything like a Moral faculty is to be found among them. That which most resembles it is referable to another cause; *e.g.*, gratitude in an animal towards its habitual benefactor is the result of its affections, of which many animals possess a large amount, and in no respect to a sense of duty, or the adoption of a line of conduct, because it is right.[2] In fine, anything like shame at the habitual deceit or falsehood which most of them at times naturally practise, is not discoverable in any animal; nor do they manifest the slightest sense of shame at nakedness, or at the intercourse of the sexes in public, which shame has

[1] 'No hypothesis' (says Dr. Campbell), 'hitherto invented hath shown that by means of a Discursive Faculty, without the aid of any other mental power, we could ever obtain a notion of either the Beautiful or the Good.' ('Philosophy of Rhetoric,' vol. i. p. 204.) The remark is undoubtedly true, and may be applied to all those systems which ascribe to Reason the origin of our Moral ideas, if the expressions, Reason and Discursive Faculty, be used as synonymous. (Stewart, 'Outlines of Moral Philosophy,' Sec. 198.)

[2] [But see on the other side Darwin's 'Descent of Man,' p. 78; Agassiz, 'De l'Espèce et de la Classification,' p. 97; and an admirable article in the *Quarterly Review*, October 1872, on the 'Consciousness of Dogs,' which has been attributed to Miss Cobbe. Ed.]

driven nearly the entire human race to clothing of some kind in reference to the former, and to secrecy in the case of the latter,[1] being, in fact, the most prominent and palpable indication which exists of the Moral faculty in mankind.

IV. But this Moral Sense, or faculty which is so distinctly evidenced in mankind at large, and which constitutes the sole generic mental distinction between him and all other animals, is not only no advantage whatever, but is positively injurious to him,[2] for,

1st. Man's natural notions of right and wrong are so vague and indefinite, that though the whole human race admit the existence of these Moral qualities, by using the terms, yet they have never been able to give any sort of approximation to a definition of those terms, or to concur in anything like a uniform Moral Code of Laws and Regulations. Though all nations use the terms Virtue and Vice, Right and Wrong, and distinguish between the two, yet none of them are agreed (generally) as to what constitutes virtue, or its opposite; nor would a definition of virtue by one nation meet with anything like concurrence from all others.[3]

2ndly. The Moral faculty in Man participates entirely in that versatility which attaches to his physical senses. The whole human race commence

[1] [Atqui inter bestias in camelis certe et felibus eadem quæ in hominibus apparet pudicitia. Ed.]

[2] In any examination of the nature and consequences of the Moral Faculty in Man, it is absolutely necessary to exclude from our consideration all those sections of the human race, that in ever so slight a degree are acquainted with a Divine Revelation; for the Scriptures, as a Moral Code, have exercised so powerful an influence in correcting, as occasion may require, the Moral Sense, and in giving it stability, that its normal and independent effect or operation on Mankind can in no measure be correctly estimated, where either the Old Testament (as among the Jews), or the entire Canon of Scripture (as among Christian nations), has been known; our investigations must be limited to Heathen nations, where the natural Moral Sense in Man has been allowed free scope to exercise itself, and entirely uninterfered with, and uninfluenced or unassisted in its operations.

[3] See Hume's 'Inquiry concerning the Principles of Morals.'

life with one and the same kind of food, viz., the milk of the mother; but by the time they arrive at manhood there is no end to the varieties of food for which different sections of mankind have a preference; and that which is delicious to one nation is disgusting to another. So it is with the Moral Sense, which develops itself in all men at the very earliest age, almost as soon as consciousness, and long before the discursive faculty has made any considerable progress; yet by the time they arrive at maturity their Moral judgments are as various as are the preferences of their palates;[1] and everything which is condemned as a vice in one nation, may be found practised as a virtue in some other.[2]

3rdly. This Moral Sense is the natural and necessary parent of conscience (Part I., Sec. 14, 2); and a *condemning conscience*, which is as universal throughout the human race as is the Moral Sense, is the natural parent of all the false religions in the world. Vague and uncertain as are the decisions of the Moral faculty, yet in one respect every man concurs, viz.:—

[1] In this case the Moral Sense forms a complete contrast to the Discursive Faculty; for propound to Mankind at large the question, 'How much is two and two?' the intellect of every Man living responds at once 'four'; and so on in every instance where the truth in question can be arrived at by the Intellect, there is almost an entire unanimity among the whole human race. And in every age of the world where the Intellect alone is the faculty appealed to, observe how Sciences which admit of demonstration, or in other words, command the assent of the Intellect, have gone on progressing towards perfection from age to age. But propose to Mankind the question, 'What is Morally Right?' and nothing like a concurrence can be obtained, or a definition given: the question itself is a complete apple of discord, which sets all men at variance: nay more, some principal Philosophers (Hume, for instance) have seriously laboured to prove that there is no such thing as Moral Right at all; but that the idea is a mere fiction, arising from Education, or from the various habits and manners of different nations; and therefore have contended that Man's worst Vices, when practised with some degree of apparent advantage, are equally legitimate with his highest Virtues.

[2] Note in Introduction, p. 8.

α. That his moral sense condemns him; that he is responsible to a law which he fails in acting up to, and, therefore, has incurred Moral guilt and condemnation. This consciousness of guilt or guilty conscience

β. Universally conjures up and supposes some imaginary Deity, who is the Author and Vindicator of this law which condemns man,[1] and who will punish the breach of it; and, therefore,

γ. Some atonement or mode of appeasing this offended Deity is invented, which almost universally takes the form of sacrifice, or the slaughter and offering up of some victim as the proxy or substitute to that Deity.[2]

Now, in almost every heathen nation that has yet been discovered, a religion in some form or other has been found to exist, and every such religion is more or less resolvable into these three particulars, viz., a Guilty and Condemning Conscience, an offended Deity, and an Atonement.

Again.—As the Moral Sense, being versatile, is liable to the mutations which attach to man's other senses, so also the imaginary Deity vindicating the Moral Law is found to correspond exactly in nature and character with this Moral Sense, however much inverted. Thus though among our Saxon ancestors in Germany, chastity was a virtue strictly adhered to, yet among nations inhabiting the sultry climates of Italy and Greece, strong animal

[1] The Moral Sense acquired by Adam at the Fall, was a partial acquisition by Man of an infinite attribute of God (Holiness), and it rendered Man responsible to a Law which was the reflex or counterpart of that attribute, and of which Law, therefore, God was the Author and Vindicator, as it was an emanation from Him; and this important truth, viz., the inseparable connection between the Moral Sense and the Law of Deity, remains indelibly implanted in human nature to this day, for among the Heathen, however debased or inverted their Moral Faculty may be, having lost all trace of the true God, they invariably invent a fictitious Deity, to whose Will or Law they refer their Moral judgments. • See Introduction, p. 12, note.

[2] See 'Magee on the Atonement.'

passions, and a consequent prevailing licentiousness, had so inverted their Moral Sense, that straightway Lust became morally right; soon a fictitious Deity (Venus) was invented in whose temples at Cyprus and elsewhere, every degree of sensuality was practised by the worshippers as a religious duty. In a similar manner Mercury was the supposed Deity presiding over thieving and fraud, and thieving was inculcated and practised as a virtue, more especially by the Lacedæmonians and others. And thus also among the Hindoos and other nations, their false Deities at this day are impersonations of revenge, cruelty, lust, fraud and every other vice which disgraces man's debased and inverted Moral nature;[1] for in false religions the Deity is always the reflex or counterpart of the Moral Sense of his worshippers; and thus the perverted or inverted Moral faculty in man, and the false religion to which it gives rise, mutually and reciprocally act and react on one another, each contributing a darker shade and an increased malignity to its counterpart.

Again.—Every *false* religion includes a Priesthood, or privileged order of Ecclesiastics supposed to be favoured by their respective Deities, and the acknow-

[1] A Frightful Picture. 'We were particularly struck with one room in this part of the Palace. Its walls were of white marble, decorated with carving and gilding and painting, in a style elaborate beyond belief. Some of the panels contained paintings of various deities, and among them, one of Bhowanee, the patroness of the Thugs; she is the same as Parbuttee, two of whose temples I have described. Bhowanee was represented as a naked black female figure, wearing round her head a necklace of human heads, bleeding. She had ten arms, with two of which she was tearing a baby to pieces. In another, she held half a man's body; the other half she had eaten, and her jaws dripped with blood. A fourth hand was bearing an elephant, with its rider in its huge red mouth, glittering with a row of sharp projecting tusks. This amiable character is supposed to smile a thousand years at the death of a single man slain in her honour. She is the patroness of the Thugs and Dakoits, classes of professional robbers and murderers, who look upon the crimes which they commit as religious duties, and who were fearfully numerous throughout India until the great and successful efforts made during the present century by the Honourable East India Company for their suppression.'—'New York to Delhi.'

ledged mediators between these Deities and their worshippers; and it is not too much to affirm that a very large part of the ignorance, error and misery under which Man has suffered, has arisen from his subjection to this class, and their tyranny over him. This order of Priesthood (as a general rule) is in character and morals the exact representative of the religion in accordance with the dogmas of which they were educated, and in which they officiate. For as the religion is the type or impression of the Moral nature which produces it, equally so is the Priesthood the counterpart or reflex of the religion which begets them.[1] Though often admired as the depositaries of learning and knowledge in dark ages, they were chiefly so because they sedulously kept their spiritual subjects in ignorance, and crushed out any light which might gleam forth among the people they ruled. Even in Christian countries, the era of Science dates from the setting open of Scripture, the religious principles of which book are the antidote, or remedy for a Guilty Conscience, and therefore as a necessary consequence confer a freedom of thought and mind, and by that freedom a total exemption from Priestly domination also, which never before was to be met with in the world. And this emancipation of the human Intellect from its former trammels and subjugation, viz., from a *Guilty Conscience*, a *False Religion*, and a *Dominant Priesthood*, set it at liberty to prosecute those discoveries in the field of physical science, which have elevated mankind to a degree heretofore inconceivable, and have even completely changed the general aspect of civilized modern countries. Now a Guilty Conscience, the inevitable result of his

[1] This argument is not limited to the case of Religions which are absolutely false, but equally applies to those which are in part true: Popery, for example, in which a small portion of Truth lies buried under a huge mass of falsity, error, and vice, both doctrinal and practical.

Moral Faculty has in all ages been the cause of man's subjection to his Priest.

Again.—The religion of a Nation, whether true or false, enters very largely into its Legislation; and in a greater or less degree regulates and modifies its Political Institutions: also it very powerfully influences both the character and the Social habits of a people by penetrating their dwellings, and exercising a dominant control over the domestic manners and customs of each family, extending to either sex and to every age in life of its respective inmates. Now as it is impossible to overrate the blessing and advantage to any people of a correct and sound Religion, which experience has abundantly proved to be the highest Agent in civilizing, and thereby elevating and exalting, a Nation; so equally is it beyond man's power to estimate the curse and incalculable injury of a False one to any Section of the Human Race. It pervades and taints both the entire body Politic and each individual member of it; giving a legislative sanction to its worst Vices, and even enjoining them upon the people as Religious duties, or as Moral Observances. Under the influence of a False Religion, Incest was habitual among the Athenians, and Pæderasty recognized as a dignified, ennobling and beneficial practice; licentiousness of every kind also, drunkenness, theft, fraud and deceit have been inculcated, and prevailed universally in different Nations as acceptable to the National Deities, and been even approved of by the Philosophers and others the wisest men of their respective Age and Country. And all this Evil and fearful debasement and degradation, have been the result of nothing else but a perverted or inverted Moral Faculty, and the requirements of a Condemning Conscience.

And therefore—to recapitulate the arguments in Sec. IV.: as this Moral Faculty is *even at the best* vague and indefinite in its decisions, and quite insufficient prac-

tically as a Rule of Right and Wrong (as witness the whole history of mankind, wherever Divine Revelation has not penetrated); as it is subject not only to *mutations*, but even to absolute *inversion* from custom, education, animal propensities and other influences; as it has proved to be the inevitable parent of a Guilty Conscience, and through it the Author of all the False Religions in the world,[1] with their infinite variety of debasing superstitions and foul abominations, vicious religious duties or practices, human sacrifices, self macerations and immolations, and innumerable other evils rendering Society on many occasions almost a Hell upon Earth, and which in dark ages no history remains to record, the extent of which therefore is known only to God; as the Human Intellect, crushed down and subjugated by this antagonistic Moral Sense, and its inevitable results, never became emancipated till its acquaintance with, and belief in, the doctrines of a Book which (whether true or false) being so known and believed, delivers man from the condemnation arising out of a Guilty Conscience originating in his Moral Sense; as this Intellect, thus enfranchised, has proved itself almost divine, in the majesty of its powers, and in the wonders of its achievements, and both *has* elevated the human race, and continues progressively to do so, to a degree to which there appears no assignable limits, ennobling and conferring both power and dignity upon mankind, it is sufficiently evident, not only that this Moral Faculty is no advantage whatever to man, but on the contrary that it is utterly ruinous to him, and is the chief curse under which he has always laboured; the natural light of his Moral Sense is not only darkness itself, but even worse; he knows nothing correctly or distinctly by

[1] The heathen mythology of the classic nations was nothing else than the offspring of a debased or inverted Moral nature, a condemning conscience, and a refined taste and poetical imagination co-operating together.

means of it respecting Right and Wrong, being on the contrary altogether deceived and misled by its decisions: but in its results it has robbed him of the bright light he would otherwise have derived from his Intellectual powers.—

And, therefore, to conclude this Part II:—

V. As the entire Universe is a wonderful display of the wisdom and the goodness of its Creator, no less than of His power: as the human animal is by far the most perfect in physical organization, and immeasurably pre-eminent in Intellectual power over the other inhabitants of the Globe: as this Moral Faculty, which constitutes the sole generic distinction between him and all other animals, is an incongruity in his nature, and the obvious cause of the *chief*, if not of *all* the evils under which he labours, the Deity never could have intended to *create him originally* with such an inherent principle of mischief and ruin in his natural constitution; and he must have acquired it in some manner and at some period subsequent to his creation, respecting which, however, we can form no conjecture, and of which (excluding Revelation) we have no information.

INTRODUCTION TO PART III.

THE Holy Scriptures comprise thirty-nine books of the Old Testament and twenty-seven of the New. On the question of the Authenticity and Inspiration of these sixty-six Books it is foreign to the object of this Essay to enter at all: it will be necessary here to assume both the one and the other; and we may further remark that, during many centuries, up to the present time, the Christian world has been unanimous in the belief that in these Scriptures is contained the only direct Revelation of God's Will to Mankind, and they have, therefore, been regarded as a class by themselves, and as differing *in toto* not merely in degree, but absolutely in kind from all other extant literary works. Of these books a very large portion is almost purely Historical, and in that portion, therefore, comparatively little that is strictly Doctrinal in Religion is to be met with. Entire chapters of Historical matter, with almost a total absence of what is expressly Doctrinal, occur; and when anything of that character does present itself, it is generally introduced either incidentally, or merely assumed or alluded to, as a recognized and admitted Truth at that period, but not dogmatically stated. Another very considerable portion of the Scriptures is Prophetical, in which, also, though exceedingly valuable, Doctrinal passages are only here and there to be found, and though that most important of all Revealed Truths, Redemption by an Atonement, is explicitly stated, yet such passages occupy but an inconsiderable fraction of the Prophetic Writings, and in their extent, as contradistinguished

from the importance of their subject matter, form but a very small section of that portion of Scripture in which they occur. Much the same may be said of David's Psalms, which are for the most part devotional, and of Solomon's two principal Books, which are proverbial: important doctrinal Truths presenting themselves here and there at intervals, in an unconnected position, as respects each other, with little or nothing of a systematic arrangement or character about them. In the New Testament the case is somewhat different—Doctrinal Truth occupying a larger extent of it, and being introduced occasionally in a somewhat argumentative form, and with even a slight approximation to systematic arrangement, but with no such perfection or completeness of system as would characterise a Philosophical composition. For Divine Revelation is in this like the Material Creation: neither of them was designed by God to teach man Philosophy. In both one and the other, all such Truths as are important to his welfare are sufficiently prominent and palpably displayed: but the occult principles upon which both are constituted and repose, have been purposely hidden from him, the Deity having regarded it as subsidiary to His own glory to wrap them in concealment.[1] But He has submitted them to Mankind as objects for the human intellect to exercise itself upon and investigate, and has made it nothing less than an honour which even kings might covet to emulate, to unravel and develop them.

[1] The entire Creation and Revelation of God, who is Himself incomprehensible, partake in some considerable degree of the same quality with their great Author: in our examinations of each, whichever way we turn, or in whatever direction we prosecute our researches, we quickly arrive at obstacles insuperable to our further progress, and experience a depth which the human intellect cannot fathom: of these obstacles, and of that depth, it is the profoundest intellects which are most conscious, just as the longest line would furnish the most correct idea of an Ocean's depth which had no bottom. Thus as regards either the Deity Himself or His Works, it is the most powerful minds which are driven to conclude, with Elihu, 'touching the Almighty, we cannot find Him out.'

The names of Bacon and Newton and of others who have been most successful in the investigation and exhibition of Truth, will stand out prominently before the world through all time, when the great majority of Princes and Rulers have passed away from the recollection of Mankind.

Under these circumstances, then, we may expect, that if the Moral System developed and exhibited in Part I. exists in the Bible at all, it will not present itself in a very prominent form, but on the contrary, that it will only be discovered after diligent research and a close investigation: that in prosecuting this enquiry we must hope for nothing more than to pick out one link here and another there, and by putting them together in their proper places to form that chain of reasoning constituting the System which unfolds itself and extorts the assent of our unassisted Mental powers in Part I. Further we may anticipate, that the more important Truths, *e.g.*, the Fall of Man, and consequently his utterly lost and ruined condition on the one hand, and his Restoration by an Atonement on the other, will be presented to us more prominently and distinctly, and with a far larger amount of information than will be accorded to Doctrines of less significance; that these grand Cardinal Truths, upon which the Salvation of Mankind hinges, will be set before us accompanied with a degree of light and knowledge on the subject far exceeding that which is attainable by our unassisted Moral and Intellectual Faculties; and that with respect to the less essential Doctrines, which, however, are necessary as connecting links in our chain of Reasoning, we must be satisfied if we can meet with them definitely and distinctly stated even in only one or two texts of the Inspired Writings.

PART III.

THE REVEALED SYSTEM.

AN EXAMINATION OF SCRIPTURE TO ASCERTAIN HOW FAR IT ACCORDS WITH OR THROWS LIGHT ON THE THEORY CONTAINED IN PART I., AND THE FACTS EXEMPLIFYING THAT THEORY IN PART II.[1]

(1) GOD is eternal and *infinite* in His nature and essence.

1st. *Eternal.* 'The King eternal,' 1 Tim. i. 17. 'The everlasting God,' Gen. xxi. 33; Isa. xl. 28; Rom. xvi. 26. 'From everlasting to everlasting Thou art God,' Ps. xc. 2; Ps. cii. 27.

2ndly. *Infinite.* 'Do not I fill heaven and earth, saith the Lord,' Jer. xxiii. 24. 'Behold the heaven and heaven of heavens cannot contain Thee,' 1 Kings viii. 27. 'Whither shall I go from Thy spirit? or whither shall I flee from Thy presence? If I ascend up into heaven, Thou art there; if I make my bed in hell, behold Thou art there. If I take the wings of the morning, and dwell in the uttermost parts of the sea; even there shall Thy hand lead me, and Thy right hand shall hold me,' Ps. cxxxix. 7–10.

[1] In the Revealed System, much knowledge is supplied by Scripture, which is wanting in the Moral System: thus there is considerable difficulty in effecting an accurate correspondence between the two, for it becomes indispensable to introduce additional Truths between the links of the Revealed System, which to some extent break their correspondence, and throw them out of their relative position to those of the Moral System.

(2) God is also immutable. 'I am the Lord, I change not,' Mal. iii. 6. 'With Him is no variableness, neither shadow of turning,' Jas. i. 17. 'He is not a man that He should repent,' 1 Sam. xv. 29.

(3) God's attributes or qualities are like His nature, infinite.

1st. Infinite in *power*. 'I am the Almighty God,' Gen. xvii. 1 ; and Job says, 'I know Thou *canst do everything*,' Job xlii. 2 ; and Christ, 'With God all things are possible,' Matt. xix. 26.

2ndly. Infinite in *wisdom*. 'His understanding is infinite,' Ps. cxlvii. 5. 'Him which is perfect in knowledge,' Job xxxvii. 16. 'The only wise God,' 1 Tim. i. 17 ; *i.e.*, the source in which all wisdom resides, and from which alone it emanates.

3rdly. And so of other attributes.

(4) God's Moral excellence or holiness is infinite. 'For there is none holy as the Lord,' 1 Sam. ii. 2 ; *i.e.*, the holiness of no finite being can compare with God's holiness. 'Glorious in holiness,' Ex. xv. 11. 'Your Father which is in heaven is perfect,' Matt. v. 48. God is everywhere by way of distinction styled 'The Holy One.' The four Beasts in heaven rest not day or night saying, 'Holy, Holy, Holy Lord God Almighty,' Rev. iv. 8, as though holiness was that quality which was pre-eminent in, and which exclusively appertained to, the Deity.

The several particular branches of this general attribute 'holiness' are infinite, viz. :—

1st. Love.[1] 'To know the love of Christ which passeth knowledge,' Eph. iii. 19.

2ndly. Mercy. 'His mercy endureth for ever,' Ps. cxxxvi. ; and so of other branches.

[1] The Love of God is an attribute proper and peculiar to Him, not only in degree, but altogether so, in its nature or kind, for it is

None of these texts declare absolutely that God's holiness is infinite, but as Scripture states that His essence and other attributes are so, and His holiness is that attribute which is pre-eminent in Him, it is quite inconceivable that His holiness, in its degree or intensity, should come short of the other attributes of His nature, to say nothing of the impossibility of conceiving a finite attribute in an infinite Being.

(5) This infinite holiness of God is the standard or measure of all moral qualities, so that whatever does not come up to it is condemned as sinful by it; nor is any degradation or reduction of this standard to meet the capacities of finite created beings admitted in Scripture; for,

1st. It is to this very holiness of God, and to no inferior degree of it, that man is urged. 'Be ye therefore perfect, even as your Father which is in heaven is perfect,' Matt. v. 48. 'Be ye holy, for I am holy,' Lev. xix. 2; 1 Pet. i. 16.

2ndly. It is this very holiness of God, and no inferior kind, which is by faith to be redeemed man's clothing and his title to glory, his own finite inherent holiness being repudiated as filthy rags, as, indeed, all finite moral excellence must when

entirely distinct from what is called Love in Man. Love in Man is, 1st, either that of the sexes, which is always more or less accompanied with animal appetite, or at least, ultimately merges into it; thus it is a natural instinct, proper to *perfect*, but wanting in *defective* manhood, for a Eunuch is incapable of it.—2ndly. The love of woman towards her offspring, also a natural instinct, common to her and the animal creation, and partially developed in the male sex also.—3rdly. Love towards each other, or friendship, implying suitableness in the object beloved, which love partakes more or less of sympathy.—4thly. Love towards a benefactor, which partakes principally of gratitude.—Now the love of God is totally distinct in kind from all these, and is therefore a separate branch of His Moral nature proper to Himself.—The love of a Christian towards his fellow-men, is in some slight degree an approximation to it, and partakes of its nature, for it is not spontaneous in the natural man, but is a supernatural work, generated in his heart by the Holy Spirit, and cultivated by the individual towards all his fellow-men, worthy or unworthy, out of a sense of duty to God.

brought to an infinite standard. Isaiah says, 'All our righteousness is as filthy rags,' Isa. lxiv. 6; and Paul, 'I do count them but dung that I may win Christ, and be found in Him, not having mine own righteousness, which is of the Law,[1] but that which is through the faith of Christ, the righteousness which is of God by faith,' Phil. iii. 8, 9.

3rdly. The want of this infinite holiness it is for which God 'charged His angels with *folly*' (which is synonymous in Scripture with sin), 'and put no trust in His servants,' Job iv. 18. *Spiritual servants* of another *world*, as they are put in apposition to them that dwell in houses of clay (verse 19), or mortal men; similarly, 'Behold He putteth no trust in His saints, yea, the heavens are not clean in His sight,' Job xv. 15. How it is that these angels and ministering spirits (Heb. i. 14) are not condemned will appear subsequently. In this Section 5, it is evidenced beyond a doubt that in Scripture all partial or finite holiness is regarded as sinfulness.

(6) A *Moral Sense*, or faculty of taking cognizance of moral qualities, *i.e.*, of distinguishing between Right and Wrong, which Right and Wrong has direct reference to the only standard (God's holiness), and a *Moral Obligation* are inseparable: 'Therefore to *him that* knoweth to do good' (καλόν, right), 'and doeth it not, to him it is sin,' Jas. iv. 17. [7.]

(7) A Moral Sense or faculty for taking cognizance of Moral qualities (as distinguished from his Intellectual powers) was never intended for Man; for,

1st. Though Adam by creation possessed an Intellect of the highest order (for 'he gave names to

[1] Law, that *partial revelation* of the *infinite law* (which Law is the counterpart of God's holiness) which God gave, 1st to Adam after the Fall, and 2ndly to the Jewish nation, from Mount Sinai, after it had become lost to the world through the wickedness of mankind at large, of which more hereafter.

every living creature,' thereby establishing a claim to be the greatest of Naturalists), yet he was created without *any*, the slightest trace of a Moral Faculty, or knowledge of Right and Wrong: Adam and Eve in Paradise 'were both naked, the man and his wife, and were not ashamed,' Gen. ii. 25. Like every other animal in the creation, among which they dwelt, they were totally devoid of any, the slightest trace of shame at perfect nakedness. See Part II. (III.)

2ndly. *Though* in the Paradise in which they dwelt there grew a tree (the Tree of the Knowledge of Good and Evil) the fruit of which possessed the miraculous power of conferring on those partaking of it a Moral Sense, yet Adam was expressly ordered by God *on no account whatever to eat of it*, as *it would inevitably and immediately introduce death* (what that death was will be seen subsequently) into his constitution: 'Of every tree in the Garden thou mayest freely eat, but of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil' (Right and Wrong: see Septgt. Καλὸν καὶ Πονηρόν) 'thou shalt not eat of it: for in the day that thou eatest thereof, thou shalt surely die,' Gen. ii. 16, 17.

Adam and Eve, therefore, were never intended to possess a Moral Sense, for

1st. They were by creation as insensible to shame at nakedness as any other living animal. Part II. (III.)

2ndly. Adam was especially cautioned by God against the fearful consequences which would accompany the acquisition of such a faculty.

[*Plura desunt.*]

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